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108th Congress, 1st Session - - - - - - - - - - - - - House Document 
                                                          108-92

 
   EMERGENCY REGARDING PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

                               __________

                             COMMUNICATION

                                  from

                   THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

                              transmitting

A 6-MONTH PERIODIC REPORT ON THE NATIONAL EMERGENCY WITH RESPECT TO THE 
   PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION THAT WAS DECLARED IN 
   EXECUTIVE ORDER 12938 OF NOVEMBER 14, 1994, PURSUANT TO 50 U.S.C. 
                     1703(c) AND 50 U.S.C. 1641(c)

<GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT>


July 7, 2003.--Referred to the Committee on International Relations and 
                         ordered to be printed
                                           The White House,
                                          Washington, July 3, 2003.
Hon. J. Dennis Hastert,
Speaker of the House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
    Dear Mr. Speaker: Consistent with section 204(c) of the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. 1703(c), 
and section 401(c) of the National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. 
1641(c), I transmit herewith a 6-month periodic report prepared 
by my Administration on the national emergency with respect to 
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction that was 
declared in Executive Order 12938 of November 14, 1994.
            Sincerely,
                                                    George W. Bush.
    Periodic Report to Congress on the National Emergency Regarding 
              Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

    This report to the Congress addresses the developments over 
the past 6 months concerning the national emergency with 
respect to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD)--nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons--and the means 
of delivering such weapons, that was declared in Executive 
Order 12938 on November 14, 1994, as amended by Executive Order 
13094 of July 28, 1998. This report is submitted pursuant to 
section 204(c) of the International Emergency Economic Powers 
Act (IEEPA), 50 U.S.C. 1703(c), and section 401(c) of the 
National Emergencies Act, 50 U.S.C. 1641(c). It reports actions 
taken and expenditures incurred pursuant to the emergency 
declaration only during the period of November 13, 2002 through 
May 14, 2003.
    To address the dangers posed by the proliferation of WMD 
and their delivery systems, on November 14, 1994, President 
Clinton issued Executive Order 12938, declaring a national 
emergency under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act 
(50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.). On July 28, 1998, President Clinton, 
pursuant to the provisions of IEEPA, issued E.O. 13094 to amend 
E.O. 12938 in order to respond more effectively to the 
worldwide threat of WMD proliferation. Under section 202(d) of 
the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622(d)), the national 
emergency terminates on the anniversary date of its declaration 
unless, within the 90-day period period to each anniversary 
date, the President publishes a Continuation of Emergency 
Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Federal Register 
and transmits the notice to the Congress. The national 
emergency was extended on November 14, 1995; November 12, 1996; 
November 13, 1997; November 12, 1998; November 10, 1999; 
November 12, 2000; November 9, 2001; and November 12, 2002.
    Weapons of mass destruction in the hands of potential 
adversary states and terrorists are among the top threats to 
U.S. security in the Post-Cold War world. In such hands, these 
weapons pose direct threats to the United States and its 
forces, friends, and allies.
    This Administration has given a high priority to dealing 
with the threat of WMD and missile proliferation. The September 
11, 2001 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, D.C. and 
subsequent anthrax crimes reinforce theimportance of efforts to 
prevent the proliferation of these weapons, especially to terrorists 
and countries that harbor terrorists. Likewise, arrests in Europe 
during the second half of 2002 lend support to the validity of our 
concerns that terrorists are actively plotting to conduct chemical and 
biological attacks.
    Additional information on nuclear, missile and/or chemical 
and biological weapons nonproliferation efforts may be found in 
the following reports: (a) the most recent annual Report on the 
Proliferation of Missiles and Essential Components of Nuclear, 
Biological and Chemical Weapons, provided to Congress pursuant 
to Section 1097 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 (Public Law 102-190), also known as 
the ``Nonproliferation Report;'' (b) the most recent semi-
annual Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology 
Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced 
Conventional Munitions, provided to Congress pursuant to 
Section 721 of the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 1997; (c) the most recent annual report entitled 
``Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control and Disarmament 
Act, 22 U.S.C. 2593a; (d) the most recent report on Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Policy in South Asia, provided pursuant to 
Public Law 102-391, Section 585; (e) the most recent Report on 
Regional Nonproliferation in South Asia, submitted pursuant to 
Section 620F(c) of Foreign Assistance Act; (f) the most recent 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Report known as the ``Section 601 
Report,'' submitted pursuant to Section 601 of the Nuclear 
Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (Public Law 95-242), as amended by 
the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994; (g) the most 
recent semiannual report on proliferation-related transfers to 
Iran, submitted pursuant to the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 
2000; and (h) the most recent report on Libya sanctions, 
provided pursuant to Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996, 
section 5(b).

                            NUCLEAR WEAPONS

    Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons: The 
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the 
cornerstone of the global effort to halt nuclear proliferation. 
The second meeting of the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for 
the 2005 NPT Review Conference took place in Geneva from April 
28 to May 9, 2003. NPT Parties used the session to address the 
Treaty's central tenets: nonproliferation; disarmament; and 
peaceful nuclear cooperation. PrepCom IItransmitted to PrepCom 
III (to be held in 2004) a factual summary of the session produced by 
the Chair.
    The primary U.S. objective leading up to and at PrepCom II 
was to make clear to responsible NPT Parties the threat to the 
Treaty and global security posed by those NPT Parties in 
noncompliance with, or threatening noncompliance with, their 
nonproliferation obligations. Close consultations with the 
PrepCom Chair began in June 2002 and continued throughout 
PrepCom II. The United States consulted actively with a wide 
range of NPT Parties in Washington, New York, Geneva, and 
capitals in an effort to make clear the depth of U.S. concern 
about the threat posed by noncompliance. The United States was 
generally successful in achieving its PrepCom II objective. 
More than 40 Parties addressed the compliance issue in their 
PrepCom statements, including specific references to DPRK and 
Iranian actions, and the Chair devoted a significant portion of 
his Factual Summary to the compliance issue.
    The United States will continue to highlight the importance 
of compliance as the Parties turn their attention to PrepCom 
III, which will convene on April 26, 2004 in New York. PrepCom 
III, unlike PrepCom I (2002) and II, is charged with attempting 
to make consensus recommendations to the 2005 Review Conference 
on ways to strengthen the NPT's implementation and achieve its 
universality.
    The United States will continue to meet all of its 
obligations under the NPT and notes that the conclusion of the 
Moscow Treaty for the reduction of strategic nuclear warheads 
demonstrates that the United States continues to meet its 
obligations under the nuclear disarmament-related provisions of 
Article VI of the NPT.
    North Korea's violation of the NPT and disabling of IAEA 
seals and cameras at Yongbyon, its expulsion of IAEA 
inspectors, its January 2003 notice of its intention to 
withdrawal from the NPT, and its restarting of the 5 MW (e) 
Yongbyon reactor--subsequent to its admission in October 2002 
of a covert uranium enrichment program--further underscore the 
nuclear proliferation challenges faced by the United States and 
the international community.
    Iranian compliance with the NPT also remains of primary 
concern. We assess Iran's nuclear program is aimed at 
developing the capability to produce fissile material for use 
in nuclear weapons. Recently disclosed nuclear-
relatedfacilities under construction at Natanz and Arak, for instance, 
would help Iran produce weapons-usable fissile material. The magnitude 
and completeness of Iran's nuclear fuel cycle programs are so 
disproportionate to its stated intention of developing a strictly 
civilian nuclear energy program that we are persuaded they are designed 
to support a clandestine nuclear weapons program. The IAEA is 
undertaking a rigorous examination of Iran's nuclear program and is 
expected to report its findings soon to the IAEA Board of Governors.
    The United States is increasingly concerned over statements 
by Libyan leaders about Arab nations' right to pursue nuclear 
weapons as well as Libya's development of its nuclear 
infrastructure.
    International Atomic Energy Agency: The International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), inter alia, verifies the 
compliance of non-nuclear weapons states with their NPT 
safeguards obligations. During this reporting period, the 
United States continued to provide significant technical and 
financial resources to support IAEA safeguards activities.
    The IAEA safeguards system helps deter or detect diversion 
of nuclear materials. However, it has become increasingly clear 
that the IAEA safeguards agreements have limitations that 
impede its ability to detect undeclared activities. The 
discovery after the Persian Gulf War of Iraq's extensive covert 
nuclear activities led to an effort to strengthen the IAEA 
safeguards system's ability to detect undeclared nuclear 
material and activities. The United States, along with a large 
number of other IAEA members, negotiated in the mid-1990s 
substantial safeguards strengthening measures, including the 
use of environmental sampling techniques, expansion of the 
information related to nuclear activities which states are 
required to declare, and expansion of IAEA access rights. Those 
measures are embodied in a Model Additional Protocol, approved 
in 1997. With these measures, the IAEA's capability to detect 
and assess a state's undeclared nuclear activity was 
substantially enhanced. As of June 2003, this Protocol had been 
signed by 73 states and has entered into force for 35 
countries.
    During the reporting period, the IAEA proposed a biennium 
budget for CY2004-2005 that includes a real increase for 
safeguards funding of around $21.5 million. The United States 
has engaged in substantial diplomatic activity over the past 6 
months in support of this increase. The IAEA and 
otherinternational organizations have been subject to stringent budget 
levels by the United States and other major donor nations for around 15 
years. However, the United States has decided that the IAEA is 
justified in seeking this increase, in view of a substantial growth in 
its safeguards responsibilities over that period. The IAEA Director-
General has warned that the IAEA cannot continue to provide credible 
safeguards under such financial limitations. The IAEA plays an 
essential role in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and deserves 
these additional funds in order to fulfill its verification 
responsibilities under the NPT.
    The Zangger Committee: The purpose of the 35-nation NPT 
Exporters (Zangger) Committee (ZC) is to harmonize 
implementation of the NPT's requirement to apply IAEA 
safeguards to exports to non-nuclear-weapon states of (a) 
source or special fissionable material, and (b) equipment or 
material especially designed or prepared for the processing, 
use or production of special fissionable material. The 
Committee maintains and updates a list of equipment and 
materials that may only be exported if safeguards are applied 
to the recipient facility (called the ``Trigger List'' because 
such exports trigger the requirement for safeguards).
    All of the NPT nuclear weapons states, including China, are 
members of the ZC. However, China is the only member of the ZC 
that is not also a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), 
which requires full-scope safeguards (FSS) as a condition of 
nuclear supply to non-nuclear weapons states. China has not 
been willing to accept the FSS policy, but its export control 
lists are comparable, if not virtually identical, to the NSG's.
    The ZC, because of its link to the NPT, is in a unique 
position to engage NPT-party non-member critics of the 
nonproliferation regimes, such as Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
and Mexico, and to present supplier government views to NPT 
meetings. It will continue to take the lead on possible Trigger 
List additions. The ZC is not currently able to control 
radioactive sources because most of these have no significance 
for nuclear weapons or fuel cycle activities. The ZC will be 
considering whether and how to expand its mandates for possible 
coverage. The ZC took the lead in developing supplier consensus 
to add enrichment, reprocessing, heavy water production 
equipment, and most recently, plutonium separation equipment 
and technology to the Trigger List.
    At its April 10, 2003 meeting, the ZC members welcomed the 
chair's announcement of inauguration of the ZC website hosted 
by the Austrian Government. The ZC also discussed elements that 
might be incorporated in the updated understandings 
(guidelines), including physical protection and the IAEA 
Additional Protocol. The Committee again discussed the 
application of Belarus for membership. The United States is 
still not prepared to join a consensus for acceptance of 
Belarus because of concern regarding that Government's 
commitment to nonproliferation. The Committee also continued 
discussion of possible outreach activities with non-member NPT 
Party countries, particularly Non-Aligned Movement countries.
    The Nuclear Suppliers Group: The NSG was formed in 1974 
following the Indian nuclear explosion, which demonstrated how 
nuclear technology and materials transferred for peaceful 
purposes could be misused. The NSG Guidelines, first published 
in 1978, require for exports of nuclear materials and 
equipment: (1) formal recipient government assurances 
confirming IAEA safeguards and no nuclear explosive use; (2) 
adequate physical protection; and (3) particular caution in the 
transfer of sensitive facilities, technology, and weapons-
usable materials.
    In 1992, the NSG added FSS as a condition of nuclear supply 
to non-clear weapons states, and established dual-use 
guidelines and a control list. In 1995, the NSG added controls 
on nuclear technology for items of the Trigger List (items 
which trigger the requirement for IAEA safeguards).
    NSG Chairmanship rotates annually. The Republic of Korea is 
the current chair and Sweden will assume the chairmanship in 
May 2004. Japan's Mission in Vienna serves as the NSG Point of 
Contract. The NSG Consultative Group (GC), currently chaired by 
the United States, meets at least twice a year under the 
mandate of the plenary.
    The NSG is considering how to make more transparent a 
``Common Understanding'' on the safety and grandfathering 
exceptions to the full-scope safeguards supply policy, in order 
to prevent new problems like those created by the Russian 
nuclear supply to India. It is also considering making the 
Additional Protocol a condition of supply, incorporating catch-
all control provisions in the dual-use guidelines, and expanded 
information sharing on denials of Trigger List items, as is 
currently done for nuclear-related dual-use exports.
    South Asia Nuclear: During the reporting period, India and 
Pakistan have continued to pursue their respective nuclear 

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