H.Doc.107-105 THE CUMULATIVE REPORT ON RESCISSIONS AND DEFERRALS OF BUDGET AUTHORITY ...

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107th Congress, 1st Session - - - - - - - - - - House Document 107-103 


 
              IRAQ'S COMPLIANCE WITH UN SECURITY COUNCIL


                              RESOLUTIONS

                               __________

                             COMMUNICATION

                                  from

                   THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

                              transmitting

THE STATUS OF EFFORTS TO OBTAIN IRAQ'S COMPLIANCE WITH THE RESOLUTIONS 
             ADOPTED BY THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>


 July 19, 2001.--Referred to the Committee on International Relations 
                       and ordered to be printed
                               __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
89-011                     WASHINGTON : 2001

                                           The White House,
                                         Washington, July 13, 2001.
Hon. J. Dennis Hastert,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Speaker: Consistent with the Authorization for Use 
of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1) 
and as part of my effort to keep the Congress fully informed, I 
am reporting on the status of efforts to obtain Iraq's 
compliance with the resolutions adopted by the United Nations 
Security Council.
            Sincerely,
                                                    George W. Bush.
  Status of U.S. Efforts Regarding Iraq's Compliance With UN Security 
                          Council Resolutions

Overview
    As long as Saddam Hussein remains in power, he will 
continue to threaten the well-being of the Iraqi people, the 
peace of the region, and vital U.S. interests. We are 
conducting an Iraq policy review to determine the best means of 
advancing our interests. We are working to strengthen the 
international consensus on the need to change the international 
community's approach to Iraq. We are also considering how best 
to achieve our objective of helping Iraqis liberate themselves 
and how best to use the No-Fly Zones to ensure the safety of 
the Kurds and Iraq's neighbors.
    We will continue to counter the threats posed by Iraq, but, 
over the long term, the most effective and lasting way to end 
this threat is through a change of government in Baghdad. To 
this end, we support the Iraqi opposition as part of our 
program to support a transition in Iraq. We are committed to 
helping the opposition make progress in reestablishing its 
presence, developing its plans, beginning administrative and 
some program operations using U.S. funding, and beginning 
training under the Iraq Liberation Act (ILA).
    Iraq continues to reject United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) Resolution 1284, a binding resolution adopted under 
Chapter VII of the UN Charter, including its requirement that 
Iraq provide the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection 
Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) with immediate, unconditional and unrestricted access to 
Iraq. Nonetheless, the UN continues to implement those parts of 
the resolution which do not require Iraqi cooperation. In its 
quarterly report to the Council on May 24, 2001, UNMOVIC 
updated the UNSC on measures it is taking to prepare for 
inspections in Iraq, and indicated it ``is ready to take up the 
full tasks mandated to it by the Council.'' We consult 
regularly with Dr. Blix and his staff to provide the best 
support possible. In its semi-annual report to the UNSC on 
April 6, 2001, the IAEA indicated it is similarly prepared.
    Ambassador Yuli Vorontsov, the Secretary General's high-
level coordinator for Kuwait Issues, presented his semiannual 
report on stolen Kuwaiti property on June 20, 2001, and on 
April 20, 2001, he submitted his periodic report to the Council 
on Kuwaiti and third-country national prisoners. Both of these 
reports demonstrate Iraq's continuing failure to comply fully 
with its obligations under relevant UNSC Resolutions (UNSCRs). 
The Iraqi Government continues to deny Ambassador Vorontsov 
entry to the country.
    The oil-for-food program, which is designed to provide for 
the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people as long as UN 
sanctions remain in place, continues to expand. Iraq exported 
$17.8 billion worth of oil in 2000 with the proceeds going to 
an UN-controlled escrow account. On June 3, 2001, the Council 
extended the current phase of the program for an additional 30 
days and then passed a five-month extension on July 3.
U.S. and Coalition force levels in the Gulf region
    Saddam Hussein's record of aggressive behavior necessitates 
the deployment of a highly capable force in the region in order 
to deter Baghdad and respond to any threat it might pose to its 
neighbors, the reconstitution of its weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD), or movement against the Kurds in northern 
Iraq. We will continue to maintain a strong posture and have 
established a rapid reinforcement capability to supplement our 
forces in the Gulf, if needed. The United States Government is 
conducting an Iraq policy review on a number of these issues.
Operation NORTHERN WATCH and Operation SOUTHERN WATCH
    Aircraft of the United States and coalition partners 
patrolling the No-Fly Zones over Iraq under Operations NORTHERN 
WATCH and SOUTHERN WATCH are routinely tracked by Iraqi radar, 
fired upon daily by anti-aircraft artillery, and attacked by 
surface-to-air missiles. Our aircrews continue to respond in 
self-defense to threats against and attacks on our aircraft 
patrolling the No-Fly Zones in accordance with Central 
Command's well-established response options.
Maritime intercept operations
    The U.S.-led maritime Multinational Interception Force 
(MIF) continues to enforce UN sanctions in the Gulf. The United 
States continues to approach potential participants in the MIF 
to augment current partners. Canadian and British forces are 
currently operating with U.S. forces, and Australia plans to 
send a frigate and a maritime patrol aircraft in late summer. 
An Argentine boarding team completed its deployment in 
March.For the first time in years, however, the Dutch have declined to 
participate this year, citing fiscal priorities.
    In large part, member states of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) continue to support the MIF. The UAE still 
accepts the vast majority of vessels diverted for violating UN 
sanctions against Iraq, with Kuwait a distant second. A recent 
oil spill caused the UAE to exhibit some reluctance to accept 
diverted vessels. While that reluctance was overcome, it is 
unclear whether the UAE will continue to be as cooperative as 
in the past. Other GCC nations are even more hesitant to accept 
diverted vessels (Qatar has refused), but all provide support 
in some form to the enforcement of UNSCRs against Iraq.
    From March through May 2001, monthly totals of smuggled 
petroleum products through the Gulf averaged approximately 
double what they were in the previous three-month period, 
probably due to the use of larger smuggling vessels. Iran 
continues to deny use of its territorial waters to all but the 
largest of smuggling vessels from which significant fees can be 
obtained.
    The MIF, and our ability to rapidly augment it, will 
continue to serve as a critical deterrent to the smuggling of 
prohibited items and products into and out of Iraq. As our Iraq 
policy develops, we will need to assess whether MIF force 
levels are adequate.

UNMOVIC/IAEA: Weapons of mass destruction

    There have been no Council-mandated inspections in Iraq 
since December 15, 1998. Iraq's defiance of the international 
consensus, as expressed by UNSCR 1284, has meant that no 
progress has been made in addressing Iraq's outstanding 
disarmament obligations. Iraq remains in violation of its 
obligations to end its programs to develop weapons of mass 
destruction and long-range missiles.
    UNMOVIC has largely completed the hiring of its core staff 
in New York and is continuing to hire people in an on-call or 
``roster'' category, including Americans. UNMOVIC has completed 
four training courses and is planning to hold a fifth course in 
late 2001 or early 2002. The United States continues to provide 
UNMOVIC with course instructors and facilities for hands-on 
training. We consult with Dr. Blix and his staff regularly to 
provide the best support possible. On May 24, 2001, UNMOVIC 
updated UNSC on measures it is taking to prepare for 
inspections in Iraq. IAEA similarly updated the UNSC on April 
6, 2001.

Dual-Use imports

    Although the ``oil-for-food'' program revenues are 
designated for humanitarian purposes only, we remain concerned 
that Iraq is abusing this program in an attempt to acquire 
goods and materials for its weapons programs. The United 
States, as a member of the UN Iraq Sanctions Committee, reviews 
all contracts under the ``oil-for-food'' program (unless the 
items are on a list pre-approved for expedited humanitarian 
export) to ensure that items that are explicitly prohibited or 
are ``dual-use,'' which pose a significant risk of diversion to 
prohibited uses, are not allowed to be imported. For instance, 
under the rubric of importing goods for humanitarian need, Iraq 
has been able to upgrade its communication infrastructure, 
which has benefited its military's command and control. We are 
continuing work aimed at refining controls to prevent Iraq's 
acquisition of prohibited items.
    UNSCR 1051 established a joint UNSCOM/IAEA unit to monitor 
Iraq's authorized imports of WMD dual-use items (WMD dual-use 
goods are also known as ``1051-listed goods). Under UN Security 
Council resolution 1284, UNMOVIC has assumed this 
responsibility from UNSCOM, with the added requirement to 
identify if, in their estimation, a contract contains a 1051-
listed good.
    Since weapons inspectors left Iraq in December 1998, the UN 
Office of the Iraq Programme is the only organization allowed 
to observe goods going into Iraq under the ``oil-for-food'' 
program. In the absence of weapons inspectors and other experts 
on the ground in Iraq, the United States has placed holds on a 
number of dual-use contracts that otherwise likely would have 
been approved with UNMOVIC/IAEA monitoring.

UN ``Oil-for-Food'' program

    We continue to support the international community's 
efforts to provide for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi 
people through the ``oil-for-food'' program. In UNSCR 1284, the 
UNSCR authorized Iraq to export as much petroleum and petroleum 
products through designated export points as required to meet 
the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi population and for other 
specified purposes. Under UN control, the proceeds are used to 
purchase humanitarian goods, fund UN Compensation Commission 
awards against Iraqarising out of its invasion and occupation 
of Kuwait, and to meet UN administrative costs. As of June 15, Iraq had 
exported more than $5.7 billion worth of oil during the ninth six-month 
phase of the ``oil-for-food'' program, which began on December 5, 2000. 
According to UN data since the start of the ``oil-for-food'' program, 
14,971 contracts for humanitarian goods worth over $21 billion have 
been approved through March 31, 2001. To streamline the approval 
process for humanitarian goods, we have agreed with the UN on a fast-
track approval process for some goods. However, as purchases under the 
program have moved from basic humanitarian supplies to more expensive 
infrastructure projects, the number and value of U.S. ``holds'' on 
contracts has increased. The approach we have outlined in UNSCR 1352 
would eliminate holds, while ensuring that the Iraqi regime has less 
access to the goods most important to its re-armament efforts.
    The ``oil-for-food'' program maintains a separate program 
for northern Iraq, administered directly by the UN in 
consultation with the local authorities. This program, which 
the United States strongly supports, ensures that when Iraq 
contracts for the purchase of humanitarian goods, 13 percent of 
the funds generated under the ``oil-for-food'' program are 
spent on items for northern Iraq. This program has led to a 
marked contrast between the health of the population of the 
north, where indicators show an improvement, and of the 
population living in the areas where the UN does not administer 
the program. International humanitarian programs, including 
most importantly the ``oil-for-food'' program, have steadily 
improved the life of the average Iraqi and led to improvements 
in health care, water, sanitation, agriculture, education, and 
other areas, while denying Saddam Hussein control over most of 
Iraq's oil revenues.
    However, as noted in a May 18 UN report, the Government of 
Iraq is not committed to using the funds available through the 
``oil-for-food'' program to improve the health and welfare of 
the Iraqi people. Reduced oil exports could cost the program 
more than $3 billion. All oil exports were suspended June 4, 
following the adoption of UNSCR 1352, extending the program for 
30 days. Another $3.3 billion remain unobligated in the ``oil-
for-food'' escrow account. In addition, Iraqi contracting 
delays, cuts in food, medicine, educational and other 
humanitarian sectors, and government attempts to shut down 
humanitarian nongovernmental organizations (NGO) operations in 
northern Iraq, demonstrate that the Iraqi regime is attempting 
to undermine the effectiveness of the program.
    We will continue to work with the UN Secretariat, other 
members of the Security Council, and others in the 
international community to ensure that the implementation of 
UNSCR 1284, and other relevant UNSCRs, better enables the 
humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people to be met while denying 
p9olitical or military benefits to the Baghdad regime.

Flight control regime

    UNSC resolutions are open to competing interpretations 
regarding intentional flights to Baghdad. The UNSC has so far 
unsuccessfully attempted to reach a consensus agreement on new 
procedures for international flights. In the absence of an 
agreement, we continue to press for adherence to existing 
Sanctions Committee procedures, which allow for Committee 
approval of flights with a demonstrable humanitarian purpose. 
Most flights have complied with those procedures.

Northern Iraq: Kurdish reconciliation

    The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic 
Union of Kurdistan (PUK) continue their efforts to implement 
the September 17, 1998, reconciliation agreement.
    They work together effectively in a number of areas, 
including joint efforts to bring the needs of their region to 
the attention of the UN and the international community, and 
within the larger Iraqi national democratic opposition 
movement. The situation in northern Iraq is not settled, 
however, and we continue to look for ways to encourage the 
parties to make greater progress toward resolving their 
differences.

The human rights situation in Iraq

    The human rights situation in Iraq continues to fall 
severely short of international norms. UNSCR 688 expressly 
notes that the consequences of the regime's repression of its 
own people constitute a threat to international peace and 
security in the region. It also demands immediate access by 

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