S.Con.Res. 81 (is) Expressing the deep concern of Congress regarding the failure of the [Introduced in Senate] ...

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108th CONGRESS
  2d Session
S. CON. RES. 81

_______________________________________________________________________

                         CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

Whereas it is the policy of the United States to oppose, and urgently to seek 
        the agreement of other nations also to oppose, any transfer to Iran of 
        any goods or technology, including dual-use goods or technology, 
        wherever that transfer could contribute to its acquiring chemical, 
        biological, or nuclear weapons;
Whereas the United Nations Security Council decided, in United Nations Security 
        Council Resolution 1540, that ``all States shall refrain from providing 
        any form of support to non-State actors that attempt to develop, 
        acquire, manufacture, possess, transport, transfer or use nuclear, 
        chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery'';
Whereas the United States has imposed sanctions numerous times on persons and 
        entities transferring equipment and technical data to Iran to assist its 
        weapons of mass destruction programs;
Whereas on January 1, 1968, Iran signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
        Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, 
        and entered into force March 5, 1970 (the ``Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
        Treaty");
Whereas Iran, as a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-
        nuclear weapons state, is obligated never to develop or acquire nuclear 
        weapons;
Whereas Iran did not declare to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
        the existence of the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant and the 
        production-scale Fuel Enrichment Facility under construction at Natanz 
        until February 2003, after the existence of the plant and facility was 
        revealed by an opposition group;
Whereas it is estimated that the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant could 
        produce enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon every year-
        and-a-half to two years;
Whereas it is estimated that the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Facility could, when 
        completed, produce enough highly enriched uranium for as many as 25 to 
        30 nuclear weapons per year;
Whereas in his report of June 6, 2003, the Director General of the IAEA stated 
        that Iran had failed to meet its obligations under its Safeguards 
        Agreement with the IAEA to report all nuclear material imported into 
        Iran--specifically, the importation of uranium hexafluoride, uranium 
        tetrafluoride and uranium dioxide in 1991--the processing and use of 
        that material, and the facilities involved in the use and processing of 
        the material;
Whereas the IAEA Director General stated in the same report that Iran had 
        produced uranium metal and was building a uranium metal processing 
        facility, despite the fact that neither its light water reactors nor its 
        planned heavy water reactors require uranium metal for fuel;
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors urged Iran in June 2003 to promptly rectify 
        its failures to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement, not 
        to introduce nuclear material into the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment 
        Plant, and to cooperate fully with the Agency in resolving questions 
        about its nuclear activities;
Whereas the IAEA Director General reported to the Board of Governors of the IAEA 
        in August 2003 that Iran had failed to disclose additional nuclear 
        activities as required by its Safeguards Agreement and continued to fail 
        to resolve questions about its undeclared uranium enrichment activities, 
        including those raised by the detection of two types of highly enriched 
        uranium particles at the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant;
Whereas on August 19, 2003, after earlier denials, Iran admitted in a letter 
        that it had carried out uranium conversion experiments in the early 
        1990's, experiments that included bench scale preparation of uranium 
        compounds and that should have been disclosed to the IAEA in accordance 
        with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement;
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors on September 12, 2003, called on Iran to 
        suspend all further uranium enrichment and any plutonium reprocessing 
        activities, disclose all its nuclear activities, and cooperate fully 
        with the IAEA, and to sign, ratify, and fully implement the Additional 
        Protocol between Iran and the IAEA for the application of safeguards 
        (the ``Additional Protocol'') to strengthen investigation of all nuclear 
        activities within Iran, and requested all third countries to cooperate 
        closely and fully with the IAEA in resolving questions about Iran's 
        nuclear program;
Whereas IAEA inspectors and officials continued to confront Iran with 
        discrepancies in its explanations of its nuclear activities;
Whereas on October 21, 2003, Iran and the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, 
        and the United Kingdom issued a joint statement in which Iran indicated 
        that it had decided to suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing 
        activities as defined by the IAEA;
Whereas the Governments of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom promised a 
        dialogue with Iran to ease Iran's access to modern technologies and 
        supplies in a range of areas once certain international concerns 
        regarding Iran are fully resolved;
Whereas in a subsequent letter on October 23, 2003, Iran further admitted that 
        it had tested uranium enrichment centrifuges at the Kalaye Electric 
        Company between 1998 and 2002 using its previously undeclared imported 
        uranium hexafluoride;
Whereas in that same letter, Iran admitted that it had a laser uranium 
        enrichment program, in which it used 30 kilograms of uranium not 
        previously declared to the IAEA, another violation of its Safeguards 
        Agreement;
Whereas Iran indicated initially that its laser enrichment program had achieved 
        uranium enrichment levels of slightly more than 3 percent, but the 
        Director General's report of June 1, 2004, states that the IAEA later 
        learned that Iran ``had been able to achieve average enrichment levels 
        of 8 percent to 9 percent, with some samples of up to approximately 15 
        percent'';
Whereas the June 1, 2004, report states also that Iran's declaration of October 
        21, 2003, failed to include information that should have been provided, 
        including the fact that ``some samples from'' the laser uranium 
        enrichment project ``had been sent for assessment to the supplier's 
        laboratory'';
Whereas in its letter of October 23, 2003, Iran also admitted that it had 
        irradiated 7 kilograms of uranium dioxide targets and reprocessed them 
        to extract plutonium, another violation of its legal obligation to 
        disclose such activities under its Safeguards Agreement;
Whereas Iran told the IAEA on November 10, 2003, that it would sign and ratify 
        the Additional Protocol and would act in accordance with the Additional 
        Protocol pending its entry-into-force;
Whereas on November 10, 2003, Iran further informed the IAEA Director General 
        that it had decided to suspend all enrichment and reprocessing 
        activities in Iran, not to produce feed material for enrichment 
        processes, and not to import enrichment related items;
Whereas the IAEA, through its investigative and forensic activities in Iran and 
        elsewhere, has uncovered and confronted Iran about numerous lies 
        concerning its nuclear activities;
Whereas the Director General of the IAEA reported to the IAEA Board of Governors 
        on November 10, 2003, that Iran has concealed many aspects of its 
        nuclear activities from the IAEA, in breach of its obligations under its 
        Safeguards Agreement;
Whereas despite Iran's subsequent pledge to, once again, fully disclose all of 
        its nuclear activities to the IAEA, the Director General of the IAEA, in 
        a February 24, 2004, report, found that Iran continued to engage in 
        deception regarding its nuclear activities, including failing to 
        disclose a more sophisticated enrichment program using more advanced 
        enrichment centrifuge technology imported from foreign sources, and 
        providing incomplete and unsupported explanations about experiments to 
        create a highly toxic isotope of polonium that outside experts say is 
        useful as a neutron initiator in nuclear weapons;
Whereas the Director General's reports of February 24, 2001, and June 1, 2004, 
        stated that environmental samples from one room at the Kalaye Electric 
        Company workshop and from equipment that had been present in that 
        workshop showed more than trace quantities of uranium enriched to 36 
        percent U-235, despite finding only negligible traces of this on 
        imported centrifuge components, and that the types of uranium 
        contamination at that workshop differed from those found at Natanz, 
        which would appear to contradict Iran's assertion that the source of 
        contamination at both sites is imported centrifuge components and 
        perhaps also its assertion that it has not enriched uranium to more than 
        1.2 percent U-235 using centrifuge technology;
Whereas the Director General stated in the June 1, 2004, report, that ``the 
        contamination is different on domestic and imported centrifuges,'' that 
        ``it is unlikely'' that the 36 percent U-235 contamination was due to 
        components acquired from Iran's principal supplier country, and that 
        ``important information about the P-2 centrifuge programme has 
        frequently required repeated requests, and in some cases continues to 
        involve changing or contradictory information'';
Whereas these deceptions by Iran are continuing violations of Iran's Safeguards 
        Agreement and of Iran's previous assurances to the IAEA and the 
        international community of full transparency;
Whereas despite Iran's commitment to the IAEA and to France, Germany, and the 
        United Kingdom that it would suspend uranium enrichment activities, it 
        has repeatedly emphasized that this suspension is temporary and 
        continued to manufacture and, until April 2004, to import, uranium 
        enrichment centrifuge parts and equipment, allowing it to resume and 
        expand its uranium enrichment activities whenever it chooses;
Whereas the statements on February 25, 2004, of Hassan Rowhani, Secretary of the 
        Supreme National Security Council of Iran, that Iran was not required to 
        reveal to the IAEA its research into more sophisticated ``P2'' uranium 
        enrichment centrifuges, and that Iran has other projects which it has no 
        intention of declaring to the IAEA, are contrary to--
            (1) Iran's commitment to the IAEA in an October 16, 2003, letter 
        from the Vice President of Iran and the President of Iran's Atomic 
        Energy Organization that Iran would present a ``full picture of its 
        nuclear activities'' and ``full transparency'';
            (2) Iran's commitment to the foreign ministers of the United 
        Kingdom, France, and Germany of October 21, 2003, to full transparency 
        and to resolve all outstanding issues; and
            (3) its statement to the IAEA's Board of Governors of September 12, 
        2003, of its commitment to full transparency and to ``leave no stone 
        unturned'' to assure the IAEA of its peaceful objectives;
Whereas Libya received enrichment equipment and technology, and a nuclear 
        weapons design, from the same nuclear black market that Iran has used, 
        raising the question of whether Iran, as well, received a nuclear weapon 
        design that it has refused to reveal to international inspectors;
Whereas the Russian Federation has announced that it will soon conclude an 
        agreement to supply Iran with enriched nuclear fuel for the Bushehr 
        nuclear power reactor, which, if implemented, would undercut the 
        international effort to persuade Iran to cease its nuclear weapons 
        development program;
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of March 13, 2004, which was 
        adopted unanimously, noted with ``serious concern that the declarations 
        made by Iran in October 2003 did not amount to the complete and final 
        picture of Iran's past and present nuclear programme considered 
        essential by the Board's November 2003 resolution,'' and also noted that 
        the IAEA has discovered that Iran had hidden more advanced centrifuge 
        associated research, manufacturing, and testing activities, two mass 
        spectrometers used in the laser enrichment program, and designs for hot 
        cells to handle highly radioactive materials;
Whereas the same resolution also noted ``with equal concern that Iran has not 
        resolved all questions regarding the development of its enrichment 
        technology to its current extent, and that a number of other questions 
        remain unresolved, including the sources of all HEU contamination in 
        Iran; the location, extent and nature of work undertaken on the basis of 
        the advanced centrifuge design; the nature, extent, and purpose of 
        activities involving the planned heavy-water reactor; and evidence to 
        support claims regarding the purpose of polonium-210 experiments'';
Whereas Hassan Rowhani on March 13, 2004, declared that IAEA inspections would 
        be indefinitely suspended as a protest against the IAEA Board of 
        Governors' resolution of March 13, 2004, and while Iran subsequently 
        agreed to readmit inspectors to one site by March 29, 2004, and to 
        others in mid-April, 2004, including four workshops belonging to the 
        Defence Industries Organization, this suspension calls into serious 
        question Iran's commitment to full transparency about its nuclear 
        activities;
Whereas Iran informed the IAEA on April 29, 2004, of its intent to produce 
        uranium hexafluoride in amounts that the IAEA concluded would constitute 
        production of feed material for uranium centrifuges and wrote in a 
        letter of May 18, 2004, that its suspension of all uranium enrichment 
        activities ``does not include suspension of production of UF6,'' which 
        contradicted assurances provided in its letter of November 10, 2003;
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of June 18, 2004, which was also 
        adopted unanimously, ``deplores'' the fact that ``Iran's cooperation has 
        not been as full, timely and proactive as it should have been'' and 
        ``underlines that, with the passage of time, it is becoming ever more 
        important that Iran work proactively to enable the Agency to gain a full 
        understanding of Iran's enrichment programme by providing all relevant 
        information, as well as by providing prompt access to all relevant 
        places, data and persons'';
Whereas the same resolution also expresses regret that Iran's suspension 
        ``commitments have not been comprehensively implemented and calls on 
        Iran immediately to correct all remaining shortcomings'';
Whereas the same resolution also calls on Iran, as further confidence-building 
        measures, voluntarily to reconsider its decision to begin production 
        testing at the Uranium Conversion Facility and its decision to start 
        construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water, as the 
        reversal of those decisions would make it easier for Iran to restore 
        international confidence undermined by past reports of undeclared 
        nuclear activities in Iran;
Whereas Iran then announced its decision to resume production of centrifuge 
        components, notwithstanding both the IAEA Board of Governors resolution 
        of September 12, 2003, which called on Iran ``to suspend all further 
        uranium enrichment-related activities,'' and Iran's voluntary suspension 
        of all uranium enrichment activities pursuant to its agreement of 
        October 21, 2003, with the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom, 
        France, and Germany;
Whereas Iran's pattern of deception and concealment in dealing with the IAEA, 
        the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, and 
        the international community, its receipt from other countries of the 
        means to enrich uranium, its use of sources who provided a nuclear 
        weapon design to another country, its production of centrifuge 
        components at Defence Industries Organization workshops, and its 
        repeated breaches of its Safeguards Agreement suggest strongly that Iran 
        has also violated its legal obligation under article II of the Nuclear 
        Non-Proliferation Treaty not to acquire or seek assistance in acquiring 
        nuclear weapons; and
Whereas the maintenance or construction by Iran of unsafeguarded nuclear 
        facilities or uranium enrichment or reprocessing facilities will 
        continue to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security 
        and threaten United States national interests: Now, therefore, be it
    Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), 
That Congress--
            (1) condemns--
                    (A) the failure of the Government of Iran for 
                nearly two decades to report material, facilities, and 
                activities to the International Atomic Energy Agency 
                (IAEA) in contravention of its obligations under its 
                Safeguards Agreement; and
                    (B) Iran's continuing deceptions and falsehoods to 
                the IAEA and the international community about its 
                nuclear programs and activities;
            (2) concurs with the conclusion reached in the Department 
        of State's Annual Report on Adherence to and Compliance with 
        Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Agreements and Commitments 
        that Iran is pursuing a program to develop nuclear weapons;
            (3) urges the President to provide to the IAEA whatever 
        financial, material, or intelligence resources are necessary to 
        enable the IAEA it to fully investigate Iran's nuclear 
        activities;
            (4) calls upon all states party to the Treaty on the Non-
        Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, 
        and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970 
        (hereafter in this resolution referred to as the ``Nuclear Non-
        Proliferation Treaty''), including the United States, to use 
        appropriate means to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear 
        weapons, including the suspension of all nuclear and other 
        cooperation with Iran, including the provision of dual use 
        items, until Iran fully implements the Additional Protocol to 
        its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA (hereafter in this 
        resolution referred to as the ``Additional Protocol'') and is 
        clearly in compliance with its obligations under the Nuclear 
        Non-Proliferation Treaty;
            (5) declares that Iran, through its many breaches during 
        the past 18 years of its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, 
        has forfeited the right to be trusted with the development of a 
        full nuclear fuel cycle, especially with uranium conversion and 
        enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technology, equipment, 
        and facilities;
            (6) declares that the revelations of Iran's nondisclosure 
        of additional enrichment and nuclear-weapons-applicable 
        research activities, as detailed in the reports of February 24, 
        2004, and June 1, 2004, by the Director General of the IAEA, 
        together with the statement by the Government of Iran that it 
        will not disclose other research programs, constitute ample 
        evidence of Iran's continuing policy of noncompliance with the 
        letter and spirit of its obligations under its Safeguards 
        Agreement and the Additional Protocol;

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