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H.Doc.107-94 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA'S FY 2002 BUDGET REQUEST ACT AND FY 2001 ...


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107th Congress, 1st Session - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 107-93 


 
           A REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON EXECUTIVE ORDER 12938

                               __________

                                MESSAGE

                                  from

                   THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

                              transmitting

A REPORT ON EXECUTIVE ORDER 12938, AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 204 OF THE 
  INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCY ECONOMIC POWERS ACT AND SECTION 401(c) OF THE 
  NATIONAL EMERGENCIES ACT, PURSUANT TO 50 U.S.C. 1703(c) AND 50 U.S.C. 
  1614(c)

<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>


    July 10, 2001.--Message and accompanying papers referred to the 
     Committee on International Relations and ordered to be printed
                               __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
89-011                     WASHINGTON : 2001

To the Congress of the United States:
    Enclosed is a report to the Congress on Executive Order 
12938, as required by section 204 of the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703(c)) and section 
401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1641(c)).

                                                    George W. Bush.
    The White House, June 28, 2001.
  Report to Congress on the Emergency Regarding the Proliferation of 
                      Weapons of Mass Destruction

    Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (nuclear, chemical, and 
biological weapons) and their missile delivery vehicles are 
among the top threats to U.S. security in the post-Cold War 
world. In the hands of countries like Iran, Iraq, Libya, and 
North Korea, these weapons pose direct threats to U.S. forces 
and citizens overseas and to our friends and allies abroad. WMD 
already poses a threat to U.S. territory via terrorism and 
unconventional delivery means, and some countries of concern 
are already working on intercontinental-range missiles that 
would be able to deliver WMD against our territory directly.
    Since taking office in January 2001, my Administration has 
given high priority to dealing with the threat of WMD and 
missile proliferation. These issues figure prominently in a 
number of policy reviews (e.g., concerning North Korea), as 
well as in the Administration's reexamination of U.S. 
deterrence strategy and force posture.
    WMD and missile nonproliferation measures undertaken by the 
United States between November 2000 and May 2001 are the 
subject of this report. In November 1994, in light of the 
dangers of the proliferation of WMD and of the means of 
delivering such weapons, President Clinton issued Executive 
Order No. 12938, declaring a national emergency under the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et 
seq.). Under section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 
U.S.C. 1622(d)), the national emergency terminates on the 
anniversary date of its declaration unless, within the 90-day 
period prior to each anniversary date, the President publishes 
in the Federal Register and transmits to the Congress a notice 
stating that such emergency is to continue in effect. The 
national emergency was extended on November 14, 1995; November 
12, 1996; November 13, 1997; November 12, 1998; November 10, 
1999; and November 12, 2000.
    The following report is made pursuant to Section 204(c) of 
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 
1703(c)) and Section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 
U.S.C. 1641(c)). It reports actions taken and expenditures 
incurred pursuant to the emergency declaration during the 
period November 12, 2000 through May 15, 2001. Additional 
information on nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons (CBW) 
and missile nonproliferation efforts is contained in the most 
recent annual Report on the Proliferation of Missiles and 
Essential Components of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical 
Weapons. This report was provided to Congress pursuant to 
Section 1097 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (Public Law 102-190), also known as 
the ``Nonproliferation Report.'' Additional information in this 
regard is also contained in the most recent annual report 
provided to the Congress pursuant to Section 308 of the 
Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination 
Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-182), also known as the ``CBW 
Report.''
    On July 28, 1998, in E.O. 13094, President Clinton amended 
section 4 of E.O. 12938 to broaden the type of proliferation 
activity that can subject entities to potential penalties under 
the Executive Order. The original Executive Order provided for 
penalties for contributions to the efforts of any foreign 
country, project or entity to use, acquire, design, produce, or 
stockpile chemical or biological weapons; the amended Executive 
Order also covers contributions to foreign programs for nuclear 
weapons and for missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass 
destruction. Moreover, the amendment expands the original 
Executive Order to include attempts to contribute to foreign 
proliferation activities, as well as actual contributions, and 
broadens the range of potential penalties to expressly include 
the prohibition of United States Government assistance to 
foreign persons, and the prohibition of imports into the United 
States and United States Government procurement. In sum, the 
amendment gives the United States Government greater 
flexibility in deciding how and to what extent to impose 
measures against foreign persons that assist proliferation 
programs.

                            nuclear weapons

    Since their May 1998 nuclear tests, India and Pakistan have 
openly pursued their respective nuclear weapon programs. They 
have continued production of fissile material for nuclear 
weapons and have flight-tested nuclear-capable ballistic 
missiles. Their continued production of weapons-grade fissile 
material coupled with possession of fighter aircraft capable of 
delivering nuclear weapons gives both India and Pakistan the 
ability today to conduct a nuclear exchange. Flight testing of 
nuclear capable ballistic missiles by both countries raises the 
prospect that more sophisticated and possibly destabilizing 
capabilities will be fielded in the coming years. We have 
sought to persuade New Delhi and Islamabad that open-ended 
nuclear and missile competition in South Asia would adversely 
affect both the subcontinent and other regions. We have 
pressedfor restraint, especially to not deploy nuclear weapons or 
nuclear-capable ballistic missiles.
    Since the mandatory imposition of U.S. statutory sanctions, 
we have worked unilaterally, with other P-5 and G-8 members, 
with the South Asia Task Force (SATF), and through the UN to 
urge India and Pakistan to move toward the international 
nonproliferation mainstream. Support for international 
sanctions by other countries continues to attenuate, however.
    We have supported calls by the P-5 and G-8, and UN Security 
Council on India and Pakistan to take a broad range of concrete 
actions designed to prevent a costly and destabilizing nuclear 
arms and missile race, with possible implications beyond the 
region. During the Clinton Administration, the United States 
focused most intensely on several objectives that it thought 
could be met over the short and medium term: an end to nuclear 
testing and adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban 
Treaty (CTBT); constructive engagement in negotiations on a 
Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) and, pending its 
conclusion, a moratorium on production of fissile material for 
nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices; restraint 
in the development of nuclear-capable missiles, particularly 
non-deployment; and adoption of controls meeting international 
standards on exports of sensitive materials and technology.
    Intensive high-level U.S. dialogues with Indian and 
Pakistani officials yielded only modest progress, principally 
on export controls. Indian and Pakistani leaders reaffirmed 
their countries' testing moratoria, declared in the wake of the 
tests. Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee announced during his 
visit to Washington in September 2000 that India would maintain 
its moratorium until CTBT entered into force. Pakistan's 
leaders have said Pakistan will not be the first to test.
    India and Pakistan both withdrew their opposition to 
negotiations on an FMCT in Geneva at the end of the 1998 
Conference on Disarmament session, and negotiations got 
underway for a brief time. However, these negotiations were 
unable to resume in 1999 or 2000 due to a deadlock over the 
negotiating mandate.
    Some progress was achieved in bringing Indian and Pakistan 
export controls, while non-specific, but generally effective, 
into closer conformity with international standards. In April 
2000, India instituted new, more specific regulations on many 
categories of sensitive non-nuclear equipment and technology, 
and has said that nuclear-related regulations will be 
forthcoming. In July 2000, Pakistan publicly announced 
regulations restricting nuclear exports and has indicated that 
further measures are being prepared. Both countries' steps 
still fall short of international standards, however. We have 
begun with India a program of technical cooperation designed to 
improve the effectiveness of its already extensive export 
controls, and to encourage further steps to bring India's 
controls in line with international standards. Similar 
assistance to Pakistan is prohibited by coup-related sanctions.
    The summer 1999 Kargil conflict and the October 1999 
military take-over in Pakistan resulted in the suspension of 
the Indo-Pakistani bilateral dialogue begun at Lahore. Tensions 
remain high, particularly over insurgent attacks in Kashmir. 
India unilaterally suspended offensive military operations in 
Kashmir in November of 2000, and India and Pakistan have all 
but ceased artillery barrages across the line of control.
    My Administration has an active review underway of U.S. 
nonproliferation related sanctions policy toward South Asia. 
The results of that review will be discussed in the November 
2001 version of this report.
    In October 1994, the United States and the Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) signed an 
Agreed Framework which, if fully implemented, will ultimately 
result in Pyongyang's full compliance with the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreement, Under the 
Agreed framework, as it has been interpreted to date, the DPRK 
is not required to come into full compliance with its IAEA 
safeguards agreement until a significant portion of the light 
water reactor project is completed, but must do so before the 
delivery of key unclear components. As a first step, North 
Korea froze construction and operations at its declared nuclear 
facilities at Yongbyon and Taechon. The freeze remains in place 
and is monitored by the IAEA, which has maintained a continuous 
presence at the Yongbyon site since 1994.
    The United States and DPRK have also cooperated in the 
canning of spent fuel from the North's 5 megawatt nuclear 
reactor. Canning of all accessible spent fuel rods and rod 
fragments was completed in April 2000. The IAEA continues to 
monitor the canned fuel and has confirmed that any remaining 
rod fragments, which are currently inaccessible, do not 
represent a proliferation concern. The U.S. spent-fuel team 
regularlyreturns to the DPRK to continue clean-up operations 
and to look at maintenance.
    The Agreed Framework bars the DPRK from constructing any 
new graphite-moderated reactors or related facilities, 
including reprocessing plants. United States identification in 
mid-1998 of an underground site near Kumchang-ni in North 
Korea, which was suspected of being nuclear-related, led to an 
arrangement providing for U.S. access to the site as long as 
U.S. suspicions remained. On the basis of visits to the 
facility in May 1999 and May 2000, the United States concluded 
that the site as then configured was not suited to house a 
nuclear reactor or reprocessing operations and therefore was 
not a violation of the Agreed Framework. The U.S.- DPRK Joint 
Communique issued in October 2000, following the visit of DPRK 
Special Envoy Jo Myong Rok to Washington, stated that ``U.S. 
concern'' about Kumchang-ni had been ``removed.'' In that 
document, both sides pledged to ``redouble their commitment and 
their efforts to fulfill their respective obligations in their 
entirety under the Agreed Framework.'' The DPRK also reaffirmed 
its ballistic missile flight test moratorium.
    In March 2001, I met with ROK President Kim Dae-Jung. The 
resulting joint statement reaffirmed the commitment of the 
United States and the ROK to continue the 1994 Agreed 
Framework, while calling on North Korea ``to join in taking the 
needed steps for its successful implementation.'' Subsequently, 
in March 2001, My Administration began a full review of U.S. 
policy toward North Korea, with the purpose of determining the 
nature of any future U.S. dialogue with North Korea. My 
Administration is taking into account the views of key allies 
as it proceeds with the ongoing review. The results of the 
review will be discussed in the November 2001 version of this 
report.
    The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the 
cornerstone of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. The 
April-May 2000 NPT Review Conference (REVCON) concluded 
successfully and provided an important boost to the NPT and to 
nuclear nonproliferation goals in general. In the Fall of 2000, 
the REVCON outcome was reinforced at the UN General Assembly 
and at the General Conference of the IAEA. The United States 
continued to pursue policies aimed at advancing the goals of 
the NPT, particularly those related to compliance with the 
Treaty's nonproliferation obligations. In March 2001, the 
United States met with other NPT Depository Governments (UK and 
Russia) in Geneva to discuss the procedural steps necessary to 
begin the review process leading to the next Conference of NPT 
Parties in 2005.
    The IAEA attempts to verify states' compliance with their 
safeguards agreement pursuant to their NPT obligations. The 
discovery at the time of the Gulf War of Iraq's extensive 
covert nuclear activities led to an international consensus in 
favor of strengthening the IAEA safeguards system's ability to 
detect undeclared nuclear material and activities. The United 
States and a large number of like-minded states negotiated in 
the mid-1990s substantial safeguards strengthening measures, 
including the use of environmental sampling techniques, 
expansion of the classes of nuclear activities states are 
required to declare, and expansion of IAEA access rights. 
Measures requiring additional legal authority are embodied in a 
Model Additional Protocol approved in 1997. This Protocol has 
now been signed by 55 states and has entered into force for 19 
countries. Provided the IAEA is given the resources and 
political support it needs to implement its new safeguards 
measures effectively, proliferators who have ratified the 
Additional Protocol will likely find it harder to evade the 
system. However, to date, no country of concern/proliferator 
has adopted the Protocol.
    The purpose of the 35-nation Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT) Exporters (Zangger) Committee is to harmonize 
implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty's requirement to 
apply IAEA safeguards to nuclear exports. Article III.2 of the 
Treaty requires parties to ensure that IAEA safeguards are 
applied to exports to non-nuclear weapon states of (a) source 
or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material 
especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or 
production of special fissionable material. The Committee 
maintains and updates a list (the ``Trigger List'') of 
equipment that may only be exported if safeguards are applied 
to the recipient facility. The relative informality of the 
Zangger Committee has enabled it to take the lead on certain 
nonproliferation issues that would be more difficult to resolve 
in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).
    As its October 2000 meeting, the Committee discussed the 

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