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H.Doc.107-94 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA'S FY 2002 BUDGET REQUEST ACT AND FY 2001 ...
107th Congress, 1st Session - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 107-93 A REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON EXECUTIVE ORDER 12938 __________ MESSAGE from THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES transmitting A REPORT ON EXECUTIVE ORDER 12938, AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 204 OF THE INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCY ECONOMIC POWERS ACT AND SECTION 401(c) OF THE NATIONAL EMERGENCIES ACT, PURSUANT TO 50 U.S.C. 1703(c) AND 50 U.S.C. 1614(c) <GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT> July 10, 2001.--Message and accompanying papers referred to the Committee on International Relations and ordered to be printed __________ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 89-011 WASHINGTON : 2001 To the Congress of the United States: Enclosed is a report to the Congress on Executive Order 12938, as required by section 204 of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703(c)) and section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1641(c)). George W. Bush. The White House, June 28, 2001. Report to Congress on the Emergency Regarding the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) (nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons) and their missile delivery vehicles are among the top threats to U.S. security in the post-Cold War world. In the hands of countries like Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea, these weapons pose direct threats to U.S. forces and citizens overseas and to our friends and allies abroad. WMD already poses a threat to U.S. territory via terrorism and unconventional delivery means, and some countries of concern are already working on intercontinental-range missiles that would be able to deliver WMD against our territory directly. Since taking office in January 2001, my Administration has given high priority to dealing with the threat of WMD and missile proliferation. These issues figure prominently in a number of policy reviews (e.g., concerning North Korea), as well as in the Administration's reexamination of U.S. deterrence strategy and force posture. WMD and missile nonproliferation measures undertaken by the United States between November 2000 and May 2001 are the subject of this report. In November 1994, in light of the dangers of the proliferation of WMD and of the means of delivering such weapons, President Clinton issued Executive Order No. 12938, declaring a national emergency under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.). Under section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), the national emergency terminates on the anniversary date of its declaration unless, within the 90-day period prior to each anniversary date, the President publishes in the Federal Register and transmits to the Congress a notice stating that such emergency is to continue in effect. The national emergency was extended on November 14, 1995; November 12, 1996; November 13, 1997; November 12, 1998; November 10, 1999; and November 12, 2000. The following report is made pursuant to Section 204(c) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1703(c)) and Section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1641(c)). It reports actions taken and expenditures incurred pursuant to the emergency declaration during the period November 12, 2000 through May 15, 2001. Additional information on nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons (CBW) and missile nonproliferation efforts is contained in the most recent annual Report on the Proliferation of Missiles and Essential Components of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons. This report was provided to Congress pursuant to Section 1097 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (Public Law 102-190), also known as the ``Nonproliferation Report.'' Additional information in this regard is also contained in the most recent annual report provided to the Congress pursuant to Section 308 of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-182), also known as the ``CBW Report.'' On July 28, 1998, in E.O. 13094, President Clinton amended section 4 of E.O. 12938 to broaden the type of proliferation activity that can subject entities to potential penalties under the Executive Order. The original Executive Order provided for penalties for contributions to the efforts of any foreign country, project or entity to use, acquire, design, produce, or stockpile chemical or biological weapons; the amended Executive Order also covers contributions to foreign programs for nuclear weapons and for missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, the amendment expands the original Executive Order to include attempts to contribute to foreign proliferation activities, as well as actual contributions, and broadens the range of potential penalties to expressly include the prohibition of United States Government assistance to foreign persons, and the prohibition of imports into the United States and United States Government procurement. In sum, the amendment gives the United States Government greater flexibility in deciding how and to what extent to impose measures against foreign persons that assist proliferation programs. nuclear weapons Since their May 1998 nuclear tests, India and Pakistan have openly pursued their respective nuclear weapon programs. They have continued production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and have flight-tested nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. Their continued production of weapons-grade fissile material coupled with possession of fighter aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons gives both India and Pakistan the ability today to conduct a nuclear exchange. Flight testing of nuclear capable ballistic missiles by both countries raises the prospect that more sophisticated and possibly destabilizing capabilities will be fielded in the coming years. We have sought to persuade New Delhi and Islamabad that open-ended nuclear and missile competition in South Asia would adversely affect both the subcontinent and other regions. We have pressedfor restraint, especially to not deploy nuclear weapons or nuclear-capable ballistic missiles. Since the mandatory imposition of U.S. statutory sanctions, we have worked unilaterally, with other P-5 and G-8 members, with the South Asia Task Force (SATF), and through the UN to urge India and Pakistan to move toward the international nonproliferation mainstream. Support for international sanctions by other countries continues to attenuate, however. We have supported calls by the P-5 and G-8, and UN Security Council on India and Pakistan to take a broad range of concrete actions designed to prevent a costly and destabilizing nuclear arms and missile race, with possible implications beyond the region. During the Clinton Administration, the United States focused most intensely on several objectives that it thought could be met over the short and medium term: an end to nuclear testing and adherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); constructive engagement in negotiations on a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) and, pending its conclusion, a moratorium on production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices; restraint in the development of nuclear-capable missiles, particularly non-deployment; and adoption of controls meeting international standards on exports of sensitive materials and technology. Intensive high-level U.S. dialogues with Indian and Pakistani officials yielded only modest progress, principally on export controls. Indian and Pakistani leaders reaffirmed their countries' testing moratoria, declared in the wake of the tests. Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee announced during his visit to Washington in September 2000 that India would maintain its moratorium until CTBT entered into force. Pakistan's leaders have said Pakistan will not be the first to test. India and Pakistan both withdrew their opposition to negotiations on an FMCT in Geneva at the end of the 1998 Conference on Disarmament session, and negotiations got underway for a brief time. However, these negotiations were unable to resume in 1999 or 2000 due to a deadlock over the negotiating mandate. Some progress was achieved in bringing Indian and Pakistan export controls, while non-specific, but generally effective, into closer conformity with international standards. In April 2000, India instituted new, more specific regulations on many categories of sensitive non-nuclear equipment and technology, and has said that nuclear-related regulations will be forthcoming. In July 2000, Pakistan publicly announced regulations restricting nuclear exports and has indicated that further measures are being prepared. Both countries' steps still fall short of international standards, however. We have begun with India a program of technical cooperation designed to improve the effectiveness of its already extensive export controls, and to encourage further steps to bring India's controls in line with international standards. Similar assistance to Pakistan is prohibited by coup-related sanctions. The summer 1999 Kargil conflict and the October 1999 military take-over in Pakistan resulted in the suspension of the Indo-Pakistani bilateral dialogue begun at Lahore. Tensions remain high, particularly over insurgent attacks in Kashmir. India unilaterally suspended offensive military operations in Kashmir in November of 2000, and India and Pakistan have all but ceased artillery barrages across the line of control. My Administration has an active review underway of U.S. nonproliferation related sanctions policy toward South Asia. The results of that review will be discussed in the November 2001 version of this report. In October 1994, the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK or North Korea) signed an Agreed Framework which, if fully implemented, will ultimately result in Pyongyang's full compliance with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreement, Under the Agreed framework, as it has been interpreted to date, the DPRK is not required to come into full compliance with its IAEA safeguards agreement until a significant portion of the light water reactor project is completed, but must do so before the delivery of key unclear components. As a first step, North Korea froze construction and operations at its declared nuclear facilities at Yongbyon and Taechon. The freeze remains in place and is monitored by the IAEA, which has maintained a continuous presence at the Yongbyon site since 1994. The United States and DPRK have also cooperated in the canning of spent fuel from the North's 5 megawatt nuclear reactor. Canning of all accessible spent fuel rods and rod fragments was completed in April 2000. The IAEA continues to monitor the canned fuel and has confirmed that any remaining rod fragments, which are currently inaccessible, do not represent a proliferation concern. The U.S. spent-fuel team regularlyreturns to the DPRK to continue clean-up operations and to look at maintenance. The Agreed Framework bars the DPRK from constructing any new graphite-moderated reactors or related facilities, including reprocessing plants. United States identification in mid-1998 of an underground site near Kumchang-ni in North Korea, which was suspected of being nuclear-related, led to an arrangement providing for U.S. access to the site as long as U.S. suspicions remained. On the basis of visits to the facility in May 1999 and May 2000, the United States concluded that the site as then configured was not suited to house a nuclear reactor or reprocessing operations and therefore was not a violation of the Agreed Framework. The U.S.- DPRK Joint Communique issued in October 2000, following the visit of DPRK Special Envoy Jo Myong Rok to Washington, stated that ``U.S. concern'' about Kumchang-ni had been ``removed.'' In that document, both sides pledged to ``redouble their commitment and their efforts to fulfill their respective obligations in their entirety under the Agreed Framework.'' The DPRK also reaffirmed its ballistic missile flight test moratorium. In March 2001, I met with ROK President Kim Dae-Jung. The resulting joint statement reaffirmed the commitment of the United States and the ROK to continue the 1994 Agreed Framework, while calling on North Korea ``to join in taking the needed steps for its successful implementation.'' Subsequently, in March 2001, My Administration began a full review of U.S. policy toward North Korea, with the purpose of determining the nature of any future U.S. dialogue with North Korea. My Administration is taking into account the views of key allies as it proceeds with the ongoing review. The results of the review will be discussed in the November 2001 version of this report. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the cornerstone of the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. The April-May 2000 NPT Review Conference (REVCON) concluded successfully and provided an important boost to the NPT and to nuclear nonproliferation goals in general. In the Fall of 2000, the REVCON outcome was reinforced at the UN General Assembly and at the General Conference of the IAEA. The United States continued to pursue policies aimed at advancing the goals of the NPT, particularly those related to compliance with the Treaty's nonproliferation obligations. In March 2001, the United States met with other NPT Depository Governments (UK and Russia) in Geneva to discuss the procedural steps necessary to begin the review process leading to the next Conference of NPT Parties in 2005. The IAEA attempts to verify states' compliance with their safeguards agreement pursuant to their NPT obligations. The discovery at the time of the Gulf War of Iraq's extensive covert nuclear activities led to an international consensus in favor of strengthening the IAEA safeguards system's ability to detect undeclared nuclear material and activities. The United States and a large number of like-minded states negotiated in the mid-1990s substantial safeguards strengthening measures, including the use of environmental sampling techniques, expansion of the classes of nuclear activities states are required to declare, and expansion of IAEA access rights. Measures requiring additional legal authority are embodied in a Model Additional Protocol approved in 1997. This Protocol has now been signed by 55 states and has entered into force for 19 countries. Provided the IAEA is given the resources and political support it needs to implement its new safeguards measures effectively, proliferators who have ratified the Additional Protocol will likely find it harder to evade the system. However, to date, no country of concern/proliferator has adopted the Protocol. The purpose of the 35-nation Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Exporters (Zangger) Committee is to harmonize implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty's requirement to apply IAEA safeguards to nuclear exports. Article III.2 of the Treaty requires parties to ensure that IAEA safeguards are applied to exports to non-nuclear weapon states of (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material. The Committee maintains and updates a list (the ``Trigger List'') of equipment that may only be exported if safeguards are applied to the recipient facility. The relative informality of the Zangger Committee has enabled it to take the lead on certain nonproliferation issues that would be more difficult to resolve in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). As its October 2000 meeting, the Committee discussed the
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