H.Doc.107-177 TERMINATING A SUSPENSION OF EXPORT ...

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107th Congress, 2d Session - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 107-175


 
                 IRAQ'S COMPLIANCE WITH UNITED NATIONS
                     SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS

                               __________

                             COMMUNICATION

                                  from

                   THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

                              transmitting

A REPORT ON THE STATUS OF EFFORTS TO OBTAIN IRAQ'S COMPLIANCE WITH THE 
RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, PURSUANT TO 
                             50 U.S.C. 1541

<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>


January 24, 2002.--Referred to the Committee on International Relations 
                       and ordered to be printed

                                           The White House,
                                      Washington, January 23, 2002.

Hon. J. Dennis Hastert,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Speaker: Consistent with the Authorization for Use 
of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (Public Law 102-1) 
and as part of my effort to keep the Congress fully informed, I 
am providing a report prepared by my Administration on the 
status of efforts to obtain Iraq's compliance with the 
resolutions adopted by the United Nations Security Council. The 
last report, consistent with Public Law 102-1, was transmitted 
on October 11, 2001.
            Sincerely,
                                                    George W. Bush.
  Status of U.S. Efforts Regarding Iraq's Compliance With UN Security 
                          Council Resolutions

Overview
    As long as Saddam Hussein remains in power, he will 
continue to threaten the well-being of the Iraqi people, the 
peace of the region, and vital U.S. interests. We are 
continuing our Iraq policy review to determine the best means 
of advancing our interests. We have already strengthened 
international consensus on the need to change the international 
community's approach to Iraq by unanimous passage of a Security 
Council resolution (UNSCR 1382) providing for the Security 
Council to adopt and implement the Goods Review List (GRL) as 
the basis of UN controls on Iraq on May 30, 2002. This approach 
would maintain UN controls to prevent Iraq from acquiring items 
to support Iraq's ballistic missile, conventional military or 
nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons programs. We are 
continuing consultations with other Security Council members to 
ensure adoption and implementation of the GRL during the next 
phase of the ``Oil-for-Food'' program. We are enforcing No-Fly 
Zones over northern and southern Iraq to carry out vital United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions in an effort to 
help ensure the safety of citizens of specific ethnic and 
religious groups, and Iraq's neighbors. We are considering how 
best to achieve our objective of regime change.
    We will continue to contain the threats posed by Iraq, but 
over the long term, the most effective and lasting way to end 
these threats is through a change of government in Baghdad. To 
this end, we support the Iraqi opposition as part of our 
program to support a transition to democracy in Iraq. As part 
of that effort, the Iraqi National Congress (INC) continues to 
be funded for a variety of activities by the State Department, 
and continues to receive training under the drawdown authority 
of the Iraq Liberation Act (ILA).
    Iraq still rejects UNSC Resolution 1284, a binding 
resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, 
including its requirement that Iraq provide the UN Monitoring, 
Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with immediate, 
unconditional and unrestricted access to Iraq and its 
facilities, equipment, records, and personnel. Nonetheless, the 
UN is implementing those parts of the resolution which do not 
require Iraqi cooperation. In its quarterly report to the 
Council on December 6, 2001, UNMOVIC updated the UN Security 
Council on measures it is taking to prepare for inspections in 
Iraq. UNMOVIC Executive Chairman Dr. Hans Blix stated that 
UNMOVIC inspectors are prepared and ready to return to Iraq. To 
provide UNMOVIC the best support possible, we consult regularly 
with Dr. Blix and his staff. In its semi-annual report to the 
UN Security Council on October 5, 2001, the IAEA indicated it 
is similarly prepared to return to Iraq, but that the longer 
the suspension of resolution-related inspections lasts, the 
more difficult it will be and the more time will be required 
for the Agency to re-establish a level of knowledge comparable 
to that achieved at the end of 1998.
    Ambassador Yuli Vorontsov, the Secretary General's high-
level coordinator for Kuwait Issues, presented his semi-annual 
report on stolen Kuwaiti property on June 20, 2001, and on 
August 21, 2001, he submitted this periodic report to the 
Council on Kuwaiti and third-country national prisoners. Both 
of these reports demonstrate Iraq's continuing failure to 
comply fully with its obligations under relevant UNSCRs. The 
Iraqi Government continues to deny Ambassador Vorontsov entry 
to the country.
    The ``Oil-for-Food'' program, which is designed to provide 
for the humanitarian needs for the Iraqi people as long as UN 
sanctions remain in place, continues to expand. Iraq exported 
$17.8 billion worth of oil in 2000 with the proceeds going to a 
UN-controlled escrow account. On November 29, the Security 
Council extended the current phase of the ``Oil-for-Food'' 
program for an additional 180 days. During this time, we will 
continue to work with Security Council members to agree on the 
details of a new resolution implementing our approach.
U.S. and Coalition Force Levels in the Gulf Region
    Saddam Hussein's record of aggressive behavior necessitates 
the deployment of a highly capable force in the region to deter 
Baghad and respond to any threat it might pose to its 
neighbors, the reconstitution of its weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD), or movement against the Kurds in northern 
Iraq. We will continue to maintain a strong posture and have 
established a rapid reinforcement capability to supplement our 
forces in the Gulf, if needed.

Operation NORTHERN WATCH and Operation SOUTHERN WATCH

    Aircraft of the United States and coalition partners 
patrolling the No-Fly Zones over Iraq under Operations NORTHERN 
WATCH and SOUTHERN WATCH are routinely tracked by Iraqi radar, 
fired upon by anti-aircraft artillery, and attacked with 
surface-to-air missiles. Our aircrews continue to respond in 
self-defense to threats against and attacks on our aircraft 
patrolling the No-Fly Zones in accordance with Central 
Command's (CENTCOM) well-established response options.

Maritime Intercept Operations

    The U.S.-led maritime Multinational Interception Force 
(MIF) continues to enforce UN sanctions in the Gulf. The United 
States continues to approach potential participants in the MIF 
to augment current partners. Canadian, Australian, and British 
forces are currently operating with U.S. forces.
    In large part, member states of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) continue to support the MIF. The UAE still 
accepts the vast majority of vessels diverted for violating UN 
sanctions against Iraq, but Kuwait, at a distant second, is 
rapidly building up its numbers. Other GCC nations are more 
hesitant to accept diverted vessels (Saudi Arabia, Qatar and 
Bahrain have accepted ships in the past, but now refuse), but 
all provide support in some form to the enforcement of UNSCRs 
against Iraq.
    From September through November 2001, monthly totals of 
smuggled petroleum products through the Gulf averaged slightly 
less than those in the previous three-month period. Iran 
continues to deny use of its territorial waters to all but the 
largest of smuggling vessels from which significant fees can be 
obtained.
    The MIF, and our ability to rapidly augment it, serves as a 
critical deterrent to the smuggling of prohibited items and 
products into and out of Iraq. As our Iraq policy develops, we 
will need to assess whether MIF force levels are adequate.

UNMOVIC/IAEA: Weapons of Mass Destruction

    There have been no Council-mandated inspections in Iraq 
since December 15, 1998. Iraq's defiance of the international 
consensus, as expressed by UNSCR 1284, has meant that no 
progress has been made in addressing Iraq's outstanding 
disarmament obligations. Iraq remains in violation of its 
obligations to end its programs to develop weapons of mass 
destruction and long-range missiles.
    UNMOVIC has largely completed the hiring of its core staff 
in New York and is continuing to hire people, including 
Americans, in an on-call or ``roster'' category. UNMOVIC has 
completed four training courses and plans to hold a fifth 
course in early 2002. The United States provides UNMOVIC with 
course instructors and facilities for hands-on training. We 
consult with Dr. Blix and his staff regularly to provide the 
best support possible. On December 6, 2001, UNMOVIC issued its 
latest report on steps it is taking to prepare for inspections 
in Iraq. Dr. Blix has said that UNMOVIC inspectors are prepared 
and ready to return to Iraq.
    The United States also provides support to and holds 
regular consultations with the IAEA Iraq Action Team. In its 
semi-annual report to the UN Security Council on October 5, 
2001, the IAEA indicated that it has maintained its readiness 
to resume verification and monitoring activities in Iraq, but 
that the longer the suspension of resolution-related 
inspections lasts, the more difficult it will be and the more 
time will be required for the Agency to re-establish a level of 
knowledge comparable to that achieved at the end of 1998.

Dual-Use Items

    ``Oil-for-Food'' program revenues are designated for 
humanitarian purposes only, but we remain concerned that Iraq 
is abusing this program in an attempt to acquire goods and 
materials for its weapons programs. Currently, the United 
States, as a member of the UN Iraq Sanctions Committee, reviews 
all contracts under the ``Oil-for-Food'' program (unless the 
items are on a list pre-approved for expedited humanitarian 
export) to ensure that prohibited items are not exported to 
Iraq and dual-use items are not diverted to Iraqi weapons 
programs. However, on November 29, 2001, the United Nations 
Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1382. In this 
resolution, the Council agreed to adopt and implement a Good 
Review List (GRL) by May 30, 2002, subject to any refinements 
agreed to by the Council prior to that date. When implemented, 
the GRL will maintain UN controls on items deemed useful in 
supporting Iraq's ballistic missile, conventional military, and 
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs. At the same 
time, this approach will lift economic sanctions on purely 
civilian trade with Iraq.
    UNSCR 1051 established a joint UNSCOM/IAEA unit to monitor 
Iraq's authorized imports of WMD- and missile-related items 
(WMD/missile-related goods are also known as ``1051''-listed 
goods). UNSCR 1051 also established lists of items subject to 
review in all four weapons categories--ballistic missile, 
nuclear, chemical and biological. As noted in the last report, 
these lists were updated by UNMOVIC and the IAEA. Under UN 
Security Council resolution 1284, UNMOVIC has assumed this 
responsibility from UNSCOM, with the added requirement to 
identify if, in their estimation, a contract contains a 1051-
listed good. UNMOVIC and the IAEA have continued to perform 
this duty during this reporting period. Under UNSCR 1382, 
UNMOVIC and the IAEA would be charged with screening all ``Oil-
for-Food'' contracts for GRL-listed items. Under this approach, 
the GRL includes the 1051 lists and items that Iraq could use 
to support its conventional military. Since weapons inspectors 
left Iraq in December 1998, the UN Office of the Iraq Programme 
is the principal organization allowed to observe goods going 
into Iraq under the ``Oil-for-Food'' program. Various UN 
agencies have provided end-use verification to varying low 
degrees. In the absence of weapons inspectors and other experts 
on the ground in Iraq, the United States has placed holds on a 
number of prohibited or dual-use contracts that otherwise 
likely would have been approved if UNMOVIC/IAEA monitoring were 
available.

The UN's ``Oil-for-Food'' Program

    We support the international community's efforts to provide 
for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people through the 
``Oil-for-Food'' program. Under UN control, the proceeds of 
Iraqi oil sales are used to purchase humanitarian goods, fund 
UN Compensation Commission awards against Iraq arising out of 
its invasion and occupation of Kuwait, and to meet UN 
administrative costs. As of November 30, 2001, Iraq had 
exported more than $5.2 billion worth of oil during the tenth 
six-month phase of the ``Oil-for-Food'' program, which began on 
July 4, 2001. According to UN data since the start of the 
``Oil-for-Food'' program, 19,795 contracts for humanitarian 
goods worth over $29 billion have been approved through October 
31, 2001. To streamline the approval process for humanitarian 
goods, we have agreed with the UN on a fast-track approval 
process for some goods. However, as purchases under the program 
have moved from basic humanitarian supplies to more expensive 
infrastructure projects, the number and value of U.S. ``holds'' 
on contracts have increased. The Security Council's commitment 
in recently adopted resolution 1382 to implement the Goods 
Review List and related procedures on May 30, 2002, will help 
eliminate holds (contracts would either be approved or 
submitted to the sanctions committee members for approval or 
denial), while ensuring that the Iraqi regime has less access 
to the goods most important to its re-armament efforts.
    The ``Oil-for-Food'' program maintains a separate program 
for northern Iraq, administered directly by the UN in 
consultation with the local authorities. This program, which 
the United States strongly supports, ensures that when Iraq 
contracts for the purchase of humanitarian goods, 13 percent of 
the funds generated under the ``Oil-for-Food'' program are 
spent on items for northern Iraq.
    Humanitarian efforts in northern Iraq have led to a marked 
contrast between the health of the population of the north, 
where indicators show an improvement, and of the population 
living in the areas where the UN does not administer the 
program.
    International humanitarian programs, including most 
importantly the ``Oil-for-Food'' program, have steadily 
improved the life of the average Iraqi and led to improvements 
in health care, water, sanitation, agriculture, education, and 
other areas, while denying Saddam Hussein control over most of 
Iraq's oil revenues.
    However, as noted most recently in a November 19 UN report, 
the Government of Iraq is not committed to using the funds 
available through the ``Oil-for-Food'' program to improve the 
health and welfare of the Iraqi people. Approximately $2.0 
billion remains unobligated in the ``Oil-for-Food'' escrow 
account, as of November 19, 2001. In addition, Iraqi 
contracting delays, cuts in food, medicine, educational and 
other humanitarian sector allocations, government attempts to 
impede or shut down humanitarian NGO operations in northern 

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