H.Doc.105-11 DEVELOPMENTS CONCERNING THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY WITH RESPECT TO IRAN ...

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105th Congress, 1st Session - - - - - - - - - - -  House Document 105-10


 
CONTINUATION OF THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY WITH RESPECT TO WEAPONS OF MASS 
                              DESTRUCTION

                               __________

                             COMMUNICATION

                                  from

                   THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

                              transmitting

     NOTIFICATION THAT THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY WITH RESPECT TO THE 
 PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS (``WEAPONS 
OF MASS DESTRUCTION''--(WMD)) AND THE MEANS OF DELIVERING SUCH WEAPONS 
  IS TO CONTINUE IN EFFECT BEYOND NOVEMBER 14, 1996--RECEIVED IN THE 
 UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NOVEMBER 12, 1996, PURSUANT TO 
                           50 U.S.C. 1622(d)

<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>


January 7, 1997.--Referred to the Committee on International Relations 
                       and ordered to be printed


                                           The White House,
                                     Washington, November 12, 1996.
Hon. Newt Gingrich,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Speaker: On November 14, 1994, in light of the 
dangers of the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and 
chemical weapons (``weapons of mass destruction''--(WMD)) and 
of the means of delivery such weapons, I issued Executive Order 
12938, and declared a national emergency under the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et 
seq.). Under section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 
U.S.C. 1622(d)), the national emergency terminates on the 
anniversary date of its declaration, unless I publish in the 
Federal Register and transmit to the Congress a notice of its 
continuation.
    The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction continues 
to pose an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national 
security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States. 
Therefore, I am hereby advising the Congress that the national 
emergency declared on November 14, 1994, and extended on 
November 14, 1995, must continue in effect beyond November 14, 
1996. Accordingly, I have extended the national emergency 
declared in Executive Order 12938 and have sent the attached 
notice of extension to the Federal Register for publication.
    The following report is made pursuant to section 204 of the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703) 
and section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 
1641(c)), regarding activities taken and money spent pursuant 
to the emergency declaration. Additional information on 
nuclear, missile, and/or chemical and biological weapons (CBW) 
nonproliferation efforts is contained in the most recent annual 
Report on the Proliferation of Missiles and Essential 
Components of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons, 
provided to the Congress pursuant to section 1097 of the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 
1993 (Public Law 102-190), also known as the ``Nonproliferation 
Report,'' and the most recent annual report provided to the 
Congress pursuant to section 308 of the Chemical and biological 
Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (Public Law 
102-182).
    During the last 6 months, the three export control 
regulations issued under the Enhanced Proliferation Control 
Initiative (EPCI) remained fully in force and continue to be 
applied in order to control the export of items with potential 
use in chemical or biological weapons or unmanned delivery 
systems for weapons of mass destruction.
    The threat of chemical weapons is one of the most pressing 
security challenges of the post-Cold War era. With bipartisan 
support from the Congress, the United States has long been a 
leader in the international fight against the spread of 
chemical weapons. Democrats and Republicans have worked hard 
together to strengthen our security by concluding the 
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, 
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their 
Destruction (the Chemical Weapons Convention or CWC).
    The CWC bans an entire class of weapons of mass 
destruction. It is both an arms control and a nonproliferation 
treaty that requires total elimination of chemical weapons 
stocks, prohibits chemical weapons-related activities, bans 
assistance for such activities and bars trade with non-Parties 
in certain relevant chemicals. This treaty denies us no option 
we would otherwise wish to exercise and is a critical 
instrument in our global fight against the spread of chemical 
weapons.
    The CWC provides concrete measures that will raise the 
costs and risks of engaging in chemical weapons-related 
activities. The CWC's declaration and inspection requirements 
will improve our knowledge of possible chemical weapons 
activities, whether conducted by countries or terrorists. The 
treaty's provisions constitute the most comprehensive and 
intrusive verification regime ever negotiated, covering 
virtually every aspect of a chemical weapons program, from 
development through production and stockpiling. These 
provisions provide for access to declared and undeclared 
facilities and locations, thus making clandestine chemical 
weapons production and stockpiling more difficult, more risky 
and more expensive.
    Countries that refuse to join the CWC will be politically 
isolated and banned from trading with States Parties in certain 
key chemicals. Indeed, major chemical industry groups have 
testified before the Senate that our companies stand to lose 
millions of dollars in international sales if the United States 
is not a State Party when the treaty enters into force.
    That could happen if we fail to ratify the CWC promptly. It 
is nearly four years since the Bush Administration signed the 
Convention and three years since this Administration submitted 
the CWC to the Senate for its advice and consent. All our major 
NATO allies have deposited their instruments of ratification, 
as have all other G-7 members. The CWC will enter into force 
180 days after it has been ratified by 65 countries. By mid-
October 1996, 64 of the 160 signatory countries had done so. It 
therefore seems likely the CWC will enter into force as early 
as April 1997.
    Further delay in securing U.S. ratification of this vital 
treaty serves only the interests of proliferators and 
terrorists. Delay may well also endanger the international 
competitiveness of the chemical industry, one of our largest 
exporters. In the interim, pressures are increasing in unstable 
regions to acquire and use chemical weapons. We need to ratify 
this convention urgently to strengthen our own security, affirm 
our leadership in nonproliferation and to protect our chemical 
industry. Ratification must be a top priority of the new 
Congress in early 1997.
    During the reporting period, the United States continued to 
be active in the work of the CWC Preparatory Commission 
(PrepCom) in The Hague. The Prepcom is developing the vital 
technical and administrative procedures for implementation of 
the CWC through a strong organization to ensure compliance when 
the convention enters into force.
    The United States is working hard with the international 
community to end the threat from another terrible category of 
weapons of mass destruction--biological weapons. We are an 
active member of the Ad Hoc Group striving to create a legally 
binding instrument to strengthen the effectiveness and improve 
the implementation of the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction (The 
Biological Weapons Convention or BWC). The Ad Hoc Group was 
mandated by the September 1994 BWC Special Conference. The 
Group held meetings in July and September with the goal of 
preparing for the late November 1996 Fourth BWC Review 
Conference. Concluding a new BWC protocol is high on our list 
of nonproliferation goals. We should aim to complete such a 
protocol by 1998.
    The United States continues to be a leader in the Australia 
Group (AG) chemical and biological weapons nonproliferation 
regime. The United States supported the entry of the Republic 
of Korea (South Korea)--a country with an important chemical 
industry--into the AG. The ROK became the group's 30th member 
in late Sepgember--a tribute to the continuing international 
recognition of the importance of the Group's effort in 
nonproliferation and to the commitment of the ROK to that goal.
    The United States attended the AG's annual plenary session 
from October 14-17, 1996, during which the Group continued to 
focus on strengthening AG export controls and sharing 
information to address the threat of CBW terrorism. At the 
behest of the United States, the AG first began in-depth 
discussion of terrorism during the 1995 plenary session 
following the Tokyo subway nerve gas attack earlier that year.
    The Group also reaffirmed the members' collective belief 
that full adherence to the CWC and the BWC will be the best way 
to achieve permanent global elimination of CBW, and that all 
states adhering to these Conventions have an obligation to 
ensure that their national activities support this goal.
    Australia Group participants continue to ensure that all 
relevant national measures promote the object and purposes of 
the BWC, and CWC, and will be fully consistent with the CWC 
upon its entry into force. The AG believes that national export 
licensing policies on chemical weapons-related items fulfill 
the obligation established under Article I of the CWC that 
States Parties never assist, in any way, the acquisition of 
chemical weapons. Inasmuch as these measures are focused solely 
on preventing activities banned under the CWC, they are 
consistent with the undertaking in Article XI of the CWC to 
facilitate the fullest possible exchange of chemical materials 
and related information for purposes not prohibited by the CWC.
    The AG also agreed to continue its active program of 
briefings for non-AG countries, and to promote regional 
consultations on export controls and nonproliferation to 
further awareness and understanding of national policies in 
these areas.
    During the last year, the United States imposed chemical 
weapons proliferation sanctions on one individual. On November 
17, 1995, sanctions were imposed under the Chemical and 
Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 
on Russian citizen Anatoliy Kuntsevich for knowingly providing 
material assistance to a foreign chemical weapons program.
    The United States carefully controlled exports that could 
contribute to unmanned delivery systems for weapons of mass 
destruction, exercising restraint in considering all such 
proposed transfers consistent with the Guyidelines of the 
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR). In May 1996, the 
United States imposed missile technology proliferation 
sanctions against two entities in Iran and one entity in North 
Korea for transfers involving Category II MTCR Annex items.
    MTCR Partners continued to share information about 
proliferation problems with each other and with other potential 
supplier, consumer, and transshipment states. Partners also 
emphasized the need for implementing effective export control 
systems. This cooperation has resulted in the interdiction of 
missile-related materials intended for use in missile programs 
of concern.
    The United States worked unilaterally and in coordination 
with its MTCR Partners to combat missile proliferation and to 
encourage non-members to export responsibly and to adhere to 
the MTCR Guidelines. Since my last report, we have continued 
our missile nonproliferation dialogue with the Republic of 
Korea and Ukraine. In the course of normal diplomatic 
relations, we also have pursued such discussions with other 
countries in Central Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.
    In June 1996, the United States was an active participant 
in discussions at the MTCR's Reinforced Point of Contact 
Meeting on Regional Missile Proliferation Issues. This meeting 
resulted in an in-depth discussion of regional missile 
proliferation concerns and actions the Partners could take, 
individually and collectively, to address the specific concerns 
raised by missile proliferation in regions of tension.
    In July 1996, the MTCR held a Seminar on Transshipment 
Issues. The Seminar was held in Washington and hosted by the 
United States on behalf of the Regime. It brought together 
foreign policy makers and experts from twelve MTCR Partner 
countries and seven non-MTCR countries for the first joint 
discussion of ways to address the proliferation threat posed by 
transshipment. The seminar was successful in focusing attention 
on the transshipment problem and fostered a productive exchange 
of ideas on how to impede proliferators' misuse of 
transshipment. Seminar participants also identified several 
areas for possible follow-up, which the United States pursued 
at the 1996 Edinburgh MTCR Plenary.
    The MTCR held its Eleventh Plenary Meeting at Edinburgh, 
Scotland, October 7-11. At the Plenary, the MTCR Partners 
reaffirmed their commitment to controlling exports to prevent 
proliferation of delivery systems for weapons of mass 
destruction. They also reiterated their readiness for 
international cooperation in peaceful space activities that 
could not contribute to WMD delivery systems.
    The MTCR Partners also were supportive of U.S. initiatives 
to follow up on the success of the June 1996 Reinforced Point 
of Contact Meeting on the regional aspects of missile 
proliferation and the July 1996 Seminar on transshipment 
issues. The Partners undertook to be proactive in encouraging 
key non-Partner transshippers to adhere to the MTCR Guidelines 
and Annex, and in providing them with practical assistance in 
implementing transshipment controls on missile technology. The 
Partners also agreed on steps they could take to enhance the 
MTCR's effectiveness in impeding missile proliferation in South 
Asia and the Persian Gulf. Finally, the MTCR Partners agreed to 
increase the transparency of Regime aims and activities, and to 
continue their efforts to develop a dialogue with countries 
outside the Regime to encourage voluntary adherence to the MTCR 
Guidelines and heightened awareness of missile proliferation 
risks.
    We also continued vigorous pursuit of our nuclear 
nonproliferation goals. In May 1995, Parties to the Treaty on 
the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) agreed at the 
NPT Review and Extension Conference to extend the NPT 
indefinitely and without conditions. Since the conference, more 
nations have acceded to the treaty. There now are more than 180 
parties, making the NPT nearly universal.
    In a truly historic landmark in our efforts to curb the 
spread of nuclear weapons, the 50th UN General Assembly on 
September 10, 1996, adopted and called for signature of the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiated over 
the past two and a half years in the Conference on Disarmament 
in Geneva. The overwhelming passage of this UN resolution (158-
3-5) demonstrates the CTBT's strong international support and 
marks a major success for United States foreign policy. On 
September 24, I and other national leaders signed the CTBT in 
New York.
    The United States played a leading role in promoting the 
negotiation of this agreement by declaring a moratorium on 
nuclear testing in 1992 and calling on all the other declared 
nuclear weapons states to enact their own moratoria, and by 
announcing in August of 1995 our support for a complete ban on 
all tests no matter how small their nuclear yield--a so-called 
``zero-yield'' CTBT. The United States also insisted on an 
effective verification regime to ensure that the treaty 
enhances rather than reduces the security of its adherents.
    The CTBT will serve several United States national security 
interests in banning all nuclear explosions. It will constrain 
the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons; 
end the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons; 

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