pd09no98 Statement on Signing the Torture Victims Relief Act of 1998...

	Web GovRecords.org

legislation.
                                            William J. Clinton
The White House,
October 31, 1998.

Note: S. 2285, approved October 31, was assigned Public Law No. 105-341. 
Executive Order 13090--President's Commission on the Celebration of 
Women in American History, signed June

[[Page 2212]]

29, was published in the Federal Register on July 2.


<DOC>
[Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents]
 [frwais.access.gpo.gov]


[Page 2212]
 
Monday, November 9, 1998
 
Volume 34--Number 45
Pages 2197-2274
 
Week Ending Friday, November 6, 1998
 
Joint Statement of the President of the United States and the Prime 
Minister of Israel

October 31, 1998

    On October 31, 1998, President Clinton and Prime Minister Netanyahu 
concluded a Memorandum of Agreement on the potential threat to Israel 
posed by the proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass 
destruction in the region. This subject has been of great concern to 
both governments for some time, and the Memorandum of Agreement 
establishes a new mechanism for enhancing their cooperation in dealing 
with this potential threat. Pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement, a 
joint strategic planning committee will be established to formulate 
recommendations on upgrading the framework of U.S.-Israeli strategic and 
military relationships, as well as technological cooperation.

Note: An original was not available for verification of the content of 
this joint statement.


<DOC>
[Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents]
 [frwais.access.gpo.gov]


[Page 2212-2215]
 
Monday, November 9, 1998
 
Volume 34--Number 45
Pages 2197-2274
 
Week Ending Friday, November 6, 1998
 
Interview With Shlomo Raz and Jacob Eilon of Israeli Television Channel 
2

October 31, 1998

Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin

    Q. President Clinton, first of all, thank you very much for sitting 
down with us.
    The President. Delighted to do it. Thank you.
    Q. You know, it's exactly 3 years since the assassination of Prime 
Minister Yitzhak Rabin. And Mrs. Rabin said she was rather disappointed 
that you failed to mention her husband during the East Room ceremony 
last Friday. How do you respond to that?
    The President. Well, you know, the agreement is actually supposed to 
enter into force on the third anniversary of his passing, of his 
killing. And I think that if, in fact, it does do so, it is a fitting 
thing, because none of us would be here if it hadn't been for him. He 
really started all this in a profound way.
    I know that the Madrid conference started before his election, but 
it was his conviction and his strength and security that he conveyed to 
the people of Israel, I think, that made this whole peace process 
possible. And I never do anything in the process that I don't think 
about him.

Danger to Prime Minister Netanyahu

    Q. Mr. President, from the tragic assassination to the current 
situation, Prime Minister Netanyahu might put himself at the same risk 
as Mr. Rabin. So perhaps it is unjustified to put pressure on him to 
follow the Oslo accord or the Oslo track.
    The President. Well, I don't think there's any question that the 
Prime Minister has put himself at some physical risk in pursuing the 
peace process. But I believe that it's important that the people of 
Israel know that, at least in my opinion, it's a good agreement, that it 
strengthens Israel's security needs, that the agreements made with the 
Palestinians are fully consistent with Oslo. And the Prime Minister 
worked very, very hard to advance Israel's security interests.
    Just for example, there was the whole issue of what should be done 
with the people whom Israel believes have committed acts of violence and 
terrorism against Israelis. And I am convinced that the Palestinians 
will now act against these people in a way that is consistent with the 
agreement and that will meet the Prime Minister's and Israel's needs. So 
that's an example of a whole array of security advances that were 
embedded in this agreement. And I think all Israelis who support the 
peace process should support the agreement because I think it furthers 
the cause of peace.

Palestinian National Council

    Q. Mr. President, is it really the PNC, the Palestinian National 
Council, that is going to convene to revise the Palestinian covenant 
with your presence? Is it really the PNC?
    The President. Well, it's the PNC plus a number of other groups. And 
some of these groups are embedded within the PNC; that is, they're dual 
membership for some of the people--in the Government, in the executive 
council, in the other councils involved. And some are outside the PNC.

[[Page 2213]]

    But among other things at that meeting, we will seek a clear 
renunciation of the offending parts of the charter and a general 
endorsement of the agreement, this whole agreement, so that the process 
can be seen to be going forward with the support of those who represent 
grassroots Palestinian opinion.
    The Prime Minister wanted me to support this provision, this effort, 
and he fought very, very hard for this, as did a number of members of 
his Cabinet who were there, because they thought that there needed to be 
a debate in a Palestinian forum, even if it was controversial and 
heated, which would give to the Palestinian people some evidence not 
only of a commitment to follow an agreement but of a changing of the 
heart, an opening of the heart of the Palestinians toward the Israelis.
    And I thought that argument had a lot of appeal, even though it was 
not without its hazards for Mr. Arafat.
    Q. Because----
    The President. Because it's been 18 months since anything big has 
happened, and because there's a lot of--he has his problems, too, among 
them the fact that the standard of living for most Palestinians is lower 
today than it was when the peace process began, because the enemies of 
peace keep interrupting the flow of normal life.
    So I agreed that if it was that important to Israel and Chairman 
Arafat were willing to try to accommodate that condition by the 
Israelis, that I would go to Gaza and address this group and ask them to 
support the peace and to renounce forever the idea of animosity toward 
and opposition to the existence of the state of Israel and instead 
embrace the path not only of peace but of cooperation.

President's Upcoming Visit to Gaza

    Q. I want to ask you about your visit to Gaza. Don't you think, Mr. 
President, that this trip may be seen as a first step in recognizing an 
independent Palestinian state?
    The President. Well, if so it would be, I think, wrong, because I 
have tried strictly to adhere to the position of the United States that 
we would not take a position on any final status issue.
    One of the reasons that I worked so hard at Wye to try to bring the 
parties together is I thought it imperative to take this next big step 
along the peace process so that we could launch the final status talks 
and get them underway in good faith so that neither side would seek to 
prejudge a final status issue. That is not what I'm doing in going 
there. The Prime Minister wanted me to go there and wanted us all to 
make this pitch.
    I asked them if they would make some joint appearances, and if they 
would both make the same speech to Palestinian and to Israeli audiences. 
And they said they would do that. I would like to see that happen. I 
think that would help. It would help the Palestinians to see Yasser 
Arafat saying the same thing to the Israelis he says to the 
Palestinians. It would help the Israelis, I think, also. And it would be 
a good thing for the Prime Minister to be able to give the same speech. 
Whatever they decide to say, just say the same thing to both communities 
so that no one thinks that there's any evasion or shading or anything.
    I think, just little things like this to open up a little awareness 
of the other's position and build a little confidence, I think would be 
quite good.

Jonathan Pollard

    Q. Mr. President, why won't you release Jonathan Pollard?
    The President. Well, I agreed to review his case and to take the 
initiative to review it. I have not released him in the past because 
since I've been President in the two previous normal reviews--that is, 
the ones that were initiated by his request for clemency--the 
recommendation of all my law enforcement and security agencies was 
unanimously opposed to it.
    But the Prime Minister felt so strongly about it, and I might say, 
every Israeli Prime Minister I have dealt with on every occasion has 
asked me about Pollard. Yitzhak Rabin did, Shimon Peres did, and Prime 
Minister Netanyahu has.
    Q. But you argued pretty--you had pretty harsh exchanges with 
Netanyahu, reportedly, about that?
    The President. No. I thought then, I believe now, and I think the 
public opinion in Israel bears this out, that it was in Israel's

[[Page 2214]]

interest to do this agreement on its own merits because it would advance 
the cause of Israeli security and keep the peace process going.
    I think there's been a lot of reporting about this with which I 
don't necessarily agree. That's no criticism, I just want to tell you my 
perception. Bibi Netanyahu argued strongly for Pollard's release. He 
made the arguments that anyone who knows a lot about the case and thinks 
he should be released would make. But I took no offense at that. He was 
representing what he believes to be the interest of the State of Israel. 
And he did it in--you know, he doesn't make arguments halfway. You 
observe the Prime Minister, he's an aggressive person; he fights hard 
for what he believes. I took no offense at it at all.
    And I would ask you all to remember when evaluating reports that 
tempers were frayed or strong language was used; now, remember, the 
three of us, Mr. Arafat and Mr. Netanyahu and I, we were there for over 
8 days. Most nights I was there, I went home at 2 and 3 o'clock in the 
morning. The last time we were there on this last day, I was up for 39 
hours and so were they.
    Now, I'm amazed that we didn't have more disruptive conduct and more 
harsh words, given how exhausted and frayed we were. But it shows you 
how hard the parties were trying, on the one hand, to make peace, but on 
the other hand, to protect their security interests. Particularly, I 
think, that was Mr. Netanyahu's concern. He was desperately trying to 
find a way to make peace or to advance the peace process that would 
enable him to go home and sell it to his Cabinet and his constituency. 
And this Pollard issue was very important to him. But I took no offense 
at that.
    Q. But still, Mr. President, there were many reports that you were 
very upset with Mr. Netanyahu and were quoted saying that his behavior 
was despicable.
    The President. That report is not true. That's just inaccurate. And 
this is the first opportunity I've had to say that. There was a moment 
in the negotiations when the two guys split apart, and there was an 
issue raised that I thought was wrong. And I said so in very graphic 
terms. But I never used the word ``despicable'' to describe the Prime 
Minister. I did not do that.
    There was a moment where I thought--there were various moments in 
these negotiations when I thought--at least from my perspective, trying 
to be an honest broker--they were both wrong. You would expect this over 
8 days.
    But at that moment, the issue at stake had nothing to do with 
Pollard. It was an issue, a dispute between the Palestinians and the 
Israelis. It had nothing to do with Pollard. And it is true that there 
was a moment in which there was a heated exchange in which I said 
something rather graphic, but I did not adversely characterize the Prime 
Minister in the way that's reported.

Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin

    Q. I'd like to talk about the late Yitzhak Rabin. I think you know, 
Mr. President, that when you said the phrase, shalom chaver, ``goodbye 
friend,'' I think you touched many many Israelis in a very, very special 
way. And we've been curious, how did you come up with this? I even 
noticed you have a pin that says, shalom chaver on your desk right here 
in the Oval Office.
    The President. Yes. I have many Jewish-Americans working for me 
here, and they all knew how close I felt to Prime Minister Rabin. And 
they all knew how heartbroken I was when he was shot. And we were--
everybody was sort of coming up with ideas. And Shimon Peres later told 
me that he had not seen those two words used together before because 
chaver, it's sort of a special word; it goes beyond normal friendship.
    And one of my--I wish I could say that I knew enough Hebrew that I 
came up with it, but one of my staff members suggested that I say it. 
And they explained it to me, what it meant, and it seemed to be perfect 
for what I was trying to say. I must say, for me, that was more than a 
political loss. I felt very close to the Prime Minister, to Mrs. Rabin. 
I got to know their children, grandchildren. And I think always when I'm 
pushing the peace process forward that I'm doing it not just for myself, 
but maybe also a little for him.
    And I must say, in these last negotiations I was very pleased to see 
that Prime Minister

[[Page 2215]]

Netanyahu, I saw in his eyes, I could almost see in his eyes the moment 
when he really made the decision that, well, maybe the Palestinians were 
going to make sufficiently specific security commitments that would be 
on a sufficiently clear timetable that he could sell not just to the 
Israeli public at large but to a decisive portion of his own 
constituency, which is a very different thing, as all of you know better 
than I do.
    And he could see that, that he could personally believe that it 
would advance Israel's security. And I saw that look in his eyes. I felt 
from that point on that eventually we would get an agreement. And that's 
the look that you want to see in a leader's eyes in a situation like 
that, because I still believe that the right formula is peace and 
security, and that you really can't have one without the other. But I 
also believe--I told Mr. Arafat once during these negotiations that we 
had to get to the point where Israel and the Palestinian Authority had 
the same enemies. And that they felt that if they couldn't get to be 
friends, at least they could be comrades. And that if we could fulfill a 
role there in the way this agreement was written, to build confidence 
between them on a daily basis, then that would be a good thing for us to 
do.
    Q. Do you think, Mr. President, that things might have been 
different today if it wasn't for the assassination?
    The President. Yes, of course they might have been. But it's hard to 
know and pointless to speculate. The main thing I think that is 
important for me, at least from my perspective as an American President 
and a friend of Israel, it's important for me that the people of Israel 
know that I watched these peace talks at Wye unfold. And that I believe 
that the Prime Minister and the members of his Cabinet who were there, 
and his staff, were trying their best to advance the cause of Israel's 
security. I believe that they would never have agreed to this, no matter 

Other Popular 1998 Presidential Documents Documents:

Other Documents:

1998 Presidential Documents Records and Documents