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H.Doc.108-42 CONTINUATION OF THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY WITH RESPECT TO CUBA ...
108th Congress, 1st Session - - - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 108-41 EMERGENCY REGARDING PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION __________ MESSAGE from THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES transmitting A 6-MONTH PERIODIC REPORT ON THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY WITH RESPECT TO THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION THAT WAS DECLARED IN EXECUTIVE ORDER 12938 OF NOVEMBER 14, 1994, PURSUANT TO 50 U.S.C. 1703(c) AND 50 U.S.C. 1641(c) <GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT> February 26, 2003.--Message and accompanying papers referred to the Committee on International Relations and ordered to be printed To the Congress of the United States: As required by section 204(c) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1703(c), and section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. 1641(c), I transmit herewith a 6-month periodic report prepared by my Administration on the national emergency with respect to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction that was declared in Executive Order 12938 of November 14, 1994. George W. Bush. The White House, February 25, 2003. Periodic Report to Congress on the National Emergency Regarding Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction This report to the Congress addresses the developments over the past 6 months concerning the national emergency with respect to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)--nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons--and the means of delivering such weapons, that was declared in Executive Order 12938 on November 14, 1994, as amended by Executive Order 13094 of July 28, 1998. This report is submitted pursuant to section 204(c) of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. 1703(c) and section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. 1641(c). It reports actions taken and expenditures incurred pursuant to the emergency declaration only during the period of May 15, 2002 through November 12, 2002. To address the dangers posed by the proliferation of WMD and their delivery systems, on November 14, 1994, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12938, declaring a national emergency under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.). On July 28, 1998, President Clinton, pursuant to the provisions of IEEPA, issued E.O. 13094 to amend E.O. 12938 in order to respond more effectively to the worldwide threat of WMD proliferation. Under section 202(d) of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), the national emergency terminates on the anniversary date of its declaration unless, within the ninety-day period prior to each anniversary date, the President publishes a Continuation of Emergency Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Federal Register and transmits the notice to the Congress. The national emergency was extended on November 14, 1995; November 12, 1996; November 13, 1997; November 12, 1998; November 10, 1999; November 12, 2000; November 9, 2001; and November 12, 2002. Weapons of mass destruction--nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons--and their missile delivery systems in the hands of potential adversary states and terrorists are among the top threats to U.S. security in the post-Cold War world. In the hands of countries like those on the U.S. list of terrorist-supporting states, these weapons would pose direct threats to the United States and its forces, friends and allies. Some of these rogue states are already working on intercontinental-range missiles that would be able to deliver WMD against our homeland directly. This Administration has given high priority to dealing with the threat of WMD and missile proliferation. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington and subsequent anthrax crimes reinforce the importance of efforts to prevent the proliferation of these weapons, especially to terrorists and countries that harbor terrorists. Additional information on nuclear, missile and/or chemical and biological weapons nonproliferation efforts may be found in the following reports: (a) the most recent annual Report on the Proliferation of Missiles and Essential Components of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons, provided to Congress pursuant to Section 1097 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (Public Law 102-190), also known as the ``Nonproliferation Report;'' (b) the most recent semi- annual Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, provided to Congress pursuant to Section 721 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997; (c) the most recent annual report entitled ``Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements,'' provided pursuant to section 403 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, 22 U.S.C. 2593a; (d) the most recent report on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, provided pursuant to Section 585 of the Foreign Operations, Export, Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1997 (Public Law 104- 208); (e) the most recent report on Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy in South Asia, provided pursuant to Public Law 102-391, Section 585; (f) the most recent Report on Regional Nonproliferation in South Asia, submitted pursuant to Section 620F(c) of Foreign Assistance Act; (g) the most recent Nuclear Nonproliferation Report known as the ``section 601 Report,'' submitted pursuant to Section 601 of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (Public Law 95-242), as amended by the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994; (h) the most recent semiannual report on Proliferation-Related Transfers to Iran, submitted pursuant to Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000; (i) the most recent report on the Iran-Iraq Arms Nonproliferation Act of 1992, sections 1604-1608; and (j) the most recent report on Libya sanctions, provided pursuant to Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, section 5(b). NUCLEAR WEAPONS Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty: The Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the cornerstone of the global effort to halt nuclear proliferation. The first meeting of the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for the 2005 NPT Review Conference (RevCon) took place April 8-19, 2002, at U.N. headquarters in New York. The PrepCom successfully completed its work by issuing the Chairman's report--a factual summary for transmission to PrepCom II, which will take place in Geneva from April 28 to May 9, 2003, under the Chairmanship of Hungarian Ambassador Laszlo Molnar. The United States engaged in consultations with Ambassador Molnar in June, August, and October of 2002. These consultations focused on key procedural and substantive issues relevant to PrepCom II. Wide-ranging bilateral discussions with several key NPT parties were also held in Washington, Budapest, Geneva, London, and New York. The five Nuclear Weapons States of the NPT (U.S., U.K., France, Russia, and China) also met in New York to discuss their approach to PrepCom II. The United States continues to emphasize the importance of compliance with the NPT and looks forward to PrepCom II as an opportunity for further discussion of ways and means to implement the Treaty. The United States will continue to meet all of its obligations under the NPT and notes that the signing on May 21, 2002 of the Moscow Treaty for the reduction of deployed strategic offensive nuclear weapons demonstrates that the United States continues to meet its obligations under the nuclear disarmament-related provisions of Article VI of the NPT. Iraq's and North Korea's noncompliance with the NPT remains of primary concern as set forth below. North Korea's admission in October 2002 of a secret uranium enrichment project further underscored the requirement to bring North Korea into compliance with the NPT. Iran's nuclear program is also aimed at the acquisition of nuclear weapons in violation of its NPT undertakings. Another significant development during the reporting period was Cuba's announcement on September 14, 2002, that it intends to become a party to the NPT. International Atomic Energy Agency: The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), inter alia, verifies the compliance of non-nuclear weapons states with their NPT safeguards obligations. The IAEA safeguards system helps deter diversion of nuclear materials and provides a means to detect diversions in a timely manner should any occur. During this reporting period, the United States continued to provide significant technical and financial resources to support IAEA safeguards activities. The discovery of Iraq's extensive covert nuclear activities after the Persian Gulf War led to an effort to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system's ability to detect undeclared nuclear material and activities. The United States, along with a large number of other IAEA members, negotiated in the mid-1990s substantial safeguards strengthening measures, including the use of environmental sampling techniques, expansion of the information related to nuclear activities which States are required to declare, and expansion of IAEA access rights. Those measures are embodied in a Model Additional Protocol, approved in 1997. With these tools, the IAEA's capability to detect and assess a state's undeclared nuclear activity is substantially enhanced. This Protocol has now been signed by 61 states and has entered into force for 24 countries. On May 9, 2002, the President submitted the U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification. In doing so, he emphasized that entry into force of the U.S.-IAEA Additional Protocol will bolster U.S. efforts to strengthen nuclear safeguards and therefore promote the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, which is a cornerstone of U.S. foreign and national security policy. At the September 16-20, 2002 IAEA General Conference, the IAEA's Director General reiterated the Agency's strong commitment to stemming the proliferation of nuclear and radiological weapons. He explained the Agency's continued efforts in combating the threat of nuclear terrorism. A resolution on countering nuclear terrorism, proposed by the European Union (EU), was adopted, praising the IAEA for its significantly greater efforts in nuclear security and urging Member States to improve their national programs to secure radioactive materials. A resolution was adopted charging the IAEA to ascertain whether Iraq's nuclear activities and capabilities had changed since December 1998. A resolution on the strengthening of the Agency's safeguards system was adopted, urging States that have not yet done so to sign and ratify Additional Protocols. A resolution on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) NPT safeguards agreement was adopted by consensus. More states cosponsored the resolution than last year, indicating increased international concern over the DPRK's non-compliance with its safeguards agreement. The Zangger Committee: The purpose of the 35-nation NPT Exporters (Zangger) Committee is to harmonize implementation of the NPT's requirement to apply IAEA safeguards to nuclear exports. Article III.2 of the Treaty requires parties to ensure that IAEA safeguards are applied to exports to non-nuclear weapons states of (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material. The Committee maintains and updates a list of equipment and materials that may only be exported if safeguards are applied to the recipient facility (called the ``Trigger List'' because such exports trigger the requirement for safeguards). The Zangger Committee is informal and its decisions are not legally binding upon its members. The relative informality of the Zangger Committee has enabled it to take the lead on certain nonproliferation issues that would be more difficult to resolve in the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The Zangger Committee, by virtue of its link to the NPT, is in a better position to represent the nuclear nonproliferation regimes in dialogue with non-members critical of these regimes in NPT meetings. All of the NPT Nuclear Weapons States, including China, are members of the Zangger Committee. However, China is the only member of the Zangger Committee that is not also a member of the NSG, which requires full-scope safeguards (FSS) as a condition of nuclear supply to non-nuclear weapons states. China has not been willing to accept the FSS policy, but its export control lists are comparable, if not virtually identical, to the NSG's. At the October 2002 meeting, the Committee again discussed the application of Belarus for membership. The United States is still not prepared to join a consensus for acceptance of Belarus because of concern regarding that Government's commitment to nonproliferation. The Committee also continued discussion of possible outreach activities with non-member NPT Party countries, particularly Non-Aligned Movement countries. The Committee also considered proposals by the Chairman to engage in new areas of activity in the post-9/11 environment, including: (1) serving as a technical resource for non-member NPT Parties; (2) encouraging early ratification by states of the Additional Protocol to strengthen IAEA safeguards; and (3) adopting anti- terrorism measures. Efforts will continue to reach agreement on inclusion of plutonium isotope separation equipment on the Trigger List, through technology-holders meetings chaired by Sweden. The Nuclear Suppliers Group: The NSG was formed in 1974 following the Indian nuclear explosion, which demonstrated how nuclear technology and materials transferred for peaceful purposes could be misused. With 40 member states, the NSG is a widely accepted, mature, and effective export control arrangement that contributes to the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons through implementation of guidelines for control of nuclear and nuclear-related exports. Members pursue the aims of the NSG through voluntary adherence to the NSG Guidelines, which are adopted by consensus, and through exchanges of information on developments of nuclear proliferation concern. Nuclear suppliers took note when the 1990 NPT RevCon committee on implementation of Article III recommended that NPT Parties: (a) consider further improvements in measures to prevent diversion of nuclear technology for nuclear weapons; (b) coordinate controls of exports of significant nuclear- related items; and (c) require full-scope safeguards as a condition of nuclear supply to non-nuclear weapons states. Shortly thereafter, it became apparent that nuclear export controls had not prevented Iraq, a Party to the NPT, from aiding its clandestine nuclear weapons program through acquisition of significant dual-use items. In response to these developments, the NSG decided in 1992 to: (a) establish guidelines for control of transfers of nuclear-related dual-use equipment, materials, and technology which could make a significant contribution to unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activities; and (b) adopt a policy of requiring full scope IAEA safeguards as a condition of supply for nuclear Trigger List items to non-nuclear weapons states. The NSG Guidelines, first published in 1978, established requirements for: (1) formal recipient government assurances confirming safeguards and no nuclear explosive use; (2) adequate physical protection; and (3) particular caution in the transfer of sensitive facilities, technology, and weapons-
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