H.Doc.105-203 CERTIFICATION RELATING TO THE CONVENTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS ...

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105th Congress, 2d Session  - - - - - - - - - - House Document 105-202


 
       IRAQ'S COMPLIANCE WITH U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS

                               __________

                             COMMUNICATION

                                  FROM

                   THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

                              Transmitting

A REPORT ON THE STATUS OF EFFORTS TO OBTAIN IRAQ'S COMPLIANCE WITH THE 
 RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL, PURSUANT TO PUB. L. 
                      102-1, SEC. 3 (105 STAT. 4)


<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>


February 3, 1998.--Referred to the Committee on International Relations 
                       and ordered to be printed


                                           The White House,
                                     Washington, November 26, 1997.
Hon. Newt Gingrich,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Speaker: Consistent with the Authorization for Use 
of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1) 
and as part of my effort to keep the Congress fully informed, I 
am reporting on the status of efforts to obtain Iraq's 
compliance with the resolutions adopted by the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC). This report covers the period from 
September 23 to the present.
    Since my last report, the Government of Iraq attempted to 
defy the international community by unilaterally imposing 
unacceptable conditions on the operations of the U.N. Special 
Commission (UNSCOM). On October 29, the Iraqi government 
announced its intention to expel all U.S. personnel working in 
Iraq for UNSCOM. Iraq's aim appears to have been to establish 
an environment under which it could restore its capacity to 
develop weapons of mass destruction without restriction. For 3 
weeks, the Government of Iraq refused to allow American UNSCOM 
personnel to enter the country or to participate in site 
inspections, expelled UNSCOM personnel who are U.S. citizens, 
threatened the safety of the U.S. Air Force U-2 aircraft that 
flies missions for UNSCOM, tampered with UNSCOM monitoring 
equipment, removed UNSCOM cameras, moved and concealed 
significant pieces of dual-use equipment, and imposed 
additional unacceptable conditions on continued operations of 
UNSCOM. Two confrontational actions were undertaken in an 
atmosphere of strident, threatening Iraqi rhetoric, the 
dispersal of Iraqi armed forces as if in preparation for a 
military conflict, and the placement of innocent civilian 
``human shields'' at military sites and at many of Saddam 
Hussein's palaces in violation of international norms of 
conduct.
    On November 20, having obtained no agreement from the U.N. 
or the United States to alter UNSCOM or the sanctions regime--
indeed, having obtained none of its stated objectives--the 
Iraqi government announced that it would allow UNSCOM 
inspectors who are U.S. citizens to return to their duties. 
This encouraging development, however, will be ultimately 
tested by Saddam Hussein's actions, not his words. It remains 
to be seen whether the Government of Iraq will now live up to 
its obligations under all applicable UNSC resolutions, 
including its commitment to allow UNSCOM to perform its work 
unhindered.
    As expressed unanimously by the five permanent members (P-
5) of the Security Council meeting in Geneva November 20, the 
will of the entire international community is for the 
unconditional decision of Iraq to allow the return of UNSCOM 
inspectors to Iraq in their previous composition. I must note 
that the United States was not briefed on, did not endorse, and 
is not bound by anything other than the terms of the P-5 
statement. Neither the United States nor the U.N. are bound by 
any bilateral agreement between Russia and Iraq. We will 
carefully monitor events and will continue to be prepared for 
any contingency.
    Iraq's challenge was issued, in part, in response to U.N. 
Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1134, of October 23, in 
which the Security Council condemned Iraq's flagrant violations 
of relevant Security Council resolutions and expressed its firm 
intention to impose travel restrictions on the Iraqi leadership 
if the long-standing pattern of obstruction and harassment of 
UNSCOM personnel continued. In the debate of UNSCR 1134, not 
one nation on the Security Council questioned the need to 
continue sanctions. The only serious debate was over when and 
how to impose additional sanctions. UNSCR 1134 was based on the 
UNSCOM and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 6-
month reports to the UNSC that indicated that the Government of 
Iraq has not provided the ``substantial compliance'' called for 
in UNSCR 1115 of June 21, 1997--especially regarding immediate, 
unconditional and unrestricted access to facilities for 
inspection and to officials for interviews.
    On November 12 the resolve of the international community 
was further demonstrated when the Security Council voted 
unanimously to adopt UNSCR 1137--the first new sanctions 
against Iraq since the Gulf War--condemning Iraq's continued 
violations of its obligations and imposing restrictions on the 
travel of all Iraqi officials and armed forces members 
responsible for or participating in noncompliance. The UNSC in 
a Presidential Statement condemned Iraq again upon the actual 
expulsion of the American UNSCOM personnel. The UNSC's 
solidarity was reflected as well in the UNSCOM Executive 
Chairman's and IAEA Director's decisions that all UNSCOM and 
IAEA personnel should depart Iraq rather than accede to the 
Iraqi demand that no American participate in inspection 
activities.
    As a demonstration of our firm resolve to support the U.N., 
I directed the deployment of the USS GEORGE WASHINGTON, escort 
ships, and additional combat aircraft to the region. In this 
regard we take note of and welcome House Resolution 322 
expressing the sense of the House that the United States should 
act to resolve the crisis in a manner that assures full Iraqi 
compliance with UNSC resolutions regarding the destruction of 
Iraq's capability to produce and deliver weapons of mass 
destruction. While the addition of these forces gives us a wide 
range of military options, should they be necessary, we remain 
firmly committed to finding a diplomatic solution.
    The ongoing crisis is only one chapter in the long history 
of efforts by the Iraqi regime to flout its obligations under 
UNSC resolutions. Iraq has persistently failed to disclose 
fully its programs for weapons of mass destruction. It admits 
to moving significant pieces of dual-use equipment subject to 
monitoring. Without full disclosure, UNSCOM and the IAEA cannot 
effectively conduct the ongoing monitoring and verification 
mandated by UNSCR's 687, 707, 715, and other relevant 
resolutions.
    Iraqi biological and chemical weapons are currently the 
most troubling issues for UNSCOM. This is due to the innate 
dual-use nature of the technology--how easily it can be hidden 
within civilian industries such as, for biological agents--the 
pharmaceutical industry, and for chemical agents--the pesticide 
industry. In both cases, Iraq continues to prevent full and 
immediate access to sites suspected of chemical or biological 
warfare activities. Until 2 months ago, for example, major 
aspects of Iraq's pernicious ``VX'' program (a powerful nerve 
agent) were unknown to UNSCOM due to Iraqi concealment. UNSCOM 
is still unable to verify that all of Iraq's SCUD missile 
warheads filled with biological agents--anthrax and botulinum 
toxin--have been destroyed. When UNSCOM says it is making 
``significant progress'' in these areas, it is referring to 
UNSCOM's progress in ferreting out Iraqi deception, not Iraqi 
progress in cooperating with UNSCOM.
    The Iraqi regime contends that UNSCOM and the IAEA should 
``close the books'' on nuclear and missile inspections. But 
there are still many uncertainties and questions that need to 
be resolved. Among the many problems, Iraq has:
          failed to answer critical questions on nuclear 
        weapons design and fabrication, procurement, and 
        centrifuge enrichment;
          failed to detail how far the theoretical and 
        practical aspects of its clandestine nuclear efforts 
        progressed;
          failed to explain in full the interaction between its 
        nuclear warhead and missile design programs;
          failed to provide a written description of its post-
        war nuclear weapons procurement program;
          failed to account for major engine components, 
        special warheads, missing propellants, and guidance 
        instruments that could be used to assemble fully 
        operational missiles; and
          failed to discuss--on the direct orders of Tariq 
        Aziz--its actions to retain missile launchers.
    In accordance with relevant UNSCR's, UNSCOM must continue 
to investigate the Iraqi nuclear and missile programs until it 
can verify with absolute certainty that all the equipment has 
been destroyed and that all the capabilities have been 
eliminated. Otherwise, Iraq will be able to strike at any city 
in the Middle East, delivering devastating biological, 
chemical, and even nuclear weapons.
    UNSCOM's work must include vigorous efforts to unveil 
Iraq's ``Concealment Mechanism.'' Led by elements of its 
special security services, Iraq has for over 6-years engaged in 
a massive and elaborate campaign to keep UNSCOM inspectors from 
finding proscribed equipment, documents, and possibly weapons 
themselves. Over the years, inspection teams have been 
prevented from doing their jobs and held--often at gunpoint--
outside suspect facilities, providing enough time for evidence 
to be hidden or destroyed. To rout out Iraq's remaining weapons 
of mass destruction, UNSCOM must be granted full access to all 
sites, without exception.
    The Iraqi regime contends that it has been forced to defy 
the international community in this manner out of concern for 
the well-being of the Iraqi people, claiming that malnutrition 
and inadequate medical care are the direct result of 
internationally imposed sanctions. To the contrary, the deep 
concern of the United States and the international community 
about the condition of the Iraqi people is evident in the fact 
that the international sanctions against Iraq have been 
carefully structured to help ensure that ordinary Iraqs need 
not suffer. Since their inception, the sanctions against Iraq 
have had exceptions for the importation into Iraq of foods and 
medicines. In August 1991, when Iraq claimed that it was unable 
to pay for its food needs, the Security Council adopted UNSCR 
706 (and later 712), authorizing Iraq to sell limited amounts 
of petroleum on the international market, with the proceeds to 
be used to purchase humanitarian supplies, and to fund vital 
U.N. activities regarding Iraq. The Government of Iraq, 
however, ignored the needs of its own people, by refusing to 
accept UNSCR's 706 and 712.
    In April 1995 the Security Council proposed a new oil-for-
food offer to Iraq in UNSCR 986, sponsored by the United States 
and others. UNSCR 986 authorized the sale of up to $1 billion 
of oil every 90 days for Iraq to purchase food, medicines, and 
other ``humanitarian items'' for its people. The Government of 
Iraq delayed implementation of UNSCR 986 for a year and a half, 
until December 1996.
    Since December 1996, the Iraqi regime has continued to 
obstruct the relief plan. It has reduced the food ration for 
each person, even as more food was flowing into the country. In 
fact, there are credible reports that as food imports under 
UNSCR 986 increased, the regime reduced its regular food 
purchases, potentially freeing up money for other purposes. 
There are also reports that Iraq may have stockpiled food in 
warehouses for use by the military and regime supporters--even 
though the Iraqi people need the food now. Under UNSCR 1111--
the 6-month renewal of UNSCR 986 passed in June 1997--the 
regime delayed oil sales for 2 months, even while it claimed 
its people were starving. In Baghdad, the regime staged 
threatening demonstrations against U.N. relief offices. Under 
both UNSCR's 986 and 1111, the U.N. Sanctions Committee has had 
to carefully consider each and every import contract because of 
the possibility that Iraq may slip orders for dual-use items 
that can be employed to make weapons into long lists of 
humanitarian goods.
    Since 1990--even at the height of the Gulf War--the 
consistent position of the United States has been that this 
dispute is with Iraq's regime, not with its people. We have 
always been open to suggestions on how UNSCR's 986 and 1111 can 
be improved or expanded to better serve the needs of the 
people. The confrontational tactics of the Iraqi government 
have not altered this position.
    Sanctions against Iraq were imposed as the result of Iraq's 
invasion of Kuwait. It has been necessary to sustain them 
because of Iraq's failure to comply with relevant UNSC 
resolutions, including those to ensure that Saddam Hussein is 
not allowed to resume the unrestricted development and 
production of weapons of mass destruction. Prior to the Gulf 
War, Saddam had already used chemical weapons on the Iraqi 
people and on Iranian troops, and he threatened to use them on 
coalition forces and innocent civilians in Saudi Arabia and 
Israel during the Gulf War. By restricting the amount of oil he 
can sell to a level that provides for the needs of the Iraqi 
people but does not allow him to pursue other, nonhumanitarian 
objectives, international sanctions make it virtually 
impossible for Saddam to gear up his weapons programs to full 
strength.
    Saddam could end the suffering of his people tomorrow if he 
would cease his obstruction of the oil-for-food program and 
allow it to be implemented properly. He could end sanctions 
entirely if he would demonstrate peaceful intentions by 
complying fully with relevant UNSC resolutions. The United 
States has supported and will continue to support the sanctions 
against the Iraqi regime until such time as compliance is 
achieved.
    Saddam Hussein remains a threat to his people, to the 
region, and to the world, and the United States remains 
determined to contain the threat posed by his regime. The 
United States looks forward to the day when Iraq rejoins the 
family of nations as a responsible and law-abiding member but 
until then, containment must continue.
    Regarding military operations, the United States and its 
coalition partners continue to enforce the no-fly zones over 
Iraq under Operation Northern Watch and Operation Southern 
Watch. We have detected myriad intentional Iraqi violations of 
both no-fly zones. While these incidents (Iraqi violations of 
the no-fly zones) started several hours after an Iranian air 
raid on terrorist bases inside Iraq, it was clear that Iraq's 
purpose was to try and test the coalition to see how far it 
could go in violating the ban on flights in these regions. A 
maximum effort by Operation Southern Watch forces complemented 
by early arrival in theater of the USS NIMITZ battle group, 
dramatically reduced violations in the southern no-fly zone. An 
increase in the number of support aircraft participating in 
Northern Watch allowed increased operating capacity that in 
turn significantly reduced the number of violations in the 
north. We have repeatedly made clear to the Government of Iraq 
and to all other relevant parties that the United States and 
its partners will continue to enforce both no-fly zones, and 
that we reserve the right to respond appropriately and 
decisively to any Iraqi provocations.
    United States force levels include land- and carrier-based 
aircraft, surface warships, a Marine amphibious task force, a 
Patriot missile battalion, a mechanized battalion task force, 
and a mix of special operations forces deployed in support of 
USCINCCENT operations. To enhance force protection throughout 
the region, additional military security personnel have been 
deployed for continuous rotation. USCINCCENT continues to 

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