H.Doc.108-7 PERIODIC REPORT ON THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY CAUSED BY THE LAPSE OF THE ...

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108th Congress, 1st Session - - - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 108-6


 
                           KOSOVO BENCHMARKS

                               __________

                             COMMUNICATION

                                  from

                   THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

                              transmitting

 A REPORT ON THE PROGRESS MADE IN ACHIEVING THE MILITARILY SIGNIFICANT 
  BENCHMARKS FOR CONDITIONS THAT WOULD ACHIEVE A SUSTAINABLE PEACE IN 
                  KOSOVO, PURSUANT TO PUB. L. 106-398

<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>


 January 7, 2003.--Referred jointly to the Committees on International 
Relations, Armed Services, and Appropriations and ordered to be printed
                                           The White House,
                                     Washington, November 26, 2002.
Hon. J. Dennis Hastert,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Speaker: Pursuant to section 1212 of the Floyd D. 
Spence National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, 
Public Law 106-398, I hereby submit a report, prepared by my 
Administration, on the progress made in achieving the 
militarily significant benchmarks for conditions that would 
achieve a sustainable peace in Kosovo and ultimately allow for 
the withdrawal of the United States military presence in 
Kosovo.
    The term ``militarily significant'' relates to tasks and 
objectives significant from a military standpoint that once 
accomplished would allow for withdrawal of military forces from 
Kosovo. In the establishment of the Kosovo benchmarks, four 
critical tasks for NATO forces were identified: military 
stability, public security, border/boundary issues, and war 
crimes/International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia support. Objectives for these tasks were drawn from 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, the NATO 
Operations Plan, the Military Technical Agreement, and the 
Kosovo Liberation Army Undertaking.
    I anticipate that KFOR--and U.S. participation in it--will 
gradually reduce in size as public security conditions improve 
and Kosovars assume increasing responsibility for their own 
self-government.
            Sincerely,
                                                    George W. Bush.
                           Kosovo Benchmarks

                              INTRODUCTION

    Section 1212(a) of Public Law 106-398, The Floyd D. Spence 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001 (the 
Act), requires that ``The President shall develop militarily 
significant benchmarks for conditions that would achieve a 
sustainable peace in Kosovo and ultimately allow for the 
withdrawal of the U.S. military presence in Kosovo.'' Pursuant 
to Section 1212(b) of the Act, I am providing this report to 
Congress on progress in Kosovo toward achieving such militarily 
significant benchmarks.
    Every 6 months, NATO reviews the situation on the ground in 
Kosovo and Bosnia, and adjusts troop strengths in the NATO-led 
Kosovo Force (KFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) accordingly. 
Reflecting a positive trend in the region, the Foreign 
Ministers and Defense Ministers of NATO took important 
decisions during their Spring 2002 ministerials regarding a 
regional approach in the Balkans, including Kosovo. As a result 
of these decisions, KFOR will be reduced from 36,000 as of June 
2002, to 32,000 by December 2002, and 29,000 by June 2003. This 
latter figure represents about a 38 percent reduction from the 
initial KFOR commitment of 47,000 following Operation ALLIED 
FORCE in 1999. The U.S. contribution in KFOR will be reduced 
from 5,200 in June 2002 to approximately 4,000 in June 2003, 
thereby remaining at approximately 15 percent of the total 
force.

                               BACKGROUND

    The benchmarks measure progress in achieving a sustainable 
peace in Kosovo. The objectives and tasks were drawn from 
several important documents: the NATO Operation Plan for Kosovo 
(OPLAN 10413); United Nations Security Council Resolution 
(UNSCR) 1244 (1999); the Military Technical Agreement (MTA) 
between the international Security Force (KFOR) and the 
governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the 
Republic of Serbia; and the Undertaking of Demilitarization and 
Transformation of the Kosovo Liberation Army (the Undertaking).
    Significant progress has been made in Kosovo since the 
establishment of KFOR and the U.N. Interim Administration 
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). KFOR has completed several military 
tasks specified in OPLAN 10413 and UNSCR 1244. The remaining 
tasks are of a continuous or recurring nature and provide for 
the unimpeded operation of UNMIK, freedom of movement for 
minorities, and the safe return of displaced persons and 
refugees. KFOR efforts have helped UNMIK to make substantial 
progress in implementing UNSCR 1244: reconstruction is well-
advanced, free and fair elections held twice, more than 4,900 
multi-ethnic Kosovo police trained and deployed, and a new 
constitutional framework for provisional self-government 
promulgated.
    Security challenges remain in the form of ethnically 
oriented, political extremist and criminally motivated armed 
groups who threaten to compromise these accomplishments, both 
through their actions in Kosovo and in southern Serbia and 
Macedonia. Rather than Yugoslav and Serbian forces posing a 
continued risk, these internal factors are now the primary 
threat to public security within Kosovo. KFOR and UNMIK will 
have to continue to cooperate over the coming months to deter 
and disrupt the activities of these groups, and continue to 
ensure stability in Kosovo and, by extension, the surrounding 
region.

                            PROGRESS REVIEW

    The benchmarks depict progress on four overarching tasks 
and related objectives that will allow for the withdrawal of 
U.S. military forces from Kosovo. They are: Military Stability; 
Public Security; Border and Boundary Issues; and, War Crimes.
1. Task: Military Stability
Objectives
    <bullet> Withdrawal of Yugoslav and Serbian Security Forces 
from Kosovo.
    <bullet> Demilitarization of the Kosovo Liberation Army 
(KLA) and other armed Kosovar-Albanian groups.
    <bullet> Deterrence of renewed hostilities, maintenance 
and, where necessary, enforcement of the cease-fire.
    Progress on these objectives and the benchmarks associated 
with them has been very good. FRY forces have withdrawn from 
Kosovo and have adhered to all military agreements, the Kosovo 
Liberation Army has been demilitarized and there are no ongoing 
hostilities in Kosovo.

Benchmarks

            a. The cease-fire has been maintained and FRY has adhered 
                    to the MTA
    The rampant ethnic cleansing and the killing of Spring 1999 
is now history and neither party to the conflict has resumed 
military action. FRY forces left Kosovo as called for in the 
MTA. In 2001, NATO oversaw a reduction in the Air Safety Zone 
and the return of FRY forces to the GSZ in southern Serbia, as 
part of a political agreement to end fighting between 
government forces and ethnic Albanian groups in southern 
Serbia.
            b. KLA has been demilitarized and transformed in compliance 
                    with the Undertaking
    The Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) ceased to exist on 
September 20, 1999. Many former KLA members chose to enter the 
Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC), now a civil emergency response 
force, or the Kosovo Police Service.
            c. Establishment of the KPC and low incidence of officer 
                    noncompliance
    The KPC was created in 1999 out of demobilized KLA troops. 
UNMIK Regulation 1999/8 authorizes the KPC to engage in 
disaster response, search and rescue, and infrastructure 
rebuilding activities. The KPC is permitted no role in law 
enforcement, security or defense. KFOR and UNMIK jointly 
supervise the KPC. Authorized strength is 5,000 members; by the 
end of 2002 just under 2,000 will have moved from active to 
reserve status with an additional 2,000 projected to follow. 
Ten percent of the positions are reserved for minorities. The 
2001 KPC budget was approximately $11.8 million.
    One of the primary purposes for the establishment of the 
KPC was to provide transparency to the process of 
demilitarizing the KLA. While some individual members of the 
KPC are involved in supporting extremism and organized crime, 
since the KPC was established, documented non-compliance has 
declined from 35 incidents per month to as few as 4 per month, 
to include such incidents as illegal possession of weapons and 
ammunition, and celebratory gunfire.
            d. FRY and Kosovars participate in the Joint Implementation 
                    Commission
    The Joint Implementation Commission (JIC) was established 
in accordance with the MTA and given two key mandates: ensure 
compliance with the MTA and demilitarize the KLA. JICs have 
been established at two echelons--at KFOR Headquarters and at 
each of the five Multinational Brigades (MNBs). Meetings 
between KFOR, Yugoslav Army (VJ), FRY Ministry of Interior 
Police (MUP), UNMIK CIVPOL, FRY JIC, International Committee 
for Red Cross (ICRC) and Border Police occur on a regular 
basis. Topical areas range from administrative issues such as 
ID cards to security issues such as VJ/MUP manned contact 
points on/near the administrative boundary. The JICs have 
facilitated training for the KPC in first aid, fire fighting, 
land navigation, identification of unexploded ordnance, 
construction, and humanitarian relief.
            e. End of Offensive Activities by armed groups
    Large armed groups are no longer active in Kosovo proper, 
but ethnic Albanian armed groups (EAAGs) in southern Serbia and 
in Macedonia have used Kosovo as a supply route and base for 
recruiting and fundraising. KFOR and U.N. police have been 
active in apprehending members of these groups and their 
supporters, and the United States Government has repeatedly 
reminded Kosovo's political leaders and the KPC that any 
support for the insurgents' activities is not acceptable.

2. Task: Public Security

Objectives

    <bullet> Establishment and maintenance of a secure 
environment for the operation of UNMIK, the delivery of 
humanitarian aid, and the safe return of refugees and displaced 
persons to their homes.
    <bullet> Ensure protection and freedom of movement for 
KFOR, UNMIK, and other International Organizations (IOs).
    <bullet> Transfer responsibility for public safety and 
order when either UNMIK or newly elected Kosovar authorities 
can take responsibility for this function.
    Significant progress has been achieved toward the 
benchmarks related to these objectives, but continued progress 
in the area of public security will require a strong continued 
commitment by the international community to provide resources 
for rule of law and other security programs.

Benchmarks

            a. UNMIK safely conducts its mission
    UNMIK has regional administrations in each KFOR MNB, headed 
by an international administrator and staffed by a mixture of 
international and local staff. Additionally, there are UNMIK 
offices in each of Kosovo's 30 municipalities. UNMIK success 
stories include promulgation of the Constitutional Framework, 
municipal and province-wide elections, registration of and 
distribution of ID cards to nearly one million Kosovars, and 
issuance of over 30,000 travel documents recognized in 20 
countries. In all UNMIK endeavors (except North Mitrovica)--
from travel to governance--UNMIK has been able to safely 
conduct its mission.
            b. IOs travel without disruption of their activities
    Travel in Kosovo by IOs is generally unimpeded. Serb 
residents in northern Kosovo sporadically established 
roadblocks in Serb majority areas, but alternative routes were 
available to IOs with little or no disruption of their 
activities.
            c. Humanitarian relief delivered
    Humanitarian relief was one of the original UNMIK pillars, 
led by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), but as 
humanitarian needs abated, the UNMIK humanitarian pillar ceased 
operations in June 2000. UNMIK has institutionalized the 
delivery of goods and services to Kosovo's neediest populations 
through a system of Centers for Social Work. These centers 
ensure poor, isolated and/or minority communities have the 
goods and services they require. UNHCR also remains active in 
its core protection functions, including minority stabilization 
and returns.
            d. Initial demining efforts accomplished and responsibility 
                    transferred to requisite civilian authorities
    Since June 1999, over 20,000 mines, 13,000 items of 
unexploded ordnance (UXO), and 6,700 cluster bomb units (CBU) 
have been located and destroyed. Over 25 million square meters 
of land have been cleared and returned to use. There are 16 
different international demining organizations involved in mine 
awareness activities; and mine awareness has been incorporated 
into the Kosovo school system curriculum. While KFOR's mandate 
is concerned only with minefields that impede its mission, KFOR 
soldiers continue to mark newly discovered minefields for 
demining by accredited civilian agencies. Also, the KPC has 
been trained to conduct emergency explosive ordinance disposal 
services and is primarily responsible for UXO deactivation or 
destruction. The overall result of this concentrated effort has 
been a drastic reduction in mine/UXO/CBU-related casualties. In 
light of these operating procedures, this benchmark is 
essentially accomplished.
            e. Elections held in secure environment
    UNMIK held elections for Municipal Assemblies in October 
2000. Kosovars endured long lines to vote in municipal 
elections that were deemed free and fair, and that were 
unmarred by violence. Local assemblies and governments have 
been established in almost all of Kosovo's 30 municipalities, 
including most Serb-dominated ones in the north. Province-wide 
elections for a Provincial Assembly were held in November 2001. 
UNMIK Police, KPS, and KFOR worked together to help ensure 
these first-ever democratic provincial elections were not 
marred by any significant violence. In Spring 2002, the 
Assembly elected a President and a Prime Minister to head 
Kosovo's provisional government.
            f. Parallel institutions dissolved and pose no threat to 
                    KFOR and/or UNMIK authority
    There were two parallel sets of institutions initially 
operating in Kosovo. The Provisional Government of Kosovo 
(PGOK), led by former KLA elements, installed officials in 27 
of Kosovo's 30 municipalities. These officials exercised 
varying amounts of power and influence, in some cases 
collecting taxes and regulating business and property. The 
second set of parallel institutions was a ``shadow government'' 

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