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H.Doc.107-230 CONTINUATION OF A NATIONAL EMERGENCY ...
107th Congress, 2d Session - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 107-229 EMERGENCY REGARDING PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION __________ MESSAGE from THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES transmitting A 6-MONTH PERIODIC REPORT ON THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY WITH RESPECT TO THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION THAT WAS DECLARED IN EXECUTIVE ORDER 12938 OF NOVEMBER 14, 1994, PURSUANT TO 50 U.S.C. 1703(c) AND 50 U.S.C. 1641(c) <GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT> June 19, 2002.--Message and accompanying papers referred to the Committee on International Relations and ordered to be printed __________ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 99-011 WASHINGTON : 2002 To the Congress of the United States: As required by section 204(c) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1703(c), and section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. 1641(c), I transmit herewith a 6-month periodic report prepared by my Administration on the national emergency with respect to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction that was declared in Executive Order 12938 of November 14, 1994. George W. Bush. The White House, June 18, 2002. Report to Congress on the Emergency Regarding Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Weapons of mass destruction (WMD)--nuclear chemical, and biological weapons--and their missile delivery systems are among the top threats to U.S. security in the post-Cold War world. In the hands of countries like those on the U.S. list of terrorist-supporting states, these weapons would pose direct threats to the United States and its forces, friends, and allies. Some of these rogue states are already working on intercontinental-range missiles that would be able to deliver WMD against our territory directly. This Administration has given high priority to dealing the threat of WMD and missile proliferation. The September 11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington and subsequent anthrax crimes reinforce the importance of efforts to prevent the proliferation of these weapons, especially to terrorists and countries that harbor terrorists. This report describes WMD and missile nonproliferation measures undertaken by the United States between November 2001 and May 2002. To address the dangers posed by the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems, on November 14, 1994, former President Clinton issued Executive Order No. 12938, declaring a national emergency under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.). Under section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), the national emergency terminates on the anniversary date of its declaration unless, within the ninety-day period prior to each anniversary date, the President publishes a Continuation of Emergency Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Federal Register and transmits the notice to the Congress. The national emergency was extended on November 14, 1995; November 12, 1996; November 13, 1997; November 12, 1998; November 10, 1999; November 12, 2000; and November 9, 2001. The following report is made pursuant to Section 204(c) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703(c)) and Section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1641(c)). It reports actions taken and expenditures incurred pursuant to the emergency declaration during the period November 12, 2001 through May 15, 2002. Additional information on nuclear, missile, and/or chemical and biological weapons (CBW) nonproliferation efforts may be found in the following reports: (a) the most recent annual Report on the Proliferation of Missiles and Essential Components of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons, provided to Congress pursuant to Section 1097 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (Public Law 102-190), also known as the ``Nonproliferation Report;'' (b) the most recent semi-annual Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, provided to Congress pursuant to Section 721 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997; (c) the most recent annual report entitled ``Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements'', provided pursuant to section 403 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, 22 U.S.C. 2593a; (d) the most recent report on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, provided pursuant to Section 585 of the Foreign Operations, Export, Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1997 (Public Law 104-208); (e) the most recent Report on Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy in South Asia, provided pursuant to Public Law 102-391, Section 585; (f) the most recent Report on Regional Nonproliferation in South Asia, submitted pursuant to Section 620F(c) of Foreign Assistance Act; (g) the most recent Nuclear Nonproliferation Report, known as the ``Section 601 Report,'' submitted pursuant to Section 601 of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (Public Law 95- 242), as amended by the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994; (h) the most recent semiannual report on Proliferation- Related Transfers to Iran, submitted pursuant to Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000; (i) the most recent report on Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Sanctions, submitted pursuant to the Iran-Iraq Non-Proliferation Act of 1992, sections 1604- 1608; and (j) the most recent report on Libya sanctions, provided pursuant to Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 (ILSA), section 5(b). NUCLEAR WEAPONS Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: The Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the cornerstone of the global effort to halt nuclear proliferation. The first meeting of the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the 2005 NPT Review Conference (RevCon) took place April 8-19, 2002, at UN headquarters in New York. This meeting was preceded by extensive consultations among key NPT parties and the designated Chairman of the PrepCom, Ambassador Henrik Salander of Sweden. The PrepCom completed its work successfully by issuing the Chairman's report--a factual summary for transmission to PrepCom II, which will take place in Geneva from April 28-May 9, 2003, under the Chairmanship of Hungarian Ambassador Laszlo Molnar. The PrepCom also decided that PrepCom III and the 2005 NPT RevCon will be held in New York, and that representatives from the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) will chair PrepCom III and preside over the 2005 RevCon. On substantive issues, the participants agreed that preserving and strengthening the NPT is vital to peace and security. They expressed strong support for International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Many nations cited September 11 as reinforcing the need to strengthen measures against terrorist acquisition of nuclear material. India and Pakistan were urged to exercise restraint and to join the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon states. Many states expressed concern about NPT compliance by Iraq and North Korea. Israel's nuclear program was highlighted by other Middle East states. Some U.S. nuclear policies were criticized, but many states welcomed U.S.-Russian efforts to reduce nuclear weapons. International Atomic Energy Agency: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), inter alia, verifies the compliance of non-nuclear weapons states (NNWS) with their NPT safeguards obligations. The IAEA safeguards system helps deter diversion of nuclear materials and provides the means to detect such diversions in a timely manner should any occur. During this reporting period, the United States continued to provide significant technical and financial resources to the IAEA to support its safeguards activities. The discovery of Iraq's extensive covert nuclear activities led to strengthening the IAEA safeguards system's ability to detect undeclared nuclear material and activities. The United States and a large number of like-minded states negotiated in the mid-1990s substantial safeguards strengthening measures, including the use of environmental sampling techniques, expansion of the information on nuclear activities which states are required to declare, and expansion of IAEA access rights. Those measures requiring additional legal authority are embodied in a Model Additional Protocol, approved in 1997. With these tools, the IAEA's capability to address a state's undeclared nuclear activities has been substantially enhanced. This Protocol has now been signed by 61 states and has entered into force for 24 countries. On May 9, 2002, the President submitted the U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification. In doing so, he emphasized that entry into force of the U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol will bolster U.S. efforts to strengthen nuclear safeguards and promote the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, which is a cornerstone of U.S. foreign and national security policy. During the March 18-21, 2002 IAEA Board of Governors Meeting, the Director General presented his statement proposing Agency activities relevant to preventing acts of terrorism involving nuclear materials and other radioactive materials, with a view to strengthening the Agency's work in this area. The Board of Governors approved funding for such activities through voluntary contributions, as well as approved, in principle, the proposals advanced by the Director General for further enhancing nuclear security. A number of member states pledged specific sums of money in support of Agency activities, while others expressed hope to be able to provide financial and/or other support in the near future. Additionally, the Board also recognized that the IAEA's program for technical cooperation assistance could be important for implementing some of these activities. The Agency will report to the Board periodically on the progress made in implementing this proposal. Zangger Committee: The purpose of the 35-nation NPT Exporters (Zangger) Committee (ZC) is to harmonize implementation of the NPT's requirement to apply IAEA safeguards to nuclear exports. Article III.2 of the Treaty requires parties to ensure that IAEA safeguards are applied to exports to non-nuclear weapon states of (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use, or production of special fissionable material. The ZC maintains and updates a list of equipment and materials that may only be exported if safeguards are applied to the recipient facility (called the ``Trigger List'' because such exports trigger the requirement for safeguards). All five of the nuclear weapon states are members of the ZC. However, China is the only ZC member that is not also a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), which requires full-scope safeguards (FSS) as a condition of nuclear supply to NNWS. China has not been willing to require FSS as a condition of nuclear supply in accordance with the NSG Guidelines--an important distinction from the ZC. The ZC held three meetings on November 26, 2001, in Vienna. The first meeting was the Technology Holders Working Group, under the chairmanship of Sweden, which focused on adding plutonium isotope separation equipment to the Trigger List. At the ZC Plenary meeting that afternoon, the Working Group Chair reported that Technology Holders were closer to consensus on new language, but that some members needed more time for consideration of the proposal. The second November 26 meeting was the Friends of the Chair to discuss; (1) outcomes of the 2000 NPT RevCon; (2) possible outreach activities with NPT Party non-members, including review of a UK non-paper on the subject; (3) review of ZC ``understandings'' (guidelines) to determine if updating is needed; and (4) actions that might be taken in preparation for 2002 or 2003 NPT PrepComs and recommendations that could be made to the 2005 NPT RevCon. The ZC's Austrian Chair outlined an ambitious program of possible future ZC activities, including serving as an NPT-wide technical resource, encouraging early ratification by states of the Additional Protocol to strengthen IAEA safeguards, and promoting outreach dialogue with non-member NPT Party states, particularly members of the NAM who have been critical of the nonproliferation regimes. The Chair also noted that in light of the events of September 11, the ZC should consider exploring new areas such as the combating of illicit trafficking. The third November 26 meeting was the ZC Plenary that reviewed the Friends of the Chair discussion on outreach. There was strong support for the UK outreach paper, which outlined various options for promoting dialogue with NPT Party non- members. Most members, including the United States, supported pursuing several outreach approaches including ZC-NAM forums and roundtable discussions as well as ZC seminars and workshops for selected NAM countries. However, some members had reservations, suggesting that the ZC, as a technical body, needed to avoid political activities such as outreach programs. There was a general consensus that ZC outreach activities should be conducted on an informal basis and not duplicate NSG outreach activities nor involve non-NPT states such as India, Israel and Pakistan. Some members were concerned about limiting outreach dialogue to NPT Party critics of the nonproliferation regimes and suggested that it would be more useful to engage non-ZC NPT Party states supportive of nonproliferation regimes. The United States reported that it was not prepared to join in a consensus in ZC membership for Belarus owing to concerns about certain of the GOB's nonproliferation policies. The Russians questioned the U.S. position, given that Belarus was an NPT Party, a member of the NSG, and had enacted the necessary export control legislation to accord with NSG and ZC Guidelines. The United States suggested that Belarus be encouraged to cease questionable supply activities. Nuclear Suppliers Group: With 39 member states, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) is a widely accepted and effective export control arrangement, which contributes to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons through implementation of guidelines for control of nuclear and nuclear-related exports. Members pursue the aims of the NSG through adherence to the Guidelines, which are adopted by consensus, and through exchanges of information on developments of nuclear proliferation concern. The first set of NSG Guidelines (Part 1) governs exports of nuclear materials and equipment that require the application of IAEA safeguards at the recipient facility, FSS in the recipient state, commitments for no nuclear explosive use, and retransfer controls. The second set of NSG Guidelines (Part 2) governs exports of nuclear-related dual-use equipment and materials. The NSG Guidelines also control technology related to both nuclear and nuclear-related dual-use exports. At the U.S.-hosted 2001 NSG Plenary meeting May 10-11, 2001 in Aspen, Colorado, the United States achieved its main objectives on restructuring the regime's mechanisms and procedures and revising its Guidelines. Moreover, the Plenary strongly reaffirmed its support of full-scope IAEA safeguards as a condition of nuclear supply and rejected Russian proposals to broaden the safety exemption to the FSS policy and to confer ``associate member'' status on India, Israel and Pakistan to permit nuclear cooperation with those countries. However, the Plenary did agree to consider possibilities for an ``intensified dialogue'' with the three countries. The Plenary also agreed to the establishment of a new
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