H.Doc.107-236 A REPORT ON THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY WITH RESPECT TO IRAN ...

	Web GovRecords.org

107th Congress, 2d Session - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 107-235 


 
 PERIODIC REPORT ON THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY CAUSED BY THE LAPSE OF THE 
                   EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT OF 1979

                               __________

                                MESSAGE

                                  from

                   THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

                              transmitting

A SIX MONTH PERIODIC REPORT ON THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY DECLARED BY 
  EXECUTIVE ORDER 13222 OF AUGUST 17, 2001 TO DEAL WITH THE THREAT TO THE 
  NATIONAL SECURITY, FOREIGN POLICY, AND ECONOMY OF THE UNITED STATES 
  CAUSED BY THE LAPSE OF THE EXPORT ADMINISTRATION ACT OF 1979, PURSUANT 
  TO 50 U.S.C. 1641(c) AND 50 U.S.C. 1703(c)

<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>


    June 26, 2002.--Message and accompanying papers referred to the 
     Committee on International Relations and ordered to be printed
                               __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
99-011                    WASHINGTON : 2002

To the Congress of the United States:
    As required by section 204(c) of the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703(c)) and section 
401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1641(c)), I 
transmit herewith a 6-month report prepared by my 
Administration, on the national emergency declared by Executive 
Order 13222 of August 17, 2001, to deal with the threat to the 
national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United 
States caused by the lapse of the Export Administration Act of 
1979.

                                                    George W. Bush.
    The White House, June 25, 2002.

Periodic Report on the National Emergency Caused by the Lapse of the 
  Export Administration Act of 1979 for August 19, 2001 to February 19, 
  2002

    On August 17, 2001, in Executive Order 13222, I declared a 
national emergency under the International Emergency Economic 
Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) to deal with the threat to 
the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the 
United States caused by the lapse of the Export Administration 
Act of 1979, as amended (EAA) (50 U.S.C. App. 2401 et seq.), 
and the systems of controls maintained under that Act. In that 
order, I continued in effect, to the extent permitted by law, 
the provisions of the EAA, the Export Administrations 
Regulations (EAR) (15 C.F.R. et seq.), and the delegations of 
authority set forth in Executive Order 12002 of July 7, 1977 
(as amended by Executive Order 12755 of March 12, 1991, and 
Executive Order 13026 of November 15, 1996), Executive Order 
12214 of May 2, 1980, Executive Order 12851 of June 11, 1993, 
and Executive Order 12938 of November 14, 1994, as amended.
    I issued Executive Order 13222 pursuant to the authority 
vested in me as President of the Constitution and laws of the 
United States, including, but not limited to, IEEPA. I also 
submitted a report to Congress pursuant to section 204(b) of 
IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1703(b)). Section 204 of IEEPA requires 
follow-up reports, with respect to actions and changes, to be 
submitted every 6 months. Additionally, section 401(c) of the 
National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1641(c)) requires that the 
President, within 90 days after the end of each 6-month period 
following a declaration of a national emergency, to report to 
the Congress on the total expenditures directly attributable to 
that declaration. To comply with these requirements, I am 
submitting the following combined activities and expenditures 
report for the 6-month period from August 19, 2001, to February 
19, 2002. Detailed information on export control activities is 
contained in the most recent Export Administration Annual 
Report for Fiscal Year 2001 and the January 2002 Report on 
Foreign Policy Export Controls, required by section 14 and 
section 6(f) of the EAA, respectively, which the Department of 
Commerce continues to submit to Congress under a policy of 
conforming actions under the Executive Order to the provisions 
of the EAA, as appropriate.
    Since the issuance of Executive Order 13222, the Department 
of Commerce has continued to administer and enforce the system 
of export controls, including anti-boycott provisions, 
containedin the EAR. In administering these controls, the 
Department has acted under a policy of conforming actions under 
Executive Order 13222 to the provisions of the EAA, insofar as 
appropriate.
    The expenses incurred by the Federal Government in the 6-
month period from August 19, 2001, to February 19, 2002, that 
are directly attributable to the exercise of authorities 
conferred by the declaration of a national emergency with 
respect to export controls, were largely centered in the 
Department of Commerce's Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). 
Expenditures by the Department of Commerce for the reporting 
period are anticipated to be $28,648,000, most of which 
represents program operating costs, wage and salary costs for 
federal personnel, and overhead expenses.
    There have been several significant developments in the 
area of export controls since the EAA expired in August 2001:

                      A. MULTILATERAL DEVELOPMENTS

The Wassenaar Arrangement (WA)

    The Wassenaar Arrangement is a multilateral regime 
currently consisting of 33 member countries. Its purpose is to 
contribute to regional and international security and stability 
by promoting transparency and greater responsibility in 
international transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods 
and technologies.
    In October 2001, a Wassenaar General Working Group Meeting 
discussed the increase in general information exchange 
regarding regions and projects of concern, specific information 
exchange on dual-use goods and technologies, and the scope of 
dual-use notifications. In light of the events of September 11, 
2001, the United States introduced a proposal to ensure that 
Wassenaar's focus included combating terrorism; this proposal 
was subsequently approved. Discussions also centered around 
U.S. proposals for expanded reporting of conventional arms 
transfers, strengthening dual-use notification procedures by 
establishing a denial consultation procedure, and 
implementation of catch-all controls.
    In November 2001 and February 2002, WA Expert Group 
meetings reviewed Wassenaar controls on conventional arms and 
dual-use goods and technologies. The proposals discussed at the 
November meeting were in the areas of electronics, computers, 
telecommunications, encryption, andmachine tools. Proposals 
discussed at the February 2002 meeting focused on electronics, 
computers, machine tools, sensors and lasers, navigation and avionics, 
the definition of ``specially designed,'' and Wassenaar's munitions 
list. Discussions also were held to seek agreement to relax controls on 
microprocessors and computers in light of rapid technological advances 
and controllability factors. The majority of Wassenaar members 
advocated a complete decontrol of general purpose microprocessors and a 
drastic liberalization of computer controls. However, members could not 
come to consensus on these issues. With a few notable exceptions, there 
was little agreement on changes to the dual-use and munitions control 
lists. Further discussions in these areas will resume during the April 
2002 list review.
    In December 2001, a special Expert Group meeting--to 
discuss controls on general purpose microprocessors and 
computers, and the annual Plenary meeting were held. Members 
underlined the importance of strengthening export controls and 
reaffirmed their commitment to maintain responsible national 
policies in the licensing of exports of arms and sensitive 
dual-use items. The Plenary approved the U.S. proposal to add 
prevention of the acquisition of conventional arms and dual-use 
goods and technologies by terrorist groups as a focus of the 
regime. The Plenary approved a revised statement of 
understanding on intangible transfers of technology and 
software, agreed to subject two additional sub-categories of 
military items to mandatory arms export reporting, and agreed 
to a number of control list amendments. The Plenary also agreed 
to continue the study of options for increasing the efficiency 
of export controls, including a catch-all mechanism and a 
denial consultation procedure. These measures will be discussed 
during the May 2002 General Working Group Meeting.
    The United States also continues to participate in 
submissions of export data made by regime members. Wassenaar 
members make dual-use data submissions on a semi-annual basis 
in April and October.

The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)

    The MTCR is an informal multilateral nonproliferation 
regime of 33 countries that have agreed to coordinate their 
national export controls for the prevention of missile 
proliferation. Each member, under its own laws and practices, 
adheres to the export licensing policy reflectedin the MTCR 
Guidelines for items found on the MTCR Equipment and Technology Annex.
    The United States participated in the annual MTCR Plenary 
held in Ottawa, Canada on September 24-28, 2001. At the 
Plenary, the MTCR Partners shared information about activities 
and programs of missile proliferation concern, agreed that the 
risk of proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery 
remained a major concern for global and regional security, and 
considered additional steps they can take, individually and 
collectively, to prevent the proliferation of delivery systems 
for weapons of mass destruction. To this end, the Partners held 
a special meeting for enforcement officers to foster greater 
cooperation in stopping and impeding specific shipments of 
missile proliferation concern. They also reaffirmed the 
important role played by export controls and the need to 
strengthen them further and implement them vigorously. The 
Partners also discussed ways to promote outreach to non-members 
on key controls and the need to strengthen them further and 
implement them vigorously in addition to key issues such as the 
global missile threat, missile related export controls and 
transshipment.

The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)

    The NSG, composed of 39 countries and the European 
Commission as a permanent observer, is an informal group of 
nations concerned with the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
    The NSG has established guidelines to assist member nations 
in administering national nuclear export control programs. 
Controls are focused on certain categories of goods: nuclear 
material, equipment and technology unique to the nuclear 
industry, and so-called nuclear dual-use items that have both 
nuclear and non-nuclear applications.
    At the annual NSG Plenary held in May 2001, members agreed 
that the two segments of the NSG organization devoted to dual-
use (Commerce Department) and ``trigger list'' (Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission for components, and Department of Energy 
for technology and services) items would be combined into one 
administrative unit. To reflect this new structure, members 
agreed to establish a new Consultative Group (CG) that will 
meet twice a year to review the guidelines, control lists, and 
overall activities of the NSG. The first meeting of the CG, 
which replaces the NSGDual Use Regime, the Information Sharing 
Working Group, and the Transparency Working Group, occurred in Vienna, 
Austria, on November 29, 2001. It was also agreed that the NSG would 
consider having an intensified dialogue with non-NPT parties.
    At this first CG meeting, it was agreed to limit the number 
of items caught by a control on linear displacement measurement 
devices through the addition of a technical note of explanation 
in the NSG Guidelines. This clarification will limit the 
control to those more sophisticated items that are directly 
useful in the creation of weapons of mass destruction. 
Agreement also was reached to hold the first Export Enforcement 
Experts meeting at the 2002 NSG Plenary to be held in Prague, 
the Czech Republic in May 2002; to review the NSG Guidelines 
for ways to address the nuclear terrorism threat; and to hold 
the 2003 NSG Plenary in South Korea.

The Australia Group (AG)

    The AG is an informal multilateral nonproliferation regime 
that seeks to impede the proliferation of chemical and 
biological weapons through the harmonization of export 
controls, an exchange of information on global proliferation 
activities, and outreach to nonmembers. The 33-member countries 
meet annually and communicate intersessionally to review and 
refine the list of controlled chemicals, biological agents, and 
related equipment and technology.
    At the October 2001 AG Plenary Session, the Group 
reaffirmed the members' continued collective belief in the AG's 
viability, importance and compatibility with the Chemical 
Weapons Convention (CWC) and Biological Weapons Convention 
(BWC). Responding to the terrorist events of September 11, AG 
participants also agreed that strengthening the regime to 
better counter CBW proliferation and CBW terrorism should be a 
priority. Participants agreed to several proposals aimed at 
plugging loopholes in current AG export controls; they also 
agreed that export controls, regional nonproliferation and 
countering CBW terrorism will be the main focus of the Group 
for the foreseeable future. Members also continued to agree 
that full adherence to the CWC and Biological Weapons 
Convention (BWC) by all governments will be a key to achieving 
a permanent global ban on chemical and biological weapons, and 
that all states adhering to theseConventions must take steps to 
ensure that their national activities support these goals. The Group 
welcomed Bulgaria as its newest member and reaffirmed its commitment to 
continue its active outreach program of briefings for non-AG countries, 
and to promote regional consultations on export controls and 
nonproliferation to further awareness and understanding of national 
policies in these areas.
    At a February 2002 intercessional meeting, an understanding 
was reached on two Department of Commerce proposals that would 
create export controls on biotechnology, and change the 
criteria for controls on chemical process valves. Three other 
Commerce proposals that would expand controls on shipments of 
dual-use chemicals, biological agents, and related equipment to 
include items useful in terrorist activities were favorably 
considered. These proposals were considered in detail at a 
Technical Experts Meeting in March 2002. AG export controls 
currently focus on items that can support militarily 
significant, state-run programs. The United States is seeking 
to augment AG controls with measures directed at commodities 
and technology that can be used to support terrorist 
activities.

The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)

    The CWC is an international arms control and 
nonproliferation treaty that bans chemical weapons and monitors 
the legitimate production, processing, consumption, export, and 
import of certain toxic chemicals and precursors that could 
contribute to the development of weapons of mass destruction. 
Certain export control provisions of the Convention are 
reflected in the EAR.

             B. ENCRYPTION/HIGH PERFORMANCE COMPUTER POLICY

Encryption

    To conform with Wassenaar changes, the Administration 

Other Popular 107th Congressional Documents Documents:

Other Documents:

107th Congressional Documents Records and Documents