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H.Doc.108-7 PERIODIC REPORT ON THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY CAUSED BY THE LAPSE OF THE ...
108th Congress, 1st Session - - - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 108-6 KOSOVO BENCHMARKS __________ COMMUNICATION from THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES transmitting A REPORT ON THE PROGRESS MADE IN ACHIEVING THE MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT BENCHMARKS FOR CONDITIONS THAT WOULD ACHIEVE A SUSTAINABLE PEACE IN KOSOVO, PURSUANT TO PUB. L. 106-398 <GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT> January 7, 2003.--Referred jointly to the Committees on International Relations, Armed Services, and Appropriations and ordered to be printed The White House, Washington, November 26, 2002. Hon. J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Washington, DC. Dear Mr. Speaker: Pursuant to section 1212 of the Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, Public Law 106-398, I hereby submit a report, prepared by my Administration, on the progress made in achieving the militarily significant benchmarks for conditions that would achieve a sustainable peace in Kosovo and ultimately allow for the withdrawal of the United States military presence in Kosovo. The term ``militarily significant'' relates to tasks and objectives significant from a military standpoint that once accomplished would allow for withdrawal of military forces from Kosovo. In the establishment of the Kosovo benchmarks, four critical tasks for NATO forces were identified: military stability, public security, border/boundary issues, and war crimes/International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia support. Objectives for these tasks were drawn from United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, the NATO Operations Plan, the Military Technical Agreement, and the Kosovo Liberation Army Undertaking. I anticipate that KFOR--and U.S. participation in it--will gradually reduce in size as public security conditions improve and Kosovars assume increasing responsibility for their own self-government. Sincerely, George W. Bush. Kosovo Benchmarks INTRODUCTION Section 1212(a) of Public Law 106-398, The Floyd D. Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (the Act), requires that ``The President shall develop militarily significant benchmarks for conditions that would achieve a sustainable peace in Kosovo and ultimately allow for the withdrawal of the U.S. military presence in Kosovo.'' Pursuant to Section 1212(b) of the Act, I am providing this report to Congress on progress in Kosovo toward achieving such militarily significant benchmarks. Every 6 months, NATO reviews the situation on the ground in Kosovo and Bosnia, and adjusts troop strengths in the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) accordingly. Reflecting a positive trend in the region, the Foreign Ministers and Defense Ministers of NATO took important decisions during their Spring 2002 ministerials regarding a regional approach in the Balkans, including Kosovo. As a result of these decisions, KFOR will be reduced from 36,000 as of June 2002, to 32,000 by December 2002, and 29,000 by June 2003. This latter figure represents about a 38 percent reduction from the initial KFOR commitment of 47,000 following Operation ALLIED FORCE in 1999. The U.S. contribution in KFOR will be reduced from 5,200 in June 2002 to approximately 4,000 in June 2003, thereby remaining at approximately 15 percent of the total force. BACKGROUND The benchmarks measure progress in achieving a sustainable peace in Kosovo. The objectives and tasks were drawn from several important documents: the NATO Operation Plan for Kosovo (OPLAN 10413); United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244 (1999); the Military Technical Agreement (MTA) between the international Security Force (KFOR) and the governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia; and the Undertaking of Demilitarization and Transformation of the Kosovo Liberation Army (the Undertaking). Significant progress has been made in Kosovo since the establishment of KFOR and the U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). KFOR has completed several military tasks specified in OPLAN 10413 and UNSCR 1244. The remaining tasks are of a continuous or recurring nature and provide for the unimpeded operation of UNMIK, freedom of movement for minorities, and the safe return of displaced persons and refugees. KFOR efforts have helped UNMIK to make substantial progress in implementing UNSCR 1244: reconstruction is well- advanced, free and fair elections held twice, more than 4,900 multi-ethnic Kosovo police trained and deployed, and a new constitutional framework for provisional self-government promulgated. Security challenges remain in the form of ethnically oriented, political extremist and criminally motivated armed groups who threaten to compromise these accomplishments, both through their actions in Kosovo and in southern Serbia and Macedonia. Rather than Yugoslav and Serbian forces posing a continued risk, these internal factors are now the primary threat to public security within Kosovo. KFOR and UNMIK will have to continue to cooperate over the coming months to deter and disrupt the activities of these groups, and continue to ensure stability in Kosovo and, by extension, the surrounding region. PROGRESS REVIEW The benchmarks depict progress on four overarching tasks and related objectives that will allow for the withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Kosovo. They are: Military Stability; Public Security; Border and Boundary Issues; and, War Crimes. 1. Task: Military Stability Objectives <bullet> Withdrawal of Yugoslav and Serbian Security Forces from Kosovo. <bullet> Demilitarization of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other armed Kosovar-Albanian groups. <bullet> Deterrence of renewed hostilities, maintenance and, where necessary, enforcement of the cease-fire. Progress on these objectives and the benchmarks associated with them has been very good. FRY forces have withdrawn from Kosovo and have adhered to all military agreements, the Kosovo Liberation Army has been demilitarized and there are no ongoing hostilities in Kosovo. Benchmarks a. The cease-fire has been maintained and FRY has adhered to the MTA The rampant ethnic cleansing and the killing of Spring 1999 is now history and neither party to the conflict has resumed military action. FRY forces left Kosovo as called for in the MTA. In 2001, NATO oversaw a reduction in the Air Safety Zone and the return of FRY forces to the GSZ in southern Serbia, as part of a political agreement to end fighting between government forces and ethnic Albanian groups in southern Serbia. b. KLA has been demilitarized and transformed in compliance with the Undertaking The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) ceased to exist on September 20, 1999. Many former KLA members chose to enter the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), now a civil emergency response force, or the Kosovo Police Service. c. Establishment of the KPC and low incidence of officer noncompliance The KPC was created in 1999 out of demobilized KLA troops. UNMIK Regulation 1999/8 authorizes the KPC to engage in disaster response, search and rescue, and infrastructure rebuilding activities. The KPC is permitted no role in law enforcement, security or defense. KFOR and UNMIK jointly supervise the KPC. Authorized strength is 5,000 members; by the end of 2002 just under 2,000 will have moved from active to reserve status with an additional 2,000 projected to follow. Ten percent of the positions are reserved for minorities. The 2001 KPC budget was approximately $11.8 million. One of the primary purposes for the establishment of the KPC was to provide transparency to the process of demilitarizing the KLA. While some individual members of the KPC are involved in supporting extremism and organized crime, since the KPC was established, documented non-compliance has declined from 35 incidents per month to as few as 4 per month, to include such incidents as illegal possession of weapons and ammunition, and celebratory gunfire. d. FRY and Kosovars participate in the Joint Implementation Commission The Joint Implementation Commission (JIC) was established in accordance with the MTA and given two key mandates: ensure compliance with the MTA and demilitarize the KLA. JICs have been established at two echelons--at KFOR Headquarters and at each of the five Multinational Brigades (MNBs). Meetings between KFOR, Yugoslav Army (VJ), FRY Ministry of Interior Police (MUP), UNMIK CIVPOL, FRY JIC, International Committee for Red Cross (ICRC) and Border Police occur on a regular basis. Topical areas range from administrative issues such as ID cards to security issues such as VJ/MUP manned contact points on/near the administrative boundary. The JICs have facilitated training for the KPC in first aid, fire fighting, land navigation, identification of unexploded ordnance, construction, and humanitarian relief. e. End of Offensive Activities by armed groups Large armed groups are no longer active in Kosovo proper, but ethnic Albanian armed groups (EAAGs) in southern Serbia and in Macedonia have used Kosovo as a supply route and base for recruiting and fundraising. KFOR and U.N. police have been active in apprehending members of these groups and their supporters, and the United States Government has repeatedly reminded Kosovo's political leaders and the KPC that any support for the insurgents' activities is not acceptable. 2. Task: Public Security Objectives <bullet> Establishment and maintenance of a secure environment for the operation of UNMIK, the delivery of humanitarian aid, and the safe return of refugees and displaced persons to their homes. <bullet> Ensure protection and freedom of movement for KFOR, UNMIK, and other International Organizations (IOs). <bullet> Transfer responsibility for public safety and order when either UNMIK or newly elected Kosovar authorities can take responsibility for this function. Significant progress has been achieved toward the benchmarks related to these objectives, but continued progress in the area of public security will require a strong continued commitment by the international community to provide resources for rule of law and other security programs. Benchmarks a. UNMIK safely conducts its mission UNMIK has regional administrations in each KFOR MNB, headed by an international administrator and staffed by a mixture of international and local staff. Additionally, there are UNMIK offices in each of Kosovo's 30 municipalities. UNMIK success stories include promulgation of the Constitutional Framework, municipal and province-wide elections, registration of and distribution of ID cards to nearly one million Kosovars, and issuance of over 30,000 travel documents recognized in 20 countries. In all UNMIK endeavors (except North Mitrovica)-- from travel to governance--UNMIK has been able to safely conduct its mission. b. IOs travel without disruption of their activities Travel in Kosovo by IOs is generally unimpeded. Serb residents in northern Kosovo sporadically established roadblocks in Serb majority areas, but alternative routes were available to IOs with little or no disruption of their activities. c. Humanitarian relief delivered Humanitarian relief was one of the original UNMIK pillars, led by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), but as humanitarian needs abated, the UNMIK humanitarian pillar ceased operations in June 2000. UNMIK has institutionalized the delivery of goods and services to Kosovo's neediest populations through a system of Centers for Social Work. These centers ensure poor, isolated and/or minority communities have the goods and services they require. UNHCR also remains active in its core protection functions, including minority stabilization and returns. d. Initial demining efforts accomplished and responsibility transferred to requisite civilian authorities Since June 1999, over 20,000 mines, 13,000 items of unexploded ordnance (UXO), and 6,700 cluster bomb units (CBU) have been located and destroyed. Over 25 million square meters of land have been cleared and returned to use. There are 16 different international demining organizations involved in mine awareness activities; and mine awareness has been incorporated into the Kosovo school system curriculum. While KFOR's mandate is concerned only with minefields that impede its mission, KFOR soldiers continue to mark newly discovered minefields for demining by accredited civilian agencies. Also, the KPC has been trained to conduct emergency explosive ordinance disposal services and is primarily responsible for UXO deactivation or destruction. The overall result of this concentrated effort has been a drastic reduction in mine/UXO/CBU-related casualties. In light of these operating procedures, this benchmark is essentially accomplished. e. Elections held in secure environment UNMIK held elections for Municipal Assemblies in October 2000. Kosovars endured long lines to vote in municipal elections that were deemed free and fair, and that were unmarred by violence. Local assemblies and governments have been established in almost all of Kosovo's 30 municipalities, including most Serb-dominated ones in the north. Province-wide elections for a Provincial Assembly were held in November 2001. UNMIK Police, KPS, and KFOR worked together to help ensure these first-ever democratic provincial elections were not marred by any significant violence. In Spring 2002, the Assembly elected a President and a Prime Minister to head Kosovo's provisional government. f. Parallel institutions dissolved and pose no threat to KFOR and/or UNMIK authority There were two parallel sets of institutions initially operating in Kosovo. The Provisional Government of Kosovo (PGOK), led by former KLA elements, installed officials in 27 of Kosovo's 30 municipalities. These officials exercised varying amounts of power and influence, in some cases collecting taxes and regulating business and property. The second set of parallel institutions was a ``shadow government''
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