Home > 106th Congressional Bills > S. 1453 (is) To facilitate famine relief efforts and a comprehensive solution to the war in Sudan. [Introduced in Senate] ...S. 1453 (is) To facilitate famine relief efforts and a comprehensive solution to the war in Sudan. [Introduced in Senate] ...
106th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 1453
_______________________________________________________________________
AN ACT
To facilitate famine relief efforts and a comprehensive solution to the
war in Sudan.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Sudan Peace Act''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) With clear indications that the Government of Sudan
intends to intensify its prosecution of the war against areas
outside of its control, which has already cost nearly 2,000,000
lives and has displaced more than 4,000,000, a sustained and
coordinated international effort to pressure combatants to end
hostilities and to address the roots of the conflict offers the
best opportunity for a comprehensive solution to the continuing
war in Sudan.
(2) A viable, comprehensive, and internationally sponsored
peace process, protected from manipulation, presents the best
chance for a permanent resolution of the war, protection of
human rights, and a self-sustaining Sudan.
(3) Continued strengthening of humanitarian relief
operations in Sudan is an essential element in the effort to
bring an end to the war.
(4) Continued leadership by the United States is critical.
(5) Regardless of the future political status of the areas
of Sudan outside of the control of the Government of Sudan, the
absence of credible civil authority and institutions is a major
impediment to achieving self-sustenance by the Sudanese people
and to meaningful progress toward a viable peace process.
(6) Through manipulation of traditional rivalries among
peoples in areas outside their full control, the Government of
Sudan has effectively used divide and conquer techniques to
subjugate their population, and Congress finds that
internationally sponsored reconciliation efforts have played a
critical role in reducing the tactic's effectiveness and human
suffering.
(7) The Government of Sudan is increasingly utilizing and
organizing militias, Popular Defense Forces, and other
irregular troops for raiding and slaving parties in areas
outside of the control of the Government of Sudan in an effort
to severely disrupt the ability of those populations to sustain
themselves. The tactic is in addition to the overt use of bans
on air transport relief flights in prosecuting the war through
selective starvation and to minimize the Government of Sudan's
accountability internationally.
(8) The Government of Sudan has repeatedly stated that it
intends to use the expected proceeds from future oil sales to
increase the tempo and lethality of the war against the areas
outside its control.
(9) Through its power to veto plans for air transport
flights under the United Nations relief operation, Operation
Lifeline Sudan (OLS), the Government of Sudan has been able to
manipulate the receipt of food aid by the Sudanese people from
the United States and other donor countries as a devastating
weapon of war in the ongoing effort by the Government of Sudan
to subdue areas of Sudan outside of the Government's control.
(10) The efforts of the United States and other donors in
delivering relief and assistance through means outside OLS have
played a critical role in addressing the deficiencies in OLS
and offset the Government of Sudan's manipulation of food
donations to advantage in the civil war in Sudan.
(11) While the immediate needs of selected areas in Sudan
facing starvation have been addressed in the near term, the
population in areas of Sudan outside of the control of the
Government of Sudan are still in danger of extreme disruption
of their ability to sustain themselves.
(12) The Nuba Mountains and many areas in Bahr al Ghazal,
Upper Nile, and Blue Nile regions have been excluded completely
from relief distribution by OLS, consequently placing their
populations at increased risk of famine.
(13) At a cost which can exceed $1,000,000 per day, and
with a primary focus on providing only for the immediate food
needs of the recipients, the current international relief
operations are neither sustainable nor desirable in the long
term.
(14) The ability of populations to defend themselves
against attack in areas outside the Government of Sudan's
control has been severely compromised by the disengagement of
the front-line sponsor states, fostering the belief within
officials of the Government of Sudan that success on the
battlefield can be achieved.
(15) The United States should use all means of pressure
available to facilitate a comprehensive solution to the war,
including--
(A) the maintenance and multilateralization of
sanctions against the Government of Sudan with explicit
linkage of those sanctions to peace;
(B) the support or creation of viable democratic
civil authority and institutions in areas of Sudan
outside government control;
(C) continued active support of people-to-people
reconciliation mechanisms and efforts in areas outside
of government control;
(D) the strengthening of the mechanisms to provide
humanitarian relief to those areas;
(E) cooperation among the trading partners of the
United States and within multilateral institutions
toward those ends; and
(F) the use of any and all possible unilateral and
multilateral economic and diplomatic tools to compel
Ethiopia and Eritrea to end their hostilities and again
assume a constructive stance toward facilitating a
comprehensive solution to the ongoing war in Sudan.
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Government of sudan.--The term ``Government of Sudan''
means the National Islamic Front government in Khartoum, Sudan.
(2) IGAD.--The term ``IGAD'' means the Inter-Governmental
Authority on Development.
(3) OLS.--The term ``OLS'' means the United Nations relief
operation carried out by UNICEF, the World Food Program, and
participating relief organizations known as ``Operation
Lifeline Sudan''.
SEC. 4. CONDEMNATION OF SLAVERY, OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, AND NEW
TACTICS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN.
Congress hereby--
(1) condemns--
(A) violations of human rights on all sides of the
conflict in Sudan;
(B) the Government of Sudan's overall human rights
record, with regard to both the prosecution of the war
and the denial of basic human and political rights to
all Sudanese;
(C) the ongoing slave trade in Sudan and the role
of the Government of Sudan in abetting and tolerating
the practice; and
(D) the Government of Sudan's increasing use and
organization of ``murahalliin'' or ``mujahadeen'',
Popular Defense Forces (PDF), and regular Sudanese Army
units into organized and coordinated raiding and
slaving parties in Bahr al Ghazal, the Nuba Mountains,
Upper Nile, and Blue Nile regions; and
(2) recognizes that, along with selective bans on air
transport relief flights by the Government of Sudan, the use of
raiding and slaving parties is a tool for creating food
shortages and is used as a systematic means to destroy the
societies, culture, and economies of the Dinka, Nuer, and Nuba
peoples in a policy of low-intensity ethnic cleansing.
SEC. 5. SUPPORT FOR THE IGAD PEACE PROCESS.
(a) Sense of Congress.--Congress hereby--
(1) declares its support for the efforts by executive
branch officials of the United States and the President's
Special Envoy for Sudan to lead in a reinvigoration of the
IGAD-sponsored peace process;
(2) calls on IGAD member states, the European Union, the
Organization of African Unity, Egypt, and other key states to
support the peace process; and
(3) urges Kenya's leadership in the implementation of the
process.
(b) Relation to United States Diplomacy.--It is the sense of
Congress that any such diplomatic efforts toward resolution of the
conflict in Sudan are best made through a peace process based on the
Declaration of Principles reached in Nairobi, Kenya, on July 20, 1994,
and that the President should not create any process or diplomatic
facility or office which could be viewed as a parallel or competing
diplomatic track.
(c) United States Diplomatic Support.--The Secretary of State is
authorized to utilize the personnel of the Department of State for the
support of--
(1) the secretariat of IGAD;
(2) the ongoing negotiations between the Government of
Sudan and opposition forces;
(3) any peace settlement planning to be carried out by the
National Democratic Alliance and IGAD Partners' Forum (IPF);
and
(4) other United States diplomatic efforts supporting a
peace process in Sudan.
SEC. 6. INCREASED PRESSURE ON COMBATANTS.
It is the sense of Congress that the President, acting through the
United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations, should--
(1) sponsor a resolution in the United Nations Security
Council to investigate the practice of slavery in Sudan and
provide recommendations on measures for its eventual
elimination;
(2) sponsor a condemnation of the human rights practices of
the Government of Sudan at the United Nations conference on
human rights in Geneva in 2000;
(3) press for implementation of the recommendations of the
United Nations Special Rapporteur for Sudan with respect to
human rights monitors in areas of conflict in Sudan;
(4) press for UNICEF, International Committee of the Red
Cross, or the International Federation of Red Cross and Red
Crescent Societies, or other appropriate international
organizations or agencies to maintain a registry of those
individuals who have been abducted or are otherwise held in
bondage or servitude in Sudan;
(5) sponsor a condemnation of the Government of Sudan each
time it subjects civilian populations to aerial bombardment;
and
(6) sponsor a resolution in the United Nations General
Assembly condemning the human rights practices of the
Government of Sudan.
SEC. 7. REPORTING REQUIREMENT.
Beginning 3 months after the date of enactment of this Act, and
every 3 months thereafter, the President shall submit a report to
Congress on--
(1) the specific sources and current status of Sudan's
financing and construction of oil exploitation infrastructure
and pipelines;
(2) the extent to which that financing was secured in the
United States or with involvement of United States citizens;
(3) such financing's relation to the sanctions described in
subsection (a) and the Executive Order of November 3, 1997;
(4) the extent of aerial bombardment by the Government of
Sudan forces in areas outside its control, including targets,
frequency, and best estimates of damage;
(5) the number, duration, and locations of air strips or
other humanitarian relief facilities to which access is denied
by any party to the conflict; and
(6) the status of the IGAD-sponsored peace process and any
other ongoing effort to end the conflict, including the
specific and verifiable steps taken by parties to the conflict,
the members of the IGAD Partners Forum, and the members of IGAD
toward a comprehensive solution to the war.
SEC. 8. REFORM OF OPERATION LIFELINE SUDAN (OLS).
It is the sense of Congress that the President should organize and
maintain a formal consultative process with the European Union, its
member states, the members of the United Nations Security Council, and
other relevant parties on coordinating an effort within the United
Nations to revise the terms of OLS to end the veto power of the
Government of Sudan over the plans by OLS for air transport relief
flights.
SEC. 9. CONTINUED USE OF NON-OLS ORGANIZATIONS FOR RELIEF EFFORTS.
(a) Finding.--Congress recognizes the progress made by officials of
the executive branch of Government toward greater utilization of non-
OLS agencies for more effective distribution of United States relief
contributions.
(b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the
President should continue to increase the use of non-OLS agencies in
the distribution of relief supplies in southern Sudan.
(c) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of
this Act, the President shall submit a detailed report to Congress
describing the progress made toward carrying out subsection (b).
SEC. 10. CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR ANY BAN ON AIR TRANSPORT RELIEF FLIGHTS.
(a) Plan.--The President shall develop a detailed and implementable
contingency plan to provide, outside United Nations auspices, the
greatest possible amount of United States Government and privately
donated relief to all affected areas in Sudan, including the Nuba
Mountains, Upper Nile, and Blue Nile, in the event the Government of
Sudan imposes a total, partial, or incremental ban on OLS air transport
relief flights.
(b) Element of Plan.--The plan developed under subsection (a) shall
include coordination of other donors in addition to the United States
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