pd08mr99 The President's News Conference With Prime Minister Massimo D'Alema of...

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sanctions against Iraq. Kuwait was especially helpful providing 
significant naval and coast guard assistance. Additionally, they 
accepted over 15 diverted sanctions violators.
    Although refined petroleum products leaving Iraq comprise most of 
the prohibited traffic, the MIF has intercepted a growing number of 
ships smuggling prohibited items into Iraq in violation of U.N. 
sanctions and outside the parameters of the humanitarian oil-for-food 
program. In early December, the MIF conducted the latest in a series of 
periodic surge operations in the far northern Gulf near the major Iraqi 
waterways. These operations disrupted smuggling in the region. Kuwait 
and the UAE have stepped up their own enforcement efforts. Although 
partially repaired and back on line, damage to the Basra refinery 
inflicted during Desert Fox had a significant impact on Iraq's gas and 
oil smuggling operations in the Gulf.
    In December 1998, Iraq relocated surface-to-surface missile 
batteries to the coastal area of the Al Faw Peninsula. The missiles in 
question, with a range of nearly 60 nautical miles, could reach far into 
the North Arabian Gulf and posed a serious threat to the MIF. The 
deployment of these missiles to a position from which they could engage 
coalition naval forces was carried out in concert with the increased 
attempts to shoot down aircraft enforcing the no-fly zones and 
constituted an enhancement of Iraq's military capability in southern 
Iraq. Coalition aircraft responded with air strikes to the threat posed 
by these missiles and are authorized to continue to do so as necessary.

Chemical Weapons

    After Iraq's November 15, 1998, pledge of unconditional cooperation 
with weapons inspectors, UNSCOM began to test the Iraqi promise. In a 
November 25 letter, Iraq continued to deny that it ever weaponized VX 
nerve agent or produced stabilized VX, despite UNSCOM's publicly stated 
confidence in the Edgewood Arsenal Laboratory finding of stabilized VX 
components in fragments of Iraqi SCUD missile warheads. Iraq alleges 
that the presence of VX was a deliberate act of tampering with the 
samples examined in the United States.
    On November 26, Iraq agreed to cooperate with UNSCOM efforts to 
determine the disposition of 155mm shells filled with mustard chemical 
agent, and UNSCOM agreed to proceed with such an effort when 
logistically possible. Iraq also agreed to cooperate in verifying the 
tail assemblies of R-400 bombs, and in determining the precise locations 
of pits that had been used for the field storage of special warheads at 
Fallujah Forest and the Tigris Canal.
    On November 30, the Iraqis failed to meet a deadline to provide 
various documents

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Chairman Butler requested pertaining to Iraq's chemical weapons program. 
Included in this request was the Iraqi Air Force file of documents found 
previously by UNSCOM inspectors that details chemical weapons expended 
during the Iran-Iraq war. We understand that UNSCOM believes the file 
indicates that Iraq's official declarations to UNSCOM have greatly 
overstated the quantities of chemical weapons expended, which means that 
at least 6,000 chemical weapons are unaccounted.
    In a January 25, 1999, report to the U.N. Security Council 
President, UNSCOM identified as a priority chemical weapons disarmament 
issues: VX, the 155mm mustard shells; the Iraqi Air Force file of 
chemical weapons documents; R-400 bombs filled with CBW (field 
inspections needed); and chemical weapons production equipment (field 
verification is needed for 18 of 20 shipping containers UNSCOM knows 
were moved together). On monitoring, the report identified as priorities 
the ability to verify Iraqi compliance at listed facilities and to 
detect construction of new dual-use facilities.

Biological Weapons

    Iraq has failed to provide a credible explanation for UNSCOM tests 
that found anthrax in fragments of seven SCUD missile warheads. Iraq has 
been claiming since 1995 that it put anthrax in only five such warheads, 
and had previously denied weaponizing anthrax at all. Iraq's 
explanations to date are far from satisfactory, although it now 
acknowledges putting both anthrax and botulinum toxin into some number 
of warheads.
    Iraq's biological weapons (BW) program--including SCUD missile BW 
warheads, R-400 BW bombs, drop-tanks to be filled with BW, spray devices 
for BW, production of BW agents (anthrax, botulinum toxin, aflatoxin, 
and wheat cover smut), and BW agent growth media--remains the ``black 
hole'' described by Chairman Butler. Iraq has consistently failed to 
provide a credible account of its efforts to produce and weaponize its 
BW agents.
    During the period November 17 to December 2, 1998, an undeclared 
Class II Biosafety Cabinet and some filter presses were discovered; 
these items are subject to declarations by Iraq and biological 
monitoring.
    On November 18 and 20, Chairman Butler again asked Iraq's Deputy 
Prime Minister for information concerning Iraq's biological weapons 
programs. Iraq has supplied none of the information requested.
    In the January 25, 1999, report to the U.N. Security Council 
President, UNSCOM identified as a priority biological weapons 
disarmament issue Iraq's incomplete declarations on ``the whole scope of 
the BW program.'' The declarations are important because ``Iraq 
possesses an industrial capability and knowledge base, through which 
biological warfare agents could be produced quickly and in volume.'' The 
report also identified the importance of monitoring dual-use biological 
items, equipment, facilities, research, and acquisition at 250 listed 
sites. The effectiveness of monitoring is ``proportional to Iraq's 
cooperation and transparency, to the number of monitored sites, and to 
the number of inspectors.''

Long-Range Missiles

    Iraq's past practices of (1) refusing to discuss further its system 
for concealment of longer range missiles and their components, (2) 
refusing to provide credible evidence of its disposition of large 
quantities of the unique fuel required for the long-range SCUD missile, 
and (3) continuing to test modifications to SA-2 VOLGA surface-to-air 
missile components appear intended to enhance Iraq's capability to 
produce a surface-to-surface missile of range greater than its permitted 
range of 150 km.
    While UNSCOM believes it can account for 817 of 819 imported Soviet-
made SCUD missiles, Iraq has refused to give UNSCOM a credible 
accounting of the indigenous program that produced complete SCUD 
missiles that were both successfully test-flown and delivered to the 
Iraqi Army.
    In its January 25, 1999, report to the U.N. Security Council 
President, UNSCOM identified the following as priority missile 
disarmament issues: 50 unaccounted SCUD conventional warheads; 500 tons 
of SCUD propellants, the destruction of which has not been verified; 7 
Iraqi-produced SCUDs given to the army, the destruction of which

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cannot be verified; truckloads of major components for SCUD production 
that are missing; the concealment of BW warheads; and the lack of 
accounting for VX-filled war-heads. The report identified as priorities 
the capability to monitor declared activities, leaps in missile 
technology, and changes to declared operational missiles. There are 80 
listed missile sites.

Nuclear Weapons

    After Iraq unconditionally rescinded its declarations of 
noncooperation on November 15, the IAEA began to test the Iraqi pledge 
of full cooperation. The IAEA Director General Mohammed El-Baradei's 
December 14 report on Iraqi cooperation stated: ``The Iraqi counterpart 
has provided the necessary level of cooperation to enable the above-
enumerated activities [ongoing monitoring] to be completed efficiently 
and effectively.'' In its 6-month report to the Security Council on 
October 7, the IAEA stated that it had a ``technically coherent'' view 
of the Iraqi nuclear program. At that time, the IAEA also stated its 
remaining questions about Iraq's nuclear program can be dealt with 
within IAEA's ongoing monitoring and verification (OMV) effort. In the 
IAEA's February 8 report to the U.N. Security Council it reiterated this 
position.
    Nonetheless, Iraq has not yet supplied information in response to 
the Security Council's May 14 Presidential Statement. This statement 
noted that the IAEA continues to have questions and concerns regarding 
foreign assistance, abandonment of the program, and the extent of Iraqi 
progress in weapons design. Iraq has also not passed penal legislation 
prohibiting nuclear-related activities contrary to Resolution 687.
    In a February 8, 1999, report to the U.N. Secretary Council 
President, IAEA Director General Mohammed El-Baradei summarized previous 
IAEA assessments of Iraq's compliance with its nuclear disarmament and 
monitoring obligations. The report restates that ``Iraq has not 
fulfilled its obligation to adopt measures and enact penal laws, to 
implement and enforce compliance with Iraq's obligations under 
Resolutions 687 and 707, other relevant Security Council resolutions and 
the IAEA OMV plan, as required under paragraph 34 of that plan.'' The 
IAEA states that the three areas where questions on Iraq's nuclear 
disarmament remain (lack of technical documentation, lack of information 
on external assistance to Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons program, 
and lack of information on Iraq's abandonment of its nuclear weapons 
program) would not prevent the full implementation of its OMV plan.
    The IAEA continues to plan for long-term monitoring and verification 
under Resolution 715. In its February 8 report, the IAEA restated that 
monitoring must be ``intrusive'' and estimated annual monitoring costs 
would total nearly $10 million.

Dual-Use Imports

    Resolution 1051 established a joint UNSCOM/IAEA unit to monitor 
Iraq's imports of allowed dual-use items. Iraq must notify the unit 
before it imports specific items that can be used in both weapons of 
mass destruction and civilian applications. Similarly, U.N. members must 
provide timely notification of exports to Iraq of such dual-use items. 
Following the withdrawal of UNSCOM and IAEA monitors, there is no 
monitoring of dual-use items inside Iraq. This factor has presented new 
challenges for the U.N. Sanctions Committee and is taken into 
consideration in the approval process.

The U.N.'s ``Oil-for-Food'' Program

    We continue to support the international community's efforts to 
provide for the humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people through the oil-
for-food program. Transition from phase four to phase five (authorized 
by U.N. Security Council Resolution 1210) was smooth. As in phase four, 
Iraq is again authorized to sell up to $5.2 billion worth of oil every 
180 days. However, because of a drop in world oil prices, Iraq was only 
able to pump and sell approximately $3.1 billion worth of oil during 
phase four. Since the first deliveries under oil-for-food began in March 
1997, food worth $2.75 billion, and over $497 million worth of medicine 
and health supplies have been delivered to Iraq.
    As of January 19, under phase four of the oil-for-food program, 
contracts for the purchase of over $2.3 billion worth of humanitarian 
goods for the Iraqi people have been

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presented to the U.N. Office of the Iraq Program for review by the 
Sanctions Committee; of these, contracts worth over $1.6 billion have 
been approved; most of the remaining contracts are being processed by 
the Office of the Iraq Program. As of February 4, the United States had 
approved 584 contracts in phase four and had placed 28 on hold pending 
clarification of questions about the proposed contracts.
    With regard to funds set aside for imports of parts and equipment to 
increase oil exports, as of February 4, 333 contracts with a total value 
of nearly $178 million have been approved; 94 contracts are on hold. In 
January, the United States released a number of holds on oil spare parts 
contracts. Up to $300 million had been set aside in phase four of the 
oil-for-food program to pay for spare parts and equipment to increase 
Iraqi oil exports and thus increase available humanitarian funding. The 
United States had requested holds on contracts that did not directly 
boost oil exports. As the current phase of oil-for-food again sets aside 
$300 million for this purpose, the United States decided to remove holds 
on lower priority contracts.
    The Security Council met in January to discuss the humanitarian 
situation in Iraq. The United States supported an examination of the 
current situation and exploration of ways to improve the humanitarian 
situation, particularly with regard to vulnerable groups such as 
children under age five, and pregnant and nursing women. The United 
States has expressed its support for lifting the cap on Iraqi oil 
exports under the oil-for-food program, and has suggested some 
streamlining of approval of food and medicine contracts in the U.N. 
Sanctions Committee.
    Three assessment panels are being formed to look at Iraqi 
disarmament, the humanitarian situation in Iraq, and Iraq's obligations 
regarding Kuwait. The panels are expected to complete their work by the 
middle of April.
    Resolution 1210 maintains a separate oil-for-food program for 
northern Iraq, administered directly by the United Nations in 
consultation with the local population. This program, which the United 
States strongly supports, receives 13 to 15 percent of the funds 
generated under the oil-for-food program. The separate northern program 
was established because of the Baghdad regime's proven disregard for the 
humanitarian needs of the Kurdish, Assyrian, and Turkomen minorities of 
northern Iraq, and its readiness to apply the most brutal forms of 
repression against them. In northern Iraq, where Baghdad does not 
exercise control, the oil-for-food program has been able to operate 
relatively effectively. The Kurdish factions are setting aside their 
differences to work together so that Resolution 1210 is implemented as 
efficiently as possible.
    The United Nations is required to monitor carefully implementation 
of all aspects of the oil-for-food program. The current phase marked by 
Resolution 1210 anticipates infrastructure repairs in areas such as oil 
export capacity, generation of electricity, and water purification. The 
U.N. monitoring regime is presented with increasing challenges, as 
UNSCOM monitors are no longer in Iraq.
    Humanitarian programs such as oil-for-food have steadily improved 
the life of the average Iraqi living under sanctions (who, for example, 
now receives a ration basket providing over 2,000 calories per day, a 
significant improvement in nutrition since the program began) while 
denying Saddam Hussein control over oil revenues. We will continue to 
work with the U.N. Secretariat, the Security Council, and others in the 
international community to ensure that the humanitarian needs of the 
Iraqi people are met while denying any political or economic benefits to 
the Baghdad regime.

Northern Iraq: Kurdish Reconciliation

    Since their ground-breaking meeting with Secretary Albright in 
September, Massoud Barzani, President of the Kurdistan Democratic Party 
(KDP), and Jalal Talabani, Chairman of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 
(PUK), have met three times to continue their work towards full 
reconciliation. Both parties have condemned internal fighting, pledged 
to refrain from violence in settling their differences, and resolved to 
eliminate terrorism by establishing stronger safeguards for Iraq's 
borders. Our deep concern for the safety, security, and economic well-
being of Iraqi Kurds, Shias, Sunnis, and others who have been subject to 
brutal attacks by the

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Baghdad regime remains a primary focus of our Iraq policy.
    On November 4, the Governments of Turkey and the United Kingdom 
joined us in recognizing and welcoming the cooperative achievement of 
Mr. Barzani and Mr. Talabani. The three states reiterated the importance 
of preserving the unity and territorial integrity of Iraq and noted, 
with pleasure, the prominence the KDP and PUK have accorded this 
principle. We also welcomed the commitment by the KDP and PUK to deny 
sanctuary to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), to eliminate all PKK 
bases from the region, and to safeguard the Turkish border. The parties 
believe that key decisions on Iraq's future should be made by all the 
Iraqi people together at an appropriate time and in a regular political 
process. Their work to achieve the principles embodied in the Ankara 
Statements are thus meant to implement a framework of regional 
administration until a united, pluralistic, and democratic Iraq is 
achieved.
    On January 8, the two leaders met without recourse to U.S., U.K., or 
Turkish interlocutors, in Salahidin in northern Iraq. They reiterated 
their determination to implement the September agreement, made concrete 
progress on key issues of revenue sharing and closing down PKK bases, 
and agreed to stay in close contact.
    The United States is committed to ensuring that international aid 
continues to reach the north, that the human rights of the Kurds and 
northern Iraq minority groups, such as the Turkomen, Assyrians, Yezedis, 
and others are respected, and that the no-fly-zone enforced by Operation 
Northern Watch is observed. The United States will decide how and when 
to respond should Baghdad's actions pose an increased threat to Iraq's 
neighbors, to regional security, to vital U.S. interests, and to the 
Iraqi people, including those in the north.

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