H.Doc.108-42 CONTINUATION OF THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY WITH RESPECT TO CUBA ...

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108th Congress, 1st Session - - - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 108-41


 
                   EMERGENCY REGARDING PROLIFERATION


                    OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

                               __________

                                MESSAGE

                                  from

                   THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

                              transmitting

A 6-MONTH PERIODIC REPORT ON THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY WITH RESPECT TO THE 
   PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION THAT WAS DECLARED IN 
   EXECUTIVE ORDER 12938 OF NOVEMBER 14, 1994, PURSUANT TO 50 U.S.C. 
                     1703(c) AND 50 U.S.C. 1641(c)

<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>


  February 26, 2003.--Message and accompanying papers referred to the 
     Committee on International Relations and ordered to be printed
To the Congress of the United States:
    As required by section 204(c) of the International 
Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1703(c), and section 
401(c) of the National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. 1641(c), I 
transmit herewith a 6-month periodic report prepared by my 
Administration on the national emergency with respect to the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction that was declared 
in Executive Order 12938 of November 14, 1994.

                                                    George W. Bush.
    The White House, February 25, 2003.
    Periodic Report to Congress on the National Emergency Regarding 
              Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

    This report to the Congress addresses the developments over 
the past 6 months concerning the national emergency with 
respect to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD)--nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons--and the means 
of delivering such weapons, that was declared in Executive 
Order 12938 on November 14, 1994, as amended by Executive Order 
13094 of July 28, 1998. This report is submitted pursuant to 
section 204(c) of the International Emergency Economic Powers 
Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. 1703(c) and section 401(c) of the 
National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. 1641(c). It reports actions 
taken and expenditures incurred pursuant to the emergency 
declaration only during the period of May 15, 2002 through 
November 12, 2002.
    To address the dangers posed by the proliferation of WMD 
and their delivery systems, on November 14, 1994, President 
Clinton issued Executive Order 12938, declaring a national 
emergency under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act 
(50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.). On July 28, 1998, President Clinton, 
pursuant to the provisions of IEEPA, issued E.O. 13094 to amend 
E.O. 12938 in order to respond more effectively to the 
worldwide threat of WMD proliferation. Under section 202(d) of 
the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), the national 
emergency terminates on the anniversary date of its declaration 
unless, within the ninety-day period prior to each anniversary 
date, the President publishes a Continuation of Emergency 
Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Federal Register 
and transmits the notice to the Congress. The national 
emergency was extended on November 14, 1995; November 12, 1996; 
November 13, 1997; November 12, 1998; November 10, 1999; 
November 12, 2000; November 9, 2001; and November 12, 2002.
    Weapons of mass destruction--nuclear, chemical, and 
biological weapons--and their missile delivery systems in the 
hands of potential adversary states and terrorists are among 
the top threats to U.S. security in the post-Cold War world. In 
the hands of countries like those on the U.S. list of 
terrorist-supporting states, these weapons would pose direct 
threats to the United States and its forces, friends and 
allies. Some of these rogue states are already working on 
intercontinental-range missiles that would be able to deliver 
WMD against our homeland directly.
    This Administration has given high priority to dealing with 
the threat of WMD and missile proliferation. The September 11, 
2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington and 
subsequent anthrax crimes reinforce the importance of efforts 
to prevent the proliferation of these weapons, especially to 
terrorists and countries that harbor terrorists.
    Additional information on nuclear, missile and/or chemical 
and biological weapons nonproliferation efforts may be found in 
the following reports: (a) the most recent annual Report on the 
Proliferation of Missiles and Essential Components of Nuclear, 
Biological and Chemical Weapons, provided to Congress pursuant 
to Section 1097 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (Public Law 102-190), also known as 
the ``Nonproliferation Report;'' (b) the most recent semi-
annual Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology 
Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced 
Conventional Munitions, provided to Congress pursuant to 
Section 721 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 1997; (c) the most recent annual report entitled 
``Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements,'' 
provided pursuant to section 403 of the Arms Control and 
Disarmament Act, 22 U.S.C. 2593a; (d) the most recent report on 
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, provided pursuant to 
Section 585 of the Foreign Operations, Export, Financing, and 
Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1997 (Public Law 104-
208); (e) the most recent report on Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Policy in South Asia, provided pursuant to Public Law 102-391, 
Section 585; (f) the most recent Report on Regional 
Nonproliferation in South Asia, submitted pursuant to Section 
620F(c) of Foreign Assistance Act; (g) the most recent Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Report known as the ``section 601 Report,'' 
submitted pursuant to Section 601 of the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (Public Law 95-242), as amended by 
the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994; (h) the most 
recent semiannual report on Proliferation-Related Transfers to 
Iran, submitted pursuant to Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000; 
(i) the most recent report on the Iran-Iraq Arms 
Nonproliferation Act of 1992, sections 1604-1608; and (j) the 
most recent report on Libya sanctions, provided pursuant to 
Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, section 5(b).

                            NUCLEAR WEAPONS

    Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: The Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the cornerstone of 
the global effort to halt nuclear proliferation. The first 
meeting of the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the 2005 NPT 
Review Conference (RevCon) took place April 8-19, 2002, at U.N. 
headquarters in New York. The PrepCom successfully completed 
its work by issuing the Chairman's report--a factual summary 
for transmission to PrepCom II, which will take place in Geneva 
from April 28 to May 9, 2003, under the Chairmanship of 
Hungarian Ambassador Laszlo Molnar.
    The United States engaged in consultations with Ambassador 
Molnar in June, August, and October of 2002. These 
consultations focused on key procedural and substantive issues 
relevant to PrepCom II. Wide-ranging bilateral discussions with 
several key NPT parties were also held in Washington, Budapest, 
Geneva, London, and New York. The five Nuclear Weapons States 
of the NPT (U.S., U.K., France, Russia, and China) also met in 
New York to discuss their approach to PrepCom II.
    The United States continues to emphasize the importance of 
compliance with the NPT and looks forward to PrepCom II as an 
opportunity for further discussion of ways and means to 
implement the Treaty. The United States will continue to meet 
all of its obligations under the NPT and notes that the signing 
on May 21, 2002 of the Moscow Treaty for the reduction of 
deployed strategic offensive nuclear weapons demonstrates that 
the United States continues to meet its obligations under the 
nuclear disarmament-related provisions of Article VI of the 
NPT.
    Iraq's and North Korea's noncompliance with the NPT remains 
of primary concern as set forth below. North Korea's admission 
in October 2002 of a secret uranium enrichment project further 
underscored the requirement to bring North Korea into 
compliance with the NPT. Iran's nuclear program is also aimed 
at the acquisition of nuclear weapons in violation of its NPT 
undertakings.
    Another significant development during the reporting period 
was Cuba's announcement on September 14, 2002, that it intends 
to become a party to the NPT.
    International Atomic Energy Agency: The International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), inter alia, verifies the 
compliance of non-nuclear weapons states with their NPT 
safeguards obligations. The IAEA safeguards system helps deter 
diversion of nuclear materials and provides a means to detect 
diversions in a timely manner should any occur. During this 
reporting period, the United States continued to provide 
significant technical and financial resources to support IAEA 
safeguards activities.
    The discovery of Iraq's extensive covert nuclear activities 
after the Persian Gulf War led to an effort to strengthen the 
IAEA safeguards system's ability to detect undeclared nuclear 
material and activities. The United States, along with a large 
number of other IAEA members, negotiated in the mid-1990s 
substantial safeguards strengthening measures, including the 
use of environmental sampling techniques, expansion of the 
information related to nuclear activities which States are 
required to declare, and expansion of IAEA access rights. Those 
measures are embodied in a Model Additional Protocol, approved 
in 1997. With these tools, the IAEA's capability to detect and 
assess a state's undeclared nuclear activity is substantially 
enhanced. This Protocol has now been signed by 61 states and 
has entered into force for 24 countries.
    On May 9, 2002, the President submitted the U.S.-IAEA 
Additional Protocol to the Senate for advice and consent to 
ratification. In doing so, he emphasized that entry into force 
of the U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol will bolster U.S. efforts 
to strengthen nuclear safeguards and therefore promote the 
nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, which is a cornerstone of 
U.S. foreign and national security policy.
    At the September 16-20, 2002 IAEA General Conference, the 
IAEA's Director General reiterated the Agency's strong 
commitment to stemming the proliferation of nuclear and 
radiological weapons. He explained the Agency's continued 
efforts in combating the threat of nuclear terrorism. A 
resolution on countering nuclear terrorism, proposed by the 
European Union (EU), was adopted, praising the IAEA for its 
significantly greater efforts in nuclear security and urging 
Member States to improve their national programs to secure 
radioactive materials. A resolution was adopted charging the 
IAEA to ascertain whether Iraq's nuclear activities and 
capabilities had changed since December 1998. A resolution on 
the strengthening of the Agency's safeguards system was 
adopted, urging States that have not yet done so to sign and 
ratify Additional Protocols. A resolution on the Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) NPT safeguards agreement was 
adopted by consensus. More states cosponsored the resolution 
than last year, indicating increased international concern over 
the DPRK's non-compliance with its safeguards agreement.
    The Zangger Committee: The purpose of the 35-nation NPT 
Exporters (Zangger) Committee is to harmonize implementation of 
the NPT's requirement to apply IAEA safeguards to nuclear 
exports. Article III.2 of the Treaty requires parties to ensure 
that IAEA safeguards are applied to exports to non-nuclear 
weapons states of (a) source or special fissionable material, 
or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared 
for the processing, use or production of special fissionable 
material. The Committee maintains and updates a list of 
equipment and materials that may only be exported if safeguards 
are applied to the recipient facility (called the ``Trigger 
List'' because such exports trigger the requirement for 
safeguards).
    The Zangger Committee is informal and its decisions are not 
legally binding upon its members. The relative informality of 
the Zangger Committee has enabled it to take the lead on 
certain nonproliferation issues that would be more difficult to 
resolve in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The Zangger 
Committee, by virtue of its link to the NPT, is in a better 
position to represent the nuclear nonproliferation regimes in 
dialogue with non-members critical of these regimes in NPT 
meetings.
    All of the NPT Nuclear Weapons States, including China, are 
members of the Zangger Committee. However, China is the only 
member of the Zangger Committee that is not also a member of 
the NSG, which requires full-scope safeguards (FSS) as a 
condition of nuclear supply to non-nuclear weapons states. 
China has not been willing to accept the FSS policy, but its 
export control lists are comparable, if not virtually 
identical, to the NSG's.
    At the October 2002 meeting, the Committee again discussed 
the application of Belarus for membership. The United States is 
still not prepared to join a consensus for acceptance of 
Belarus because of concern regarding that Government's 
commitment to nonproliferation.
    The Committee also continued discussion of possible 
outreach activities with non-member NPT Party countries, 
particularly Non-Aligned Movement countries. The Committee also 
considered proposals by the Chairman to engage in new areas of 
activity in the post-9/11 environment, including: (1) serving 
as a technical resource for non-member NPT Parties; (2) 
encouraging early ratification by states of the Additional 
Protocol to strengthen IAEA safeguards; and (3) adopting anti-
terrorism measures. Efforts will continue to reach agreement on 
inclusion of plutonium isotope separation equipment on the 
Trigger List, through technology-holders meetings chaired by 
Sweden.
    The Nuclear Suppliers Group: The NSG was formed in 1974 
following the Indian nuclear explosion, which demonstrated how 
nuclear technology and materials transferred for peaceful 
purposes could be misused. With 40 member states, the NSG is a 
widely accepted, mature, and effective export control 
arrangement that contributes to the nonproliferation of nuclear 
weapons through implementation of guidelines for control of 
nuclear and nuclear-related exports. Members pursue the aims of 
the NSG through voluntary adherence to the NSG Guidelines, 
which are adopted by consensus, and through exchanges of 
information on developments of nuclear proliferation concern.
    Nuclear suppliers took note when the 1990 NPT RevCon 
committee on implementation of Article III recommended that NPT 
Parties: (a) consider further improvements in measures to 
prevent diversion of nuclear technology for nuclear weapons; 
(b) coordinate controls of exports of significant nuclear-
related items; and (c) require full-scope safeguards as a 
condition of nuclear supply to non-nuclear weapons states. 
Shortly thereafter, it became apparent that nuclear export 
controls had not prevented Iraq, a Party to the NPT, from 
aiding its clandestine nuclear weapons program through 
acquisition of significant dual-use items. In response to these 
developments, the NSG decided in 1992 to: (a) establish 
guidelines for control of transfers of nuclear-related dual-use 
equipment, materials, and technology which could make a 
significant contribution to unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or 
nuclear explosive activities; and (b) adopt a policy of 
requiring full scope IAEA safeguards as a condition of supply 
for nuclear Trigger List items to non-nuclear weapons states.
    The NSG Guidelines, first published in 1978, established 
requirements for: (1) formal recipient government assurances 
confirming safeguards and no nuclear explosive use; (2) 
adequate physical protection; and (3) particular caution in the 
transfer of sensitive facilities, technology, and weapons-

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